3,015 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
An exchange-rate change can increase export volumes while reducing receipts in foreign currency—and import expenditure can rise in one currency while falling in another. In this first installment of The Theory of Foreign Exchanges, Fritz Machlup uses such distinctions to connect currency markets with production, consumption, and competition. His central challenge is to explanations that treat national price levels as independently given determinants of exchange rates. By tracing how exporters win customers from competitors, how new goods become tradable, and how overseas payments redirect domestic spending, he shows why exchange rates can move without prior inflation or deflation. Readers gain a concrete way to distinguish accounting identities from behavioural responses, and genuine changes in trade from the effects of the currency used to measure them.
A comprehensive account of trade controls is not necessarily an account of trade planning. This distinction anchors Gottfried Haberler’s brief 1940 review of Heinrich Heuser’s Control of International Trade. Haberler values the book’s otherwise hard-to-find material on import quotas, exchange controls, and bilateral clearing and payment agreements, while noting its omission of the broader planning questions raised by the Russian and German systems. His judgement gives teachers of international trade a concrete assessment of the book’s usefulness, tempered by criticism of its editing and organization. The review offers a compact example of how Haberler separates descriptive coverage, theoretical analysis, and practical usability in assessing economic scholarship.
Written as Keynesian ascendancy pushed Austrian cycle theory to the margins, this reconstruction insists that its critics had mistaken its character: the theory is not a static contrast between saving and credit but a dynamic account of how investment reshapes the interdependence of industries over time. Its hinge is irreversibility—investment transforms fluid resources into specific, complementary capital that mistaken expectations can no longer unwind. Lachmann gives the theory a sectoral anatomy of consumers' goods, equipment, raw-material, and 'dynamic key' industries, and joins the Lundberg effect to the Ricardo effect to show how falling real wages during a boom divert entrepreneurs from long-period deepening toward speculation. Candid about limits, he finds the nineteenth-century railway booms fit the model but concedes that the 1929 crisis, with its stable prices and rising raw-material stocks, does not.
Once "free Capital" has been converted into buildings and machinery, any failure of events to conform to expectations will upset everything.
What began as a 4,000-word review for Economica, commissioned by Hayek, had swollen into a 20,000-word analysis—"a monster," Schütz calls it—of Talcott Parsons's The Structure of Social Action. This 1940 letter opens the celebrated transatlantic exchange between the émigré phenomenologist and the Harvard theorist of social action. Schütz reports reading Parsons's unpublished second manuscript three times, reserves his sharpest comments for an oral meeting he proposes in New York or Cambridge, and presses gently on their differences over the foundations of a theory of action. He encloses his essay "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" from Farber's Husserl memorial volume and mentions his forthcoming paper on William James, folding a personal letter into a document at the crossroads of phenomenology and American sociology.
Ich verdanke Ihren Theorien auch dort unendlich viel Gewinn und Anregung, wo ich von ihnen abweiche.
English translation: “I owe your theories an infinite amount of profit and stimulation, even where I depart from them.”
Do the so-called primitive peoples truly lack logical and causal thought? Thurnwald, drawing on first-contact encounters in New Guinea, the Solomons, and Africa and citing Jung on the limits of the psyche, answers no. Hunting, planting, house-building, and trapping all proceed by sound causal reasoning; magic enters only where causal relations turn opaque, as when a Buin man's festering arm is traced to coconuts stolen from a tabooed palm and healed through payment, rite, and appeal to the demon Orómrui. He reads headhunting, name magic, tjurunga stones, omens, and totemism as internally coherent theories of where life-force resides, and holds that all knowing is interpretation, modern minds included. Primitive thought, diffuse and unexact, survives in the fatigued and the neurotic today.
Doch beurteilen wir die Gedanken und Riten nur zu oft von unserem Standpunkt am Schreibtisch und im geheizten Zimmer mit hochgezogenen Augenbrauen und überlegenem Lächeln.
English translation: “Yet all too often we judge these ideas and rites from our vantage point at the desk in a heated room, with raised eyebrows and a superior smile.”
Modern dictatorship is not rule by a clique, a bureaucracy, or a defensive capitalist class; it arises, Lederer argues, when a society loses the classes, parties, associations, and publics through which individuals become politically articulate. What remains is an amorphous mass, available for emotional mobilization, crystallized around a leader and held together by propaganda that mimics argument while severing it from truth. Tracing d'Annunzio at Fiume, Italian Fascism, and the SA's conquest of the German street, he presents fascism as the destruction of society itself rather than its capture. His warning against the classless society defends not hierarchy but stratification, the plural conflict on which freedom depends. Written in American exile and read here in Angela Kornberger's German rendering of the 1940 English original, State of the Masses, it stands among the first emigre theories of totalitarianism.
Der totalitäre Staat ist der Staat der Massen.
English translation: “The totalitarian state is the state of the masses.”
