4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Stable exchange rates may require changing price relationships rather than preserving purchasing-power parity. This reversal anchors Alexander Mahr’s 1951 article on the conditions of international payments equilibrium. Developing—and qualifying—Friedrich von Wieser’s approach, Mahr locates adjustment in the interconnected receipts and expenditures of households and businesses: additional imports reduce domestic orders and incomes, setting off pressures that can eventually restrain imports and encourage exports. The interest lies in what this mechanism costs and where it fails. Reparations, rigid prices, sudden credit withdrawals, and foreign trade barriers expose the distance between an accounting tendency toward balance and an adjustment that can actually occur. Readers encounter an explanation of external equilibrium that makes monetary stability central without mistaking equilibrium for a painless or immediate outcome.
Property law can remain unchanged while ownership becomes a radically different source of social power. This tension anchors Hans Bayer’s 1951 appraisal of Karl Renner as a social scientist rather than chiefly a political figure. Bayer follows Renner’s analysis of the separation between ownership and productive activity, asking how cooperatives, unions, credit and social insurance can alter economic relations without simply abolishing existing legal forms. His distinctive contribution is to connect this account with natural-law principles that subordinate private property to the common good. The article also makes a consequential distinction: socialist possibilities emerging within capitalism are not guarantees of socialism. Readers can discover an account of institutional change in which empirical inquiry and democratic organization matter more than historical inevitability.
What can economic calculation contribute to planning without claiming to predict everything? Reporting on the 1951 European meeting of the International Econometric Society in Leuven, Hans Bayer treats econometrics as a practical bridge between abstract theory and policy decisions. His advocacy is qualified: mathematical elegance matters only when it illuminates economic relationships, and models must acknowledge social constraints and uncertain outcomes. Dutch efforts to reconcile full employment with a reduced payments deficit provide a concrete test of coordinated policy. Bayer’s criticism of treating entrepreneurial risk as a game adds another measure of realism: workers may bear consequences they never chose. The article lets readers examine how quantitative tools can inform deliberate economic planning without displacing substantive judgment or political negotiation.
In May 1895 Kálnoky could describe Austria-Hungary's foreign relations as orderly while an American envoy judged the monarchy's future exceptionally bleak—and Engel-Janosi shows the two verdicts need not contradict each other. Reconstructing the foreign minister's resignation as a constitutional rather than merely personal crisis, he traces its trigger to the Agliardi affair, in which the papal nuncio's politically charged Hungarian visitation let Premier Bánffy turn a conditional diplomatic protest into a public fait accompli. Behind the rupture lay a structural defect of the 1867 Ausgleich: a common foreign ministry obliged to act for the Dual Monarchy without any command able to restrain Vienna and Budapest at once. Agliardi's later recall partly vindicated Kálnoky, but his fall came as European politics dissolved into a wider world crisis, Russia's gaze turning eastward after Japan's defeat of China.
Zwei Leistungen bestimmen die geschichtliche Rolle des Grafen Kálnoky: seine Politik des Abschlusses und der zweimaligen Erneuerung des Dreibundvertrages und seine Politik gegenüber Rußland, in der die Balkanfrage das Zentralproblem darstellte.
English translation: “Two achievements determine the historical role of Count Kálnoky: his policy of concluding and twice renewing the Triple Alliance treaty, and his policy toward Russia, in which the Balkan question was the central problem.”
An investment curve can describe a downturn without explaining what set it in motion. In this conference contribution, published in 1951 as an unrevised draft, Joseph A. Schumpeter asks what aggregate models miss when firms, industries, and economic structures are changing. He makes historical inquiry a partner of theory and statistics, not their rival: coordinated industrial histories would reveal the transformations behind measured fluctuations. His interpretation of the depression beginning in 1929 gives this methodological argument a policy edge, distinguishing the underlying contraction from banking failures, mortgage indebtedness, and speculative excess that he regards as avoidable aggravations. The reader encounters a concrete research proposal and a demanding distinction between reproducing a cycle mathematically, explaining its causes, and identifying suffering that policy could prevent.
What makes a reliable edition of Husserl a usable entrance into his philosophy? In this 1951 review, reprinted in 1996, Alfred Schütz assesses Stephan Strasser’s edition of the Cartesian Meditations and Paris Lectures through both questions. He judges the Meditations’ route from radical doubt to transcendental phenomenology more accessible than the approaches of Ideas and the unfinished Crisis. His attention to manuscripts, revisions, and translation shows what editorial work contributes to that access—while his complaint about the missing index identifies where scholarly precision fails the reader. This compact review offers Schütz’s comparative judgment on how to approach the later Husserl, alongside a concrete account of the practical obstacles between preserving philosophical texts and making them intelligible.
