4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Calling society a “social body” does not make mechanics an explanation of social life. In this brief review of Haret’s Mécanique sociale, Schumpeter draws a sharp boundary between mathematical economic analysis and the borrowing of physical concepts without investigating social facts. His charge is not that Haret reaches false conclusions, but that he reaches no substantive conclusions at all: saying that balanced causes produce inactivity adds little to our knowledge. The review offers a compact view of Schumpeter defending precision against its imitation, asking what formal deductions can establish when the “forces” and “movements” they describe remain undefined.
Useful facts do not necessarily support the theory offered alongside them. That distinction governs Schumpeter’s brief 1913 review of T. Lloyd’s The Theory of Distribution and Consumption. He faults Lloyd for presenting familiar propositions about consumption and subjective value as discoveries, and questions why a subjective economics should necessarily require an inductive method. Yet he credits the book’s factual survey, particularly its treatment of education, resource conservation, and banking for farmers and small traders. The review offers a compact example of Schumpeter’s critical discrimination: theoretical inadequacy need not erase informational value, while neither usefulness to lay readers nor likely success with an imperial-minded public establishes theoretical merit.
The businessman takes it as self-evident that credit and available money govern the rate of interest; orthodox theory insists interest springs only from the scarcity of real capital. Schumpeter cuts between them. Defining the monetary constitution broadly, to include coinage, bank credit, central-bank policy, collateral, and crisis lending, he asks where money can actually move interest and locates it in one case: credit issued without prior saving. Such bank-created purchasing power works as a forced saving, letting entrepreneurs bid resources away from routine uses, so that interest becomes bound to the credit-financed process of development rather than to a timeless yield of capital. Banks emerge as gatekeepers authorizing which ventures command resources. He partly rehabilitates Locke, Law, and Montesquieu against Hume and Smith, while likening a lowered interest rate to morphine, relief without cure.
Gibt es eine Beziehung zwischen Kapitalzins und Geldverfassung oder, anders, kann der Kapitalzins durch die Geldverfassung beeinflußt werden?
English translation: “Is there a relationship between the rate of interest on capital and the monetary constitution—or, put differently, can the rate of interest on capital be influenced by the monetary constitution?”
How could an office investigate working conditions without the power to compel employers to supply information? In this 1913 article, Viktor Mataja recounts the development of Austrian labour statistics from the distinctive position of director of the Labour Statistical Office. He argues that demands for systematic knowledge arose from social-policy needs, not statistics for its own sake. Disputes over disclosure, confidentiality and ministerial control reveal what was at stake in making wages, working hours and occupational hazards subjects of official inquiry. Investigations into lead poisoning show how numerical evidence could work alongside medical expertise and technical inspection. Mataja’s account lets readers examine both the practical ingenuity of an institution dependent on cooperation and the limits of evidence when political conflict obstructed reform.
Who would keep production economical once entrepreneurial profit disappeared? This practical question sharpens Siegmund Feilbogen’s 1913 review of socialist literature, which tests cultural aspirations and reform programmes against incentives and institutional power. He welcomes Andler’s vision of work motivated by collective flourishing, yet doubts that aspiration alone establishes economic feasibility. His treatment of Oppenheimer is similarly discriminating: settling agricultural workers on their own land may be worthwhile without dissolving the industrial proletariat or overcoming landowners’ resistance. Alongside these criticisms, Feilbogen values historical scholarship that clarifies Marx’s theory of surplus value. The review offers a concrete encounter with a critic willing to separate a proposal’s practical merits from its promise to solve the social question.
Writing as a fellow textbook author, Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen finds in Bertrand Nogaro’s Éléments d’Économie politique a teaching aim he shares: clear, concise economics grounded in practical questions of money, banking, stock exchanges, and international trade. His brief 1914 review moves from this pedagogical approval to a more specific conceptual interest: how Nogaro connects individual economic activities with organized social life while setting aside the question of governmental intervention. Schullern offers no extended critique; instead, his selection of characteristic formulations lets readers see what he values in an introductory economics text, and how practical instruction can coexist with an explicit account of the discipline’s scope.
Can a shipowner’s pursuit of profit ever conflict with public welfare? In this brief 1914 review of the substantially expanded third edition of Camillo Supino’s La Navigazione dal punto di vista economico, Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen reports Supino’s categorical answer: private advantage and social welfare coincide. The rationale joins commercial growth to national wealth, military strength, and international standing. Schullern presents this alignment without objection, moving from the captain’s duty of self-sacrifice to the economic interests of shipowners. His appreciative assessment singles out factual and statistical evidence and current coverage of state subsidies. The review offers a compact encounter with an economic account of shipping in which enterprise, professional duty, and state power appear mutually reinforcing rather than competing.
Can technical progress postpone diminishing returns without abolishing them? This is the most pointed issue Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen selects in his brief, favorable review of Carlo di Nola’s agrarian economics. Schullern foregrounds di Nola’s account of production as an interaction among factors, rather than a question of land alone: changing their combinations can open new possibilities even as the usefulness of an individual factor declines. His selection also draws attention to a concrete distinction easily obscured in debates about land distribution—the difference between the size of a property holding and that of a working farm. The review offers an appreciative contemporary appraisal of these propositions, not an extended test of their validity.
Public work need not be invented when unemployment strikes; it can be scheduled before the crisis arrives. In this brief 1914 review of E. Bernhard’s book, Eugen Peter Schwiedland presents the case for moving ordinary public contracts into periods of weak business rather than resorting to costly emergency relief works. His emphasis connects workers’ continued earnings and occupational skills with the practical economies available to public purchasers. The revealing qualification is budgetary: prevention requires appropriations that remain available longer and reserves that make expenditure flexible. The review thus offers a compact account of how rules governing public money can enable—or obstruct—the timely use of public demand against unemployment.
Insurance for salaried employees appears here not simply as expanded social protection, but as a distinct policy for the middle classes. In this brief 1914 review, Emil Lederer presents Maurice Bellom’s comparison of German and Austrian insurance legislation as a sign of growing French interest in salaried employees. His emphasis falls on Bellom’s treatment of private-sector employees as a new constituency for middle-class policy, with insurance purposes sharply distinguished from those of workers’ insurance. Without explicitly endorsing that distinction, Lederer records how social classification shapes the case for protection.
Wages shared with kin and loans repaid through service give this brief review its central tension: reciprocity sustains social ties but can also enforce dependence. Reviewing volumes I and III of Richard Thurnwald’s South Sea research, Eugen Peter Schwiedland concentrates on the economic relations described in the ethnographic material. He highlights how common access to land coexists with ownership of plantations and produce, and how chiefly loans can bind a borrower’s children to labour obligations. His selection brings property, credit and political authority into the same frame without treating money as an independent source of power. The review offers a compact encounter with Schwiedland’s economic reading of Thurnwald, especially his attention to the point where mutual obligation becomes coercion.
Public employment offices could serve the very intermediaries whose abuses they were meant to curb. This is the tension Eugen Peter Schwiedland draws from Sigismund Gargas’s study of labour placement in Galicia. In his 1914 review, offices established in only 24 of 80 districts appear not merely understaffed or ineffective, but sometimes leased out or subordinated to private agencies while receiving public subsidies. Schwiedland’s concern is institutional independence: better provision requires provincial administration and the withdrawal of officials’ protection from powerful agents. His qualified appraisal—welcoming the study while faulting its omission of the law’s text and its unclear passages—offers a compact view of how scrutiny of local administration could inform concrete proposals for labour-market reform.