3,015 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Read through the political vocabulary of the Fascist “new state,” Pius XI's encyclical Quadragesimo anno becomes, in this 1935 tract, the moral principle that saves a corporative order from mere statism. Kerschagl presents Italian fascism as the force that overcame liberal weakness and socialist disorder—liberalism having atomized society into isolated individuals, socialism having overrun weak parliaments—and reads the Lateran settlement as proof that Church and regime can coexist when neither encroaches on the other's sphere. Fascism is redefined as organization: hierarchy, vocational grouping, and service to the whole, with freedom relocated from liberal autonomy to ordered incorporation. The encyclical's contribution, he argues, is a regulative principle the market cannot supply—social justice and social charity—binding both laissez-faire capitalism and class socialism to moral law.
Es soll gezeigt werden, daß ein faschistisches Programm ganz dem Geiste der großen Enzyklika entsprechen kann.
English translation: “It shall be shown that a Fascist program can fully correspond to the spirit of the great encyclical.”
Protecting workers against loss of income is not the same as preventing a depression. This distinction anchors Karl Pribram’s 1935 assessment of what American economic-security planners could learn from European social insurance. He treats compulsory insurance as an adaptation of individual risk-pooling to social purposes, crediting contributory schemes with replacing charity by legal claims while insisting on sound actuarial foundations. German arrangements show why different risks demand different financing and institutions; American unemployment proposals expose the danger of pools too narrow to balance favorable and unfavorable risks. The article’s distinctive tension lies between institutional autonomy and coordinated planning: readers can see how individually defensible schemes may together burden industry, and why broader coordination need not mean merging every risk into one fund.
Social insurance is the result of individualistic reasoning adapted to the needs of social objectives.
A government may collect abundant figures yet lack a coherent account of the economy it seeks to regulate. This is the difficulty Karl Pribram identifies in the New Deal’s statistical services. Drawing on his own work with the Austrian Statistical Yearbook and on German administrative practice, he argues that statistical organization reflects competing conceptions of society and the state. His comparison sharpens a practical distinction: coordinating departmental inquiries is not the same as integrating their findings. This short 1935 essay asks what American regulation requires beyond more tables—substantive economic training, stronger local observation, and an understanding of interdependence. It offers a concrete way to examine how administrative arrangements determine what governments can know, while leaving the New Deal’s institutional future open.
Expanded from two Prague lectures, this 1935 Springer volume confronts a world in which the abandoned gold standard has left currencies isolated and distrusted, with governments reaching for devaluation as a weapon of trade policy. Devaluation, Reisch argues, is merely a valuta dumping that erodes trust and eventually raises the cost of imported inputs and of domestic goods; against it he sets an active policy for 'inländische Auslandwährung,' treating export-earned foreign exchange as a separate mass sold at differentiated rates. He develops Ernst Ružička's plan for a foreign trade bank issuing valuta bonds split into A coupons for vital imports and B coupons for dispensable ones, and offers the scheme as a faster road than devaluation toward a restored gold standard and world monetary peace.
Der Goldstandard war sozusagen die gemeinsame Sprache, das einigende Band im internationalen Handel.
English translation: “The gold standard was, so to speak, the common language, the unifying bond in international trade.”
Owning wool-producing territory does not spare manufacturers the need to buy wool. With this distinction between sovereignty and commercial access, Mises redirects the debate over international peace from colonial redistribution to restrictions on migration. In this 1935 essay, he argues that workers in high-wage countries defend their advantages by excluding poorer newcomers, exposing a conflict within claims of international labor solidarity. Yet he also contends that exclusion ultimately costs protected workers the gains of a wider division of labor. His warning to the League of Nations makes migration policy a question of peace, not merely wages. The essay offers a pointed account of how national labor protection can generate international grievances, while its racial and climatic framing of European settlement marks the historical limits of its perspective.
What the educated layman takes for the chaos of monetary science, this short foreword insists, is only a chaos of dilettantism and a tangle of political wishes — not the absence of a firm analytical apparatus. Written to introduce the German edition of D. H. Robertson's Das Geld, Schumpeter's Geleitwort defends monetary economics as possessing a genuine Organon of concepts that too few economists fully command, and commends Robertson — heir to Marshall alongside Pigou and Keynes — as a bridge for students and lay readers precisely because he helped create what he expounds and refuses to convert theory into advocacy. Science, on this account, hands the reader a tool against nonsense and nothing more; the decision it leaves to him.
Dem Laien erscheint dann als wissenschaftliches Chaos, was nur ein Chaos von Dilettantismus ist. Und er hält für hoffnungsloses Gewirr von wissenschaftlichen Meinungen, was nur ein – freilich hoffnungsloses – Gewirre von politischen Wollungen ist.