Rename a cause as its effect, and blame for it dissolves: this, Mises charges, is the semantic trick by which governments escape responsibility for inflation. Properly understood, inflation is not the rise in prices but the state's expansion of money and bank credit—here to finance rearmament—which adds government demand to undiminished civilian demand and drives prices upward. Officials then claim to fight inflation while sustaining its cause, attacking only the visible symptom through price control. But ceilings cannot repeal scarcity: fixed below market-clearing levels, they force high-cost producers out and empty the shelves, as American experience under the Office of Price Administration showed. The one remedy, he insists, is to stop creating money for the Treasury; the cost of spending must fall somewhere, and inflation merely hides who pays.
This is a classical case of the thief crying “catch the thief.”
Reprinted from a 1951 newspaper column, this brief polemic reads the postwar boom as an artificial episode conjured by paper money, bank credit, cheap interest, and deficit finance rather than as genuine prosperity. Mises presses the Austrian distinction between real capital accumulation and its monetary substitutes: rising prices prove not new wealth but falsified entrepreneurial calculation, so every credit-driven boom carries its own reversal. His deeper warning is ideological. When the inevitable slump arrives, a public that blames capitalism instead of inflationary public finance—the New Deal, the Fair Deal—will convert the failure of intervention into an argument for central planning. Avoiding depressions therefore means refusing artificial booms beforehand, though Mises doubts that politicians, who reap present popularity and leave the crash to their successors, will ever exercise such restraint.
Worse than the crisis itself could prove the psychological and ideological consequences of an erroneous interpretation of its causes.
The era of financing government by taxing wealthy minorities has ended, Mises told a 1951 conference on the economics of mobilization; henceforth the masses must foot the bill. His target is the comforting belief that inflation offers a painless alternative to taxation. It works, he shows, only on public ignorance: while people expect prices to fall they hold cash, but once they grasp that depreciation is deliberate they rush to buy—the flight into real values that wrecks the currency. War means diverting real goods from civilian to military use, a cost no printing press can conjure away; the honest methods are taxation and genuine borrowing from savings. Inflation, by hiding costs and shifting popular anger onto merchants and 'profiteers,' is at bottom an antidemocratic evasion, not democratic generosity.
At the breakfast table of every citizen in wartime sits an invisible guest, as it were, a GI who shares his meal.
Does democratic control of money protect freedom—or remove a restraint on government power? In this 1951 article, Wilhelm Röpke defends monetary independence as part of the same constitutional order as federalism and the separation of powers. His argument turns on an asymmetry: inflation offers immediate political rewards while postponing its costs, whereas deflation makes its pain felt at once. Against demands to subordinate central banks to elected governments, he presents the gold standard and bank autonomy as safeguards against this temptation. His critique also distinguishes inflation from its repression through administrative controls, which he argues extends coercion without removing monetary pressure. Readers encounter a pointed case for treating stable money not merely as an economic objective, but as a limit on concentrated power.
Inflation is an ever-present temptation. Under all circumstances it is the line of least resistance. There is no organized lobby opposed to it.
For a century, Mill's exalted tributes to Harriet Taylor were dismissed as the delusion of a besotted logician. Assembling letters, family testimony, and a scrupulous chronology, Hayek sets out to replace legend with evidence, tracing the friendship from Harriet's radical circle around W. J. Fox through scandal, chronic illness, concealed journeys to Italy, the 1851 marriage, and her death at Avignon in 1858. The documents present the bond as moral and intellectual discipline rather than romance: Harriet emerges as collaborator on the Principles of Political Economy and on the essays toward On Liberty, a judgment that reshaped Mill's rationalism. Hayek's method is his argument, letting dates and manuscripts do the work where gossip once ruled. What begins as archival restraint ends in bereavement, the edition closing on the widower's grief.
The spring of my life is broken.
How do musicians understand one another when what they share cannot be restated in words? In this essay, reprinted in 1964, Alfred Schütz uses musical performance to question whether common signs and conventions are enough to explain communication. A score cannot specify everything players must do: they anticipate one another’s phrasing, respond to bodily movements, and adjust their freedom to that of their partners. Schütz’s phenomenological perspective brings these ordinary acts of coordination into focus as a sharing of lived time, distinct from agreement on clock time. His account lets readers reconsider both ensemble playing and attentive listening as relationships constituted through unfolding experience. Music becomes a concrete test of his claim that communication presupposes a “mutual tuning-in,” rather than producing it through a shared code alone.
Music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme.