3,187 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
A firm, an army, a university, a logistics system: none can be understood as a mere sum of its inputs, because their capacities depend on arrangements of authority, information, timing, and control. Morgenstern's unfinished RAND memorandum clears the ground for a future quantitative theory of organization, arguing that economics has treated the firm as a black box and lacked even a descriptive language for what happens inside it. He builds one, distinguishing inner from outer activity, defining operations as chosen sequences of acts, and replacing organic metaphors with "competences," units delegated authority to set variables within domains. Signals activate them, memory sustains them, control counters the drift toward disorder. Written in 1951, the memorandum anticipates cybernetics, information theory, operations research, and bounded rationality, insisting that careful phenomenological description must precede any premature axiomatization.
Organization in itself, wherever it occurs, whether in social or natural life, is something exceptional and extraordinary.
International trade is governed proximately by money prices and money costs, yet exchange-rate complications and pre-trade cost comparisons make the doctrine of comparative advantage easy to misread. Setting the Marshall-Viner real-cost approach against opportunity cost—which he defends as a workable approximation to general-equilibrium theory—Haberler concedes that increasing returns, monopoly, wage rigidity, and external economies all qualify the free-trade case, then argues that liberal policy remains preferable precisely because interventionist systems obscure the comparative costs on which rational choice depends. The paired concluding remarks turn to the postwar dollar shortage, where he sides with the optimists against structural pessimism, credits the 1949 sterling devaluation and disinflation with vindicating the classical adjustment mechanism, and rejects discriminatory restrictions against dollar goods in favour of non-discrimination and the most-favoured-nation principle.
Non-discrimination like honesty still remains the best policy.
In 1906 Schumpeter defended mathematical economics; in 1949 he pleaded for historical analysis — a reversal only in appearance, Machlup argues, for the man never lost the one nor lacked the other. What held across four decades was a disciplined pluralism: theory, statistics, and history each earn their keep on the problems they suit, and the sectarian spirit of the Methodenstreit, which made each camp treat its method as the only scientific one, was the real enemy. Machlup follows Schumpeter from bare functional relations toward an eventual acceptance of causal language, and shows how the split between statics and dynamics turns methodological choice into substantive economics: equilibrium explains the circular flow, while the entrepreneur's discontinuous innovation drives development. Methodological individualism, he stresses, is a rule for building explanations, not a creed of laissez-faire.
It follows that the claim usually made for statistical induction and verification must be qualified. Material exposed to so many disturbances as ours is, does not fulfill the logical requirements of the process of induction.
At the heart of Schumpeter's theory of capitalist development lies a startling doctrine: a stationary circular-flow economy would have a zero rate of interest, and the positive rate observed under capitalism springs entirely from innovation financed by newly created bank credit. Haberler weighs this extreme version against a milder one and finds the extreme untenable, since it demands both the absence of time preference and zero marginal productivity of capital, assumptions he doubts once routine investment and ordinary impatience are admitted. Yet he defends Schumpeter's larger dynamic account, ranking its disequilibrium approach above the excessively static equilibrium theory of Mises and Hayek, who deny that credit expansion can permanently enrich the capital stock. The comparative question of whether dynamics raises or lowers interest, he concludes, is a comparatively unimportant detail.
The extreme version of his theory is hardly acceptable.
Can an economy suffer inflation before it reaches full employment? In this 1951 report on the Verein für Sozialpolitik’s conference, Hans Bayer makes Germany’s reconstruction problems a test of Keynesian policy: displaced workers and regional unemployment coexist with scarce productive capacity and entrepreneurs willing to invest. Electricity supply offers a concrete example of why increased demand might raise prices without creating enough jobs. Bayer’s commentary moves beyond reporting the proceedings to argue that employment policy must address production bottlenecks, sectoral coordination, and income distribution. Yet his criticism of Keynes does not lead him to endorse unrestricted markets. The article lets readers examine a specific alternative in the reconstruction debate: public coordination that treats full employment as a consequence of sound production and income arrangements, rather than a sufficient goal in itself.
Can the word 'profit' keep a precise role in economic theory once production is recognized as action stretched through time and shadowed by uncertainty? Shackle's answer is that it cannot serve as one concept, because it silently names two: the imagined inducement that draws an enterpriser into a venture and the recorded result by which the finished venture is judged. Productive services are committed long before the product's exchange value can be known, so contractual payments merely shift uncertainty onto the equity owner rather than abolishing it. Ex ante profit, on this account, is no scalar to be maximized but a configuration of hoped-for gain and feared loss, handled through focus-gain, focus-loss, and the φ-surface. To confuse that conjectural lure with its retrospective outcome, he warns, is an error bred by static, timeless thinking; the argument was spurred by J. A. Stockfisch and J. Fred Weston.
It is only in a static analysis, the description of a situation which is essentially timeless, that a single concept of ‘profit’ could ever be enough.
Human Action supplies the occasion, but the deeper subject is the autonomy of the social sciences against positivism. Reading Mises's treatise, Lachmann fixes on its methodological core: the distinction between praxeology, the general science of human action, and catallactics, the analysis of market exchange, and the claim that categories such as means, ends, choice, and time are presupposed rather than generalized from data. He presses the argument toward process—profit and loss as signals that sort successful anticipations from failed ones—and toward a capital theory that abandons Böhm-Bawerk's average period of production for heterogeneous, time-structured assets. That perspective grounds his reading of socialist calculation, which fails for want of an entrepreneurial capital market, and of the trade cycle, where credit expansion breeds malinvestment rather than mere excess.
There is therefore such a thing as a Logic of Action closely linked to the logic of our thought.
Reviewing R. F. Harrod's admiring life of John Maynard Keynes, Mises grows impatient with its chronicle of clubs, dinners, and distinguished acquaintances, and presses the question the biographer avoids: did Keynes truly shape the age, or merely flatter it? His verdict is deflationary. Governments had practiced inflation, credit expansion, and deficit finance long before The General Theory; Keynes did not inaugurate that policy but dressed it in scientific respectability for progressives who already scorned thrift, laissez faire, and capital accumulation. The title carries the argument: Keynes is symptomatic, not causal—the brilliant emblem of an age of decay that craved painless remedies. His fame, Mises insists, measures the decline of economic understanding rather than any revolution in it.
They longed for short cuts to an earthly paradise: a protective tariff, a cheap money policy, the closed shop, doles, and social security.
Booms and busts, on the popular account, are the market's own disease; Mises answers that they are inflicted—produced by the very banks and governments that claim to cure them. This 1951 essay defends the monetary, or circulation-credit, theory: credit expansion artificially lowers the rate of interest, ignites an unsustainable boom, and guarantees the depression that follows, because bank credit cannot conjure the real capital goods the boom pretends to command. Against Marxian tales of capitalist 'anarchy' and against Alvin Hansen's case for countercyclical management, he redefines the terms of debate—whoever explains the slump controls the remedies thought available. The only safeguard, he concludes, is to let the market rather than the state set interest rates and to refuse credit expansion and deficit spending through the commercial banks.
They fail to realize that it is impossible to substitute additional bank credit for nonexistent capital goods and that therefore an artificially created boom must collapse and turn into a slump.
By the end of the First World War, Hayek recalls, liberalism had all but ceased to be a living tradition for the young, kept alive only in the rhetoric of aging statesmen who no longer stirred the imagination. This short tribute to Ludwig von Mises, given here in the 1967 translation of the 1951 original, traces how economic freedom survived that eclipse through scattered teachers rather than parties: Edwin Cannan and his London pupils, Mises and the Austrian circle, Frank Knight and the Chicago school, and the German neoliberals Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke. Mises holds the centre as the one thinker who rebuilt liberal doctrine most systematically. Liberalism, Hayek concludes, is less a policy preference than an inherited discipline that must be taught, translated and renewed before it can again become a living body of thought.
Gone is the day when the few remaining liberals each went his own way in solitude and derision; gone the day when they found no response among the young.
Twenty years after Richard Kahn's 1931 article first set the multiplier out precisely, this survey weighs what that achievement really was. Kahn's originality, Shackle argues, lay less in an unprecedented intuition than in converting a vague, politically urgent idea about public works into a usable analytical instrument, above all by asking when extra spending would raise output rather than prices. He traces three tributaries into the General Theory: Kahn's employment multiplier, Meade's ex post equality of saving and investment, and Warming's insistence that net saving cannot exist without the investment that generates it. Yet the elementary geometric series, he cautions, conceals problems of aggregation, distribution, timing, and expectation. Comparative statics cannot separate past from future or intention from outcome, which is why he sets Hicks's elegant but deliberately non-expectational trade-cycle model against his own expectation-reaction view.
This is the bare bones of the multiplier principle. Its simplicity and ‘obviousness’ are illusory.
Can measures that accelerate mobilization today weaken the capacity to fight an unforeseen war tomorrow? In these statements at the 1951 Conference on the Economics of Mobilization, Hayek treats market adaptability as a military resource. His concern is not only that controls misallocate production, but that they create dependencies and habits of authority that outlast the emergency. European rent regulation supplies a concrete example; business leaders’ attraction to directing whole industries complicates any easy opposition between business and government. The article offers a focused encounter with Hayek’s argument that wartime efficiency requires room for relative prices to change—including prices to fall—and for entrepreneurs to discover economies that planners cannot anticipate. Preparedness, on this account, must be judged by its capacity for readjustment, not merely its immediate output.