The archive.

Written in 1942 for Americans wary of economists whose earlier prosperity forecasts had failed, this plain-language essay defines inflation as an increase in money and money substitutes - deposit currency and bank credit - and traces where its losses fall. Mises shows that every creditor is silently robbed: savings, pensions, insurance claims, and Social Security benefits are all repaid in depreciated dollars, while salaried professionals watch living costs outrun their incomes. He weighs the usual escapes - gold, foreign currency, farmland, stocks - and finds each blocked by law or market. Gravest of all, he argues, are the moral and political effects: inflation destroys thrift, radicalizes the ruined, and breeds support for dictators and quack remedies. Its true cause is not necessity but the government's choice to finance itself by credit expansion rather than honest taxes.

For all these millions of people, every further step toward inflation means a further decline in the real value of the claims or credits they have saved up by years of toil and sacrifice.

When a peacetime economy converts to war, military demand piles onto civilian demand, usable productive means shrink, and the money circulation is thrown out of joint—three simultaneous shocks that no ordinary peacetime remedy can absorb. Written in Zurich in 1942 alongside Swiss reports by Böhler and Dütscher, this study refuses the comforting idea that policy should preserve the old circular flow; the whole national economy, Amonn argues, becomes structurally a war economy or it is none. He challenges the dogma that taxes never inflate while loans always do, subordinates the prevention of inflation to the overriding goal of maximum production, and defends rationing, differentiated price control, and savings-based war loans, testing each against Swiss figures for the cost of living, wages, and foreign trade.

Aber man geriete dann von der Scylla der Inflation unvermeidlich in die Charybdis der Deflation.

English translation: “But one would then inevitably pass from the Scylla of inflation into the Charybdis of deflation.”

Can an economy remain capitalist when private ownership survives but government dictates how enterprises operate? In this 1942 review of Maxine Y. Sweezy’s The Structure of the Nazi Economy, Ludwig von Mises praises her empirical research while contesting her classification of the system she describes. His criterion is effective control over production, not legal ownership or equality of incomes; on that basis, he calls the Nazi economy socialist. A particularly revealing tension concerns managers: deprived of independent authority, they may nevertheless preserve capital in the hope of recovering their businesses after the war. This brief review offers a concentrated encounter with Mises’s distinction between the outward forms of enterprise and the power to make economic decisions—and with his attempt to explain productive incentives within a system he condemns.

Listening to someone speak, we follow a thought as it unfolds; reflecting on our own experience, we grasp what has already occurred. This temporal contrast anchors Alfred Schütz’s alternative to Scheler’s account of how we understand others. In this essay, republished in 1967, Schütz accepts Scheler’s challenge to theories that infer another mind from bodily signs, but rejects the hypothesis of an originally undifferentiated consciousness. A shared present, he argues, can explain the priority of the “We” without dissolving distinct persons into a common stream of experience. The resulting account separates participation in another’s unfolding activity from certainty about what that person thinks. Readers can discover why ordinary conversation offers a precise philosophical problem: how we inhabit time together while remaining irreducibly different centres of experience.

Between a rise in commodity prices and money wages that lag behind it lies a mechanism Hayek retrieves from Ricardo and sets at the center of capital and cycle theory. When labor grows cheaper relative to selling prices, the methods that pay are not the long, roundabout, machine-intensive ones but the quick-turnover processes that recover and reinvest their outlays fast—so a boom in consumer demand can perversely reduce demand for capital goods as firms work old plant harder, postpone replacement, and shift toward circulating capital. Reworking the wage-price relation through rates of turnover and internal rates of return, Hayek argues against treating the interest rate as the sole determinant of technique, and shows how credit expansion, once incomes and prices rise, pulls resources back toward shorter processes and throws the capital-goods trades into unemployment.

A textbook’s starting point can determine which economic phenomena its students learn to see. In this review of George J. Stigler’s The Theory of Competitive Price, Schumpeter admires the clarity and rigor of the teaching while challenging its conceptual foundations. His sharpest objection concerns perfect competition: what the model excludes, he argues, belongs to the substance of capitalism, not merely to its incidental disturbances. He likewise questions whether monetary mechanisms can be postponed until after general theory has been established. The review offers a compact encounter with Schumpeter as a critic of economic instruction, showing why lucid exposition and sound theoretical architecture are separate achievements—and why the sequence of a course can embody substantive claims about how an economy works.

Could knowledge of the trade cycle prevent entrepreneurs from helping to set one in motion? In this short response to L. M. Lachmann, Mises accepts that a credit-induced boom depends on how businesspeople interpret easier borrowing, while denying that Austrian theory had overlooked this condition. His distinctive emphasis is on calculation rather than mere optimism: interest rates can mislead investors even when they appear normal or high, if they inadequately reflect monetary depreciation. The exchange clarifies where expectations enter Mises’s monetary explanation—and why recognizing credit expansion is harder than observing abundant loans or rising demand. It also leaves open a pointed possibility: entrepreneurs who understand the mechanism might respond differently, changing the outcome the theory explains.

Can a precise account of economic equilibrium explain how an economy changes when expectations fail? In this 1943 review of Mabel F. Timlin’s Keynesian Economics, G. L. S. Shackle makes admiration for her exposition the starting point for a pointed methodological criticism. He asks whether the formal prominence of interest rates reflects their practical influence on investment, and whether perfect-foresight analysis obscures Keynes’s concern with uncertainty. His sharpest reservation concerns aggregation: identical economic relationships may conceal different individual expectations, producing different responses to disappointment. This short review offers a concrete way to distinguish the consistency of an equilibrium model from its power to explain movement through time.

What should a rigorous theory of competitive price explain—and where does clarity leave questions unresolved? In this brief 1943 review of George J. Stigler’s textbook, Ludwig M. Lachmann welcomes an exposition shaped by Frank Knight’s teaching, particularly its consistent treatment of costs as foregone alternatives. His praise makes the reservations revealing: expectations raise a problem of determinateness that Stigler scarcely recognises, while inventories unsettle the rigid distinction between short and long run without prompting a sufficiently developed analysis of time. Lachmann calls these minor defects, not grounds for rejecting the book. The review offers a compact view of his critical priorities: conceptual consistency deserves recognition, but expectations and time demand more than tidy exposition.

Did European labor succumb to inadequate leadership, or to doctrines that left it unable to answer nationalism? In this 1943 review of Adolf Sturmthal’s The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918–1939, Ludwig von Mises shifts the explanation from personalities to economic ideas. He praises Sturmthal’s portraits of labor leaders but argues that Marxism and trade unionism obscured conflicts between workers protected by immigration barriers and those excluded from opportunity. His distinctive concern is the vulnerability of industrial countries dependent on imported food and raw materials: nationalist conquest offered, he argues, a vicious and unworkable answer to problems labor failed to confront. The review makes international mobility and trade central to Mises’s indictment of interwar labor politics—and to his bleak expectations for postwar recovery.

Can a critic of political myths remain captive to one himself? In this 1943 review of Gustav Stolper’s This Age of Fable, Ludwig M. Lachmann applauds an assault on economic and political formulas of both Right and Left, but challenges its picture of security before 1914. For Lachmann, nationalist agitation had already undermined Austria-Hungary and the precarious European balance: national self-determination belongs among the promises requiring scrutiny, not outside them. This brief review brings his conception of historical inquiry into focus—recovering human purposes and plans beneath inherited world-pictures—and shows how that standard turns admiration into a precise objection to Stolper’s historical frame.

Can an international currency retain the discipline of gold without tying monetary reserves to a material of limited practical use? In this 1943 article, Hayek develops proposals by Benjamin Graham and Frank D. Graham for currency issued and redeemed against a fixed basket of storable raw commodities. His distinctive concern is to make private demand for liquidity serve a useful economic purpose: holding more money would mean accumulating materials available when spending revived. The basket’s total price would be fixed, while its components’ relative prices remained free to change. The article offers a concrete encounter with Hayek as a designer of monetary institutions, exploring how a binding public rule might stabilize international exchange without discretionary management or guarantees to individual producers.