In the years before Sedan, three courts negotiated in secret over an alliance that never came, and over Rome, the one prize Italy would risk everything to seize. This tightly documented study reconstructs the Franco-Austro-Italian talks of 1869-70, in which Beust maneuvered to restore Austria's German standing, Napoleon III bargained from illness and decline, and Victor Emmanuel's envoys tied every commitment to the evacuation of the Papal States. Engel-Janosi shows Italy willing to stake Trentino, Nizza, and the Isonzo frontier on that single question, while French troops still guarded Pius IX and Antonelli's Vatican refused all compromise. When war and the fall of the Empire dissolved the last ambiguous promises, Italian troops entered Rome in September 1870, and Europe, he notes, remained strikingly unmoved by so momentous a rupture.
Die römische Frage aufzuwerfen hatten weder Paris noch Wien ein Interesse.
English translation: “Neither Paris nor Vienna had any interest in raising the Roman question.”
Man, unlike the instinct-bound animal, provides for life through willed and creative action, and so, this treatise contends, economics must take a teleological rather than a merely causal form. First published under German occupation in 1940, pointedly without the ideological genuflections the Reich required, and presented here in Ivo Moravcik's English translation of the Czech Národní hospodářství, it builds outward from the principle of economising through households and enterprises, the three markets of goods, capital and labour, money and international exchange, to a searching comparison of individualist, cooperative and solidarist systems. Pure solidarism, Engliš holds, degenerates when self-interested men give little and take much; nations therefore settle for a partial solidarism that corrects capitalism through taxation, social policy and, at its outer limit, the controlled economy.
The practical man acts purposively, and we therefore comprehend his actions in terms of the relationship of finality (teleologically).
Social scientists study a world that its inhabitants already interpret: tools, gestures and institutions carry meanings before they become objects of research. In this essay, represented by the German manuscript version with an attached January 1939 draft, Alfred Schütz asks how scientific explanation can transform those meanings without losing its footing in everyday experience. He draws on Husserl’s phenomenology while distinguishing the social sciences’ concern with relations among people from the transcendental problem of how another self is constituted. His engagement with Max Weber makes the methodological stakes concrete: the economic actor and legal subject are useful constructions, not people encountered in life. Readers can trace why ideal types are necessary—and why, for Schütz, mistaking them for reality undermines the understanding they enable.
Market socialism arrived as a concession: Lange, Taylor, and Dickinson would keep state ownership yet let a central board set producer-good prices, instruct managers to equate marginal cost with price, and revise figures by trial and error as shortages and surpluses appeared. Hayek treats the maneuver as a mistaking of a static equilibrium model for a living process. Real economic life is ceaseless change—local scarcities, new methods, altered demand, particular machines and contracts—and by the time reports reach the authority and fresh prices issue, the relevant conditions have moved. His socialist manager, forbidden to undercut, speculate, or bid resources away, becomes a rule-following functionary who innovates only by persuading his superiors in advance, while central control of investment quietly restores the planning it claimed to escape.
If this will not lead to the worst forms of bureaucracy, I do not know what will.
Grant the planners their most ingenious model, and the calculation problem still bites—such is Hayek's verdict on competitive socialism in this German essay. Two earlier chapters of the debate may be closed, he allows: calculation in kind, and the fantasy of solving equilibrium's equations. The third, advanced by Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, and H. D. Dickinson, keeps consumer choice and marginal-cost rules for managers while handing the pricing of producer goods to a central board that adjusts by trial and error. Hayek's objection turns on speed and knowledge: administered prices lag the daily flux of local conditions, made-to-order capital goods resist listing, and without free entry no cheaper method can underbid an incumbent. What survives is only quasi-competition—and, once investment is centrally directed, a standing threat to freedom.
Mit anderen Worten, wenn man wirklich alle diese Gleichungen wissen könnte, so wäre das einzige Mittel, das den menschlichen Kräften zu ihrer Lösung zur Verfügung stünde, die praktische Lösung zu beobachten, die der Markt vornimmt.
English translation: “In other words, even if one really could know all these equations, the only means available to human powers for their solution would be to observe the practical solution that the market carries out.”
American tariff policy cannot be read off a welfare diagram, this 1940 address insists: protection in the United States preceded the republic itself and grew inseparable from the young nation's drive to make its independence economically real, in a world still organized by empire and war. Schumpeter treats the tariff as a historical institution rather than a technical deviation from free trade, and presents America as an unusually strong case for the Hamilton–List infant-industry argument — a continental market and natural wealth muting protection's usual distortions while it hastened industries likely to arise anyway. He concedes the standing objections, and the high-cost dependents such as wool and sugar, yet concludes that in a mercantilist, conflict-prone world protection's value as a shield for an established industrial order remains as strong as ever.
Protection—or non-intercourse acts and so on—then was simply the economic complement of political independence or of the will to buttress that independence.