The archive.

When does efficient coordination become an abuse of economic power? In this 1949 article, Hans Bayer examines American antitrust policy without assuming that either large enterprises or unrestricted competition are inherently desirable. His concrete test is basing-point pricing: buyers can be charged freight calculated from a designated production centre, regardless of where their goods actually originate. Such arrangements expose the difficulty of distinguishing useful coordination from practices that suppress competition—and of proving collusion from identical prices. Bayer argues that law should target the abuse of concentration rather than combinations themselves. His consideration of public supervision and cooperative self-help lets readers explore what protecting consumers might require when breaking up firms is neither practicable nor economically sound.

A useful textbook can still teach distinctions that obscure the processes it seeks to explain. In this 1950 review of the third edition of Elmer Clark Bratt’s Business Cycles and Forecasting, Joseph A. Schumpeter combines a strong teaching recommendation with scrutiny of statistical and conceptual habits. He questions trend fitting, the separation of short cycles from longer movements, and the neglect of individual industries in accounts of economy-wide fluctuations. His concern is causal: do the categories clarify mechanisms, or merely organize observations? Especially revealing is his distinction between factors external to a formal model and those external to business activity. This compact review shows how Schumpeter’s welcome for complementary cycle theories coexists with exacting demands on the assumptions used to classify and explain economic change.

Written in the aftermath of a catastrophe its author dates to 1932–1945, this closing synthesis measures humanity's ascent against its recurring descent into madness. Thurnwald traces self-domestication from foragers through plant cultivators and pastoralists to the Metal Age and the archaic state, giving Überschichtung—the superimposition of specialized groups, herders over cultivators—pride of place as the engine of caste, serfdom, and slavery. Institutions of kinship, economy, law, and religion are read through cases from Maori communal redistribution and Buin shell money to the Sumerian temple economy, while universal religions appear as reforms against aristocratic cults. The verdict is somber: technical command of external nature has far outrun any comparable command of social life, whose domestication remains grievously unfinished.

Die Menschen haben die Natur in nicht unerheblichem Ausmaß zu meistern verstanden, doch nur wenig ihr Zusammenleben.

English translation: “Human beings have managed to master nature to no small extent, but their common life only very little.”

Economics had long borrowed its self-image from mechanics, treating prices and quantities as passive magnitudes tending toward equilibrium. Against that inheritance, this programmatic essay introduces the theory of games that Morgenstern developed with John von Neumann, insisting the mathematics is essential rather than decorative. Isolated maximization may suffice for a Robinson Crusoe, or for the limiting cases of monopoly and pure competition; it fails wherever each agent's best move depends on what rivals conceal, threaten, or choose. Two-person zero-sum games yield saddle points and mixed strategies, making bluff and secrecy formal elements of rational conduct; games of three or more introduce coalitions, compensations, and solution sets rather than single equilibria — the natural language of cartels, unions, and bilateral monopoly. Rationality itself, he argues, cannot be defined before the strategic situation has been analyzed.

Jeder einzelne strebt nach seinem maximalen Vorteil, und die Interessen aller oder der meisten stehen miteinander in Widerspruch.

English translation: “Each individual strives for his maximum advantage, and the interests of all, or of most, stand in conflict with one another.”

A coherent individual plan does not guarantee a coherent social outcome. In this encyclopaedia entry, first published in 1950 and reprinted with editorial annotations in 2022, Friedrich August von Hayek locates economics’ distinctive task in explaining how separately formed plans interact—and produce consequences nobody intended. His history of economic thought gives particular weight to marginal utility, which made individual valuations central to explanations of prices and allocation. Yet his account of spontaneous coordination also includes unemployment and wasted resources: explanation is not endorsement. Readers can discover why Hayek distinguishes the logic of a single choice from the causal analysis of social processes, and why he denies that economic science alone can establish the desirability of a policy such as free trade.

Economics is a science, a social science, and an analytical social science—Lachmann's 1950 inaugural lecture unfolds each claim in turn. As science it seeks systematic, value-free generalizations about observable phenomena, leaving judgments of the good to philosophy; as social science it studies not a special material object called man but phenomena—prices, output, employment—intelligible only as consequences of human choice under scarcity. Borrowing Robbins's ends-and-scarce-means framework, Lachmann insists economics is not psychology: it analyzes the logical implications of choices once made, not the motives behind them. Its method is compositive, tracing complex phenomena back to the plans that compose them, so that even failure becomes intelligible only by reconstructing the plans that failed. The lecture also polices history, warning against pseudo-explanations that personify 'Capitalism' or 'Industrialization,' and denying that any single invariant 'Trade Cycle' exists.

