The archive.

One God in heaven, one lord on earth: the Mongol letters and edicts of 1245–1255 turned that cosmic analogy into a working juridical doctrine of world conquest. Voegelin collects and classifies the documents carried between the papal and French courts and the khans—two khan letters, two edicts, two commanders' letters—reconstructing their preambles after Pelliot and reading them as formal legal instruments rather than mere barbarian arrogance. The empire they proclaim is an imperium mundi in statu nascendi, a world-empire-in-the-making in which every ruler, upon contact, must submit and enter as vassal or be destroyed as rebel. What lifts the study above orientalist antiquarianism is Voegelin's closing move, comparing the Mongols' sacral literalism—killing and conquest proclaimed as divine judgment—to the peace rhetoric of modern communist regimes.

Das Opfer der Aggression ist der Aggressor.

English translation: “The victim of aggression is the aggressor.”

Written in 1941 and reprinted here in 1997, Hayek’s wartime essay asks how Britain can act intelligently towards Germany without mistaking understanding for forgiveness. He traces a practical weakness in British policy to alternating admiration and hostility, reinforced by travel impressions rather than sustained study of German intellectual life. His distinctive concern is that German ideas already circulate within Britain and among its allies: refusing to study them does not prevent their influence, but makes it harder to judge. The essay connects this problem to concrete institutional remedies—university training for specialists and controlled scholarly access to current German publications. It offers a pointed account of why foreign knowledge requires interpreters able to notice developments beyond a government’s immediate wartime needs.

Admiration does not suspend criticism in Hayek’s English-language review of Ludwig von Mises’s Nationalökonomie, first published in 1941 and collected here in a 2013 reprint. Hayek finds the treatise’s strength in its integration of economic theory, the study of human action, and liberal social philosophy—but asks what such intellectual consistency costs when its author remains distant from contemporary economics. His reservations about interest theory and competition sharpen rather than cancel his appreciation. Particularly revealing is his response to Mises’s use of comparative costs to explain social cooperation, beyond international trade. This compact review lets readers see where Hayek supports Mises’s methodological independence, where he would argue differently, and why he distinguishes a developed liberal philosophy from a mere revival of laissez-faire.

Understanding Nazi Germany’s appeal need not mean excusing it. In this 1941 joint review, republished in 1997, Hayek welcomes two contrasting corrections to wartime perceptions: Paul Einzig’s exposure of Germany’s promised European order and C. W. Guillebaud’s account of social policies that helped secure German workers’ support. His sharper objection concerns what the reviewers’ subjects share: an apparent willingness to approve Nazi methods while condemning their purposes. Hayek asks whether comprehensive planning itself demands coercion, imposed hierarchies and leaders ruthless enough to enforce them. This brief review lets readers encounter that question in a concrete dispute over how to describe an enemy accurately—and how to judge seemingly desirable policies by the power required to carry them out.

Austria's long transformation from the Ottomans' frontier antagonist into their guarantor, the price of holding Russia back from Constantinople, frames this account of how Vienna met the birth of the Greek kingdom. Engel-Janosi weighs Metternich's reluctance, who saw in the war of independence only a rebellion, against King Ludwig of Bavaria's dynastic investment in his son Otto, and gives Prokesch-Osten, Austria's envoy in Athens, the central role: a conservative trying to shore up an independent Greek monarchy amid the rivalry of Britain, France, Russia, and Bavaria. Through the Armansperg and Rudhart ministries, the constitutional revolution of 1843, and the duel of Maurokordatos and Kolettis, the project decays. Austrian passivity, great-power intrigue, Greek factionalism, and Otto's weakness, he concludes, made an independent conservative Greece untenable.

Staaten hat noch niemand geschaffen; sie schaffen sich selbst.

English translation: “No one has ever created states; they create themselves.”

Scientific expertise can explain general laws—but can it supply the changing, local knowledge needed to direct an economy? In this 1941 article, republished here in 1997, Friedrich August von Hayek addresses scientists and engineers drawn to centralized planning. He contrasts their ideal of deliberate construction with the coordination achieved through competitive prices, then asks what happens to intellectual freedom when one authority controls the resources needed to pursue competing purposes. His contention is that comprehensive planning concentrates power over ends, not merely economic means. The article offers a compact encounter with the connection between Hayek’s account of dispersed knowledge and his defence of liberty, while distinguishing policies that sustain competition or supplement its results from those that replace it with a single plan.