English translation: “What appears to the layman as a scientific chaos is only a chaos of dilettantism. And he takes for a hopeless tangle of scientific opinions what is only a—admittedly hopeless—tangle of political wishes.”
Having the law in print is not the same as knowing how to apply it. In this brief 1935 review of Harold Rasch’s collection of German foreign-exchange legislation, Helene Lieser endorses the introduction’s warning that statutory texts alone cannot resolve practical difficulties of interpretation. Her pointed observation is that important provisions also reside in administrative instructions to officials. The review identifies a concrete limit of legal compilation—and explains why Lieser awaits the promised commentary rather than treating access to the statutes as sufficient guidance.
For Helene Lieser, a guide to foreign-exchange law must help readers navigate obstacles to trade, not merely collect regulations. Her brief 1935 review of Heinrich Troeger’s second, revised edition notes its emphasis on German rules, including import prohibitions, alongside coverage of foreign exchange law beyond Germany. The distinctive touch is her closing image: the subject index becomes Ariadne’s thread through a labyrinth with more than one Minotaur. This compact notice shows how Lieser frames the handbook’s practical purpose while suggesting the hazards that make orderly legal information necessary.
How can an economy suffer a shortage of capital while capital goods stand unused? In this 1935 essay, Hayek locates the contradiction in investment plans whose completion requires resources consumers are unwilling to release. Credit expansion, he argues, can make long-term commitments appear viable without any corresponding willingness to postpone consumption. The resulting crisis exposes incompatible expectations, not merely isolated entrepreneurial mistakes. The essay is also an exercise in theoretical revision: Hayek questions his earlier reliance on changes in an aggregate capital stock and turns instead to the timing of production and consumption. Readers can follow how this shift connects monetary disturbances to unfinished investments—and why explaining how prices shape expectations remains, by Hayek’s own admission, an unresolved task.
Assembled from roughly three hundred pre-war price series across England, Germany, the United States and beyond, this statistical study argues that the trade cycle cannot be read off any single index number. Published in Vienna by Springer with a foreword by Oskar Morgenstern and backing from the Austrian Institute for Trade Cycle Research and the London School of Economics, Tintner applies Anderson's Variate Difference Method and moving averages to decompose each series into trend, cyclical and seasonal components. His finding is that prices move unevenly — metals and interest rates on their own rhythm, textiles and foodstuffs on another — so that the notion of a general price level dissolves. He offers the results not as proof of causes but as ordered material for the theorist, cautiously favouring the monetary cycle theories of Wicksell, Mises and Hayek.
We consider time, on the contrary, only as a kind of auxiliary variable, which we must eliminate in order to bring out the economic relations.
Frank Knight's assault on the Austrian period of production provokes this sharp rejoinder, in which Machlup concedes the term's clumsiness while rescuing the concept it names. Capital, he insists against Knight, is not perpetual: maintenance may be assumed in a stationary model but cannot be smuggled in when the very question is whether capital is preserved, enlarged, or consumed. Renaming it the period of investment, he locates it on the input side—productive services carrying consumption distances—and shows that neither construction time nor average durability exhausts its meaning. The payoff is business-cycle theory: credit expansion stretches the investment period beyond what voluntary saving would support, so the crisis springs from a divergence between individual time preferences and the time structure of production, not from monetary mishap alone.
To explain unemployment (through wage stickiness) is one thing; to explain the business cycle is another.
Written as the world crisis drove Russia, Italy, Roosevelt's America and Nazi Germany toward state direction of production, these expanded 1935 newspaper essays, here in German translation, ask precisely what 'planned economy' means and where regulation ends and collectivism begins. Engliš distinguishes three rational orders, individualist, cooperative and solidarist, and defines regulated economy as intervention from above that displaces competitive prices while leaving private enterprise and its calculation intact. The decisive threshold is what he calls the critical point: once the state assumes economic responsibility for outcomes, guaranteeing work or absorbing losses, entrepreneurship dissolves and the slide into collectivization begins. Weighing regulation against democratic institutions and Czechoslovakia's dependence on exports, the argument shares its ground with the interwar planning and calculation debates of Mises and Hayek.
Welche Änderungen des Ordnungsprinzipes der Unternehmerproduktion zur regulierten Wirtschaft gehören, ist unsere Kardinalfrage, wir suchen also das Wesen der regulierten Wirtschaft.
English translation: “Which alterations of the ordering principle of entrepreneurial production belong to the regulated economy is our cardinal question; we are therefore seeking the essence of the regulated economy.”