4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Punishing Hungary after an Axis defeat would not, Richard Schüller argues, resolve the grievances that had helped bind it to Germany. Written in 1944, this article distinguishes Magyar communities separated by the Treaty of Trianon from the Hungarian elite’s ambition to recover territories inhabited by other nationalities. Schüller brings trade into the frontier question: Hungary’s agricultural dependence on neighboring markets made political antagonism economically damaging, while German purchasing arrangements exchanged recovery for dependence. His proposed ethnic borders encounter their own difficulties, especially where Magyar settlements are geographically detached. The article offers a concrete wartime attempt to reconcile minority claims, economic cooperation, and democratic reform—and shows how much that settlement depended on Schüller’s expectation that defeat would weaken Hungary’s landed oligarchy.
A gain in British imports from Belgium need not mean a gain in world trade. That distinction anchors Richard Schüller’s reply to Professor Morgan on postwar British trade policy: exchange controls, he argues, may facilitate individual transactions while restricting trade overall. His alternative rests on a pointed reversal—Britain’s large import surplus is not merely a payments problem but a source of bargaining power. This brief rejoinder clarifies what Schüller means by negotiated trade expansion, including reciprocal free trade without a common external tariff. Its interest lies in the practical boundary he draws between accepting controls during the transition from war and making them permanent, and in his willingness to consider quotas alongside freer trade rather than offer an unqualified laissez-faire prescription.
Trieste could change sovereigns without recovering the trade that sustained it. Writing in December 1946, Richard Schüller examines the disputed port through its railways, shipping companies, tariffs, and links to the Danube rather than through national claims alone. His experience as an Austrian economic official gives the article a practical institutional focus, alongside an acknowledged attachment to Austrian administration. An exclusively Austrian free zone that failed through delays and added costs offers a pointed example of the limits of nationally bounded solutions. Schüller argues that international status likewise cannot guarantee prosperity without cooperation across borders. The article lets readers distinguish the struggle to possess Trieste from the harder task of making its commercial networks function amid Italian–Yugoslav antagonism and Soviet–Western rivalry.
A tariff concession means little when a state trading monopoly can exclude foreign goods simply by declining to buy them. This problem of reciprocity gives Richard Schüller’s 1947 article a concrete entry into the tensions of postwar trade policy. He argues that Soviet resistance to American nondiscrimination stems less from bilateral commercial conflict than from the dependence of Soviet neighbors on markets beyond Moscow’s control. His defense of multilateral trade is nevertheless critical of the compromises made in its name: British demands for import quotas and elaborate charter provisions may weaken the system they are intended to secure. The article offers a way to distinguish political ambitions from trading necessities—and to understand why neither a sterling bloc nor a ruble bloc could readily replace wider commercial exchange.
Dismantling nationalist myths does not guarantee a convincing account of the past—or a democratic future. In this 1948 review of Rustem Vambery’s Hungary, To Be or Not To Be, Richard Schüller praises the author’s attack on Magyar self-glorification while questioning his treatment of Habsburg rule and his confidence in Soviet-backed reconstruction. Schüller’s distinctive objection is that Vambery hopes for a Danubian federation and customs union while discounting the regional integration the Austrian Empire had provided. Minority expulsions, political purges, and restrictive press legislation further test those hopes. This brief review offers a pointed distinction between the courage required to criticize an old ruling order and the judgement needed to assess its successor.
Can an international trade charter promote freer exchange when its exceptions leave governments ample room to restrict it? In this 1948 article, Richard Schüller argues that the Havana charter’s problem is not rigid liberalization but the possibility that exemptions will overwhelm its commitments. Balance-of-payments difficulties, development needs, and national planning all qualify its rules. Drawing on twelve years in the League of Nations Economic Committee, he locates its promise in the proposed International Trade Organization’s ability to scrutinize restrictions and organize reciprocal concessions. His assessment of the Geneva tariff agreements distinguishes substantial negotiated commitments from their uncertain practical effects. The article offers a concrete account of the tension between national discretion and international supervision, written while the institutions and agreements remained promises awaiting implementation.
State ownership does not abolish conflicting interests, nor does political independence guarantee economic recovery. In this joint review, Richard Schüller tests Nicholas Clarion’s account of Soviet domination against the practical tensions of bureaucracy, peasant resistance, industrial investment, and Moscow’s foreign holdings. He challenges Clarion’s description of bureaucratic privilege as “bourgeois” while taking seriously his account of satellite governments powerful at home but dependent abroad. Turning to Frederick Hertz’s study of the Danubian states, Schüller endorses the case against economic nationalism while acknowledging the uncertainty of national-income estimates. The pairing offers a pointed comparison between coercive regional dependence and the costs of breaking an integrated market into separate national economies, without reducing their different histories to a single explanation.
Can European countries open their markets to one another without surrendering control of their external trade policies? In this 1949 article, Richard Schüller argues for a free-trade area rather than a customs union, drawing on his experience negotiating Austro-Hungarian commercial arrangements to expose the political demands of a common tariff. His alternative preserves national independence, but offers no escape from monetary reform: duty-free trade means little while individual imports still require licenses. Concrete examples—including American aid that obstructs sales of Italian tractors and Polish coal—show how measures intended to relieve scarcity can impede European exchange. The article distinguishes what trade agreements can accomplish from what depends on stable currencies, adjusted exchange rates, and governments’ willingness to relinquish controls.
Neither these schemes nor the usual tariff agreements have any meaning so long as each individual import transaction depends on the granting of a license.