Whoever controls the means must decide which ends they are to serve.

Benevolent intentions do not settle whether centralized planning can sustain scientific discovery or improve living standards. In this joint review, first published in 1941 and reprinted here in 1997, F. A. Hayek pairs Michael Polanyi’s defence of intellectual and economic freedom with Colin Clark’s reconstruction of Soviet economic performance. Hayek values Polanyi’s challenge to scientists who advocate directing research from above: an overview of a system may lack the specialized knowledge needed to guide its activities. Clark’s figures put enthusiasm for the Russian experiment to a different test, tracing food consumption, housing and output while registering later improvements as well as earlier deterioration. The review offers a compact encounter between Hayek’s institutional objections to planning and his assessment of evidence about what planning delivered.

An economy’s complexity seems to call for comprehensive direction; Hayek argues that it makes such direction impracticable. In this 1941 article, reprinted in 1997, he shifts attention from the planner’s objectives to the changing, local knowledge needed to use scarce resources well. A shortage of tin makes the problem concrete: how can users decide what to conserve, replace or recover without knowing why supplies have tightened? Hayek’s answer is that competitive prices coordinate adjustments without assembling everyone’s knowledge in one place. His argument depends on genuine competition, not simply the existence of markets, and his acceptance of wartime planning qualifies rather than abandons it. The article offers a compact account of why economic coordination involves discovering possibilities, not merely executing a known design.

'I am not running a drug store,' Schumpeter told the Economic Club of Detroit in the spring of 1941 — no pills to hand out, only a diagnosis. Wartime defense spending, he warned, could be the catalyst that turned America's excess reserves and government-monopolized gold stock into inflation, no greenbacks required. The deeper argument is constitutional: gold was never essential to money, but like Supreme Courts and constitutions it restrained the freedom of action of government, telling the truth, like a naughty child, about a nation's finances. Planned economies resent exactly that discipline, so gold's old function is gone — though he allows it a narrower postwar life within an Anglo-American convention or bullion standard, if governments will accept limits on their own sovereignty.

Gold has no function, for planned economy has come to stay.

How does a thought retain its meaning while its content continually changes? In this essay, supplied in its 1970 republication, Alfred Schütz brings William James’s stream of thought into conversation with Husserl’s phenomenological psychology. His focus is the often-overlooked fringe of experience: the felt relations, expectations, and receding impressions that make a present thought more than an isolated mental event. Schütz shows how James’s descriptions can illuminate Husserl’s accounts of horizons and temporal continuity without making James a phenomenologist or claiming historical influence. The comparison gives readers a concrete approach to a difficult problem: how an object remains identifiable across changing experiences, and how the conclusion of a train of thought can remain available after its intermediate steps have faded.

What can economic analysis establish about monopoly, and where must political judgment begin? In this 1942 review of E. A. G. Robinson’s Monopoly, Fritz Machlup admires the handbook’s integration of institutional detail and theory while testing the precision of its claims. He questions the basis for comparing one person’s satisfaction with another’s burden and identifies the constant-marginal-cost assumption needed for Robinson’s claim about demand elasticity and monopoly output. His appreciation is equally discriminating: breaking a monopoly into a few firms need not restore competition, and opportunities for firms to combine complicate equilibrium. The review offers a compact example of sympathetic criticism, showing how accessible applied economics can remain answerable to explicit assumptions and clearly acknowledged value judgments.

When a household buys a car on monthly instalments, does that credit drive the business cycle or merely ride it? This National Bureau study, completed as Regulation W brought consumer credit under wartime control, argues firmly for the second view. Haberler defines instalment credit narrowly — scheduled repayment, finance charge, short maturity, a negotiable instrument — and shifts attention from the stock of debt outstanding to the flow of net credit change, the excess of new lending over repayments, which he takes as its direct contribution to effective demand. Durable-goods purchases, especially automobiles, make that flow cyclically volatile and, through the acceleration principle formalized in Samuelson's appendix, magnify swings in output. Yet credit follows income rather than leading it; between the oversaving arguments of Keynes and Hansen and the Austrian warnings of Hayek and Mises, Haberler places credit as amplifier, not motor.

The dog wags the tail and not the tail the dog.