The Logic of Action is essentially a Logic of Success.

What holds together a philosopher’s work in mathematics, law, and social science without making it a closed system? In this memorial essay, Alfred Schütz locates Felix Kaufmann’s intellectual coherence in his investigation of scientific reasoning—and in his willingness to leave some questions deliberately unresolved. Schütz’s personal recollections give this methodological portrait its particular force: kindness in discussion coexists with an uncompromising refusal of evasions. His account also distinguishes Kaufmann’s participation in Vienna Circle debates from adherence to its doctrines. A closing exchange between the two thinkers sharpens the essay’s central distinction: restricting an inquiry’s scope is not the same as denying the importance of what lies beyond it.

Removing state controls can leave economic power untouched—or strengthen it. In this 1950 article, Hans Bayer distinguishes a “free economy” from the conditions that make economic freedom effective. His test is concrete: rent deregulation may balance supply and demand by squeezing poorer households into less space, while the removal of public price controls may leave cartel-imposed prices in their place. Against both idealized competition and businesses that demand freedom for others but protection for themselves, Bayer argues for institutions that give weaker participants genuine room to act. Cooperatives, cartel legislation and selective socialization become, in his account, supports rather than negations of freedom. The article offers a pointed way to distinguish market equilibrium from the satisfaction of social needs, and formal independence from meaningful self-determination.

Central planning, full employment, and inflationary pressure dominated postwar policy across most of the world, yet only the second, Hayek argues, is worth wanting in itself, and even it has been corrupted into a technique of permanent monetary stimulus. The Keynesian reflex treats all unemployment as deficient aggregate demand, ignoring the commoner case where idle labour in some trades coexists with scarcity in others. Extra spending cannot reach those workers; it only pulls labour into sectors that survive as long as credit expands, especially capital-goods industries, storing up displacement for when it stops. Worse, the causation runs in a circle: inflation invites price controls and rationing, controls sap the economy's resilience, and the resulting stagnation is then cited as proof that still more expansion is needed.

A government which uses inflation as an instrument of policy but wants it to produce only the desired effects is soon driven to control ever increasing parts of the economy.

Multilingual, mountainous, and federal, Switzerland struck many postwar observers as a Europe in miniature, standing proof that peoples divided by language and creed might still be bound together. Writing in 1950, Rappard measures that hope against the institutions hastily built between 1947 and 1949—the Economic Commission for Europe, the Brussels Pact, the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty—and finds them frameworks for cooperation among sovereign states rather than the federation Churchill had gestured toward at Zurich in 1946. Swiss neutrality, he explains, forbids military alliance and counsels reserve; a united Western Europe without Britain he doubts, judging an Atlantic federation of free peoples, after Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit, the likelier safeguard against Soviet power.

Ce n'est pas d'institutions dont l'Europe a besoin. C'est de liberté.

English translation: “It is not institutions that Europe needs. It is freedom.”

A patient can identify a knife as an apple parer yet fail to call it a knife. Does this indicate a loss of abstract thought, or a changed relation to the situation in which naming occurs? In this essay, republished in 1967, Alfred Schütz examines Kurt Goldstein’s investigations of aphasia through the phenomenology of everyday experience. He shifts attention from categorical reasoning to the familiar types, selective interests, memories, and expectations that make objects meaningful before explicit judgment. His alternative remains a hypothesis: language disturbance may involve a narrowing of the temporal horizons that connect present experience with other possible uses and encounters. The clinical puzzle thus gives readers a concrete way to examine what ordinary naming presupposes—and why knowing an object need not mean classifying it abstractly.

Cap the price of milk below what the market sets, and marginal producers cut back; to restore supply the government must then control the price of feed, of the factors behind the feed, and onward until it directs all production, at which point, Mises argues, capitalism has quietly become socialism. This 1950 New York address presses that logic against every middle-of-the-road program. Interventionism is no golden mean but a separate third system, and an unstable one; price controls, minimum wages that breed unemployment, credit expansion that ends in slump, foreign-exchange control, and confiscatory progressive taxation each push toward comprehensive planning. He points to Hitler's Zwangswirtschaft and Attlee's Britain as the destinations, and insists the drift is not inevitable, that only a positive case for the free market, not mere anti-socialism, can halt it.

The middle-of-the-road policy is not an economic system that can last. It is a method for the realization of socialism by installments.