The archive.

Since Böhm-Bawerk, the interest problem had seemed to demand a single answer: capital yields interest because men systematically undervalue future wants. This 1927 essay refuses that psychological premise. Reframing the question, Hayek argues that the puzzle is not why present goods outrank the future products made from them, but why longer and shorter production processes are not extended until their yields carry equal value. Because time-consuming, roundabout methods raise physical output, such equalization would perversely require the larger future stock to fall below the present one in marginal utility. Drawing on Wieser, Mayer, Schönfeld and Strigl, he insists that whole temporal plans of provision, not isolated utility comparisons, govern intertemporal choice—and that interest belongs to static equilibrium, dissolving the 'dynamic' theories that treat it as an anomaly.

Macht die Böhm-Bawerksche Formulierung des Kapitalzinsproblemes die Annahme einer Minderschätzung künftiger Bedürfnisse unvermeidlich?

English translation: “Does Böhm-Bawerk's formulation of the problem of interest on capital make the assumption of an underestimation of future wants unavoidable?”

Mahr rejects the classical specie-flow orthodoxy: gold movements are too small and mistimed to explain how international claims and liabilities rebalance. Writing from interwar Vienna in 1927, amid reparations, hyperinflation, and violent currency swings, he fuses Angell's credit-volume theory with Wieser's account of the balance of payments as the sum of individual payment balances, deriving external equilibrium from the interdependence of debtors, creditors, and domestic-only actors. Inflation is the great disruptor, swelling nominal purchasing power that spills into foreign goods and securities; against Cassel and Keynes he denies that purchasing-power parity governs the exchanges, insisting the causation often runs the other way. Speculation, he argues from the Austrian crown and the wartime mark, is no mere forecast but itself a cause—capable of igniting fresh inflation.

Andererseits ist die Erkenntnis, daß die fortgesetzte Inanspruchnahme der Notenpresse zur Deckung eines staatlichen Defizits unweigerlich zur Kurswertsenkung führt, heutzutage wohl schon Gemeingut der ganzen Welt.

English translation: “On the other hand, the insight that the continued resort to the printing press to cover a state deficit inevitably leads to a fall in the exchange rate is today probably common knowledge throughout the world.”

Defending marginal utility theory need not mean defending every feature of the Austrian school. That distinction shapes Oskar Morgenstern’s brief review of Wilhelm Vleugels’s reply to Franz Oppenheimer, who sought to revive an objective theory of value. Morgenstern acknowledges the brilliance of Oppenheimer’s presentation while endorsing Vleugels’s critique, grounded in Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser. His criterion is explanatory power: he judges modern theory better able to account for empirical economic phenomena than Oppenheimer’s alternative. The review offers a compact statement of Morgenstern’s theoretical sympathies, but also of his standards for disagreement—systematic refutation should do justice to an opponent, not merely defeat him.

Translation, in Morgenstern’s brief 1928 review, is a practical remedy for the uneven recognition of economic ideas. He welcomes the German edition of Barone’s textbook partly because German books reach American universities more readily than Italian originals. Yet access is not his only concern: he distinguishes Barone’s mathematical research from this demanding lecture-based exposition, recommending the latter for sustained group discussion rather than beginners. His praise carries a precise reservation—advances in monetary and value theory require readers to reconsider an older systematic account. The review offers a compact view of Morgenstern’s standards for theoretical teaching: clarity and rigor matter, but neither removes the need to test established doctrine against subsequent work.

Statistical usefulness need not depend on new findings. In this brief 1928 review of Die deutschen Banken 1924 bis 1926, Helene Lieser credits the German Statistical Office with bringing scattered banking figures into an intelligible whole. She distinguishes the compilation’s merits from claims to originality: its material comes from existing publications and business reports, while its tables and graphics make that evidence accessible to wider audiences. The review offers a concise example of Lieser’s evaluative priorities—attention to the scope of banking statistics, their sources, and the practical value of their presentation.

An interest payment on public debt may be known to the last gold crown; private credit flows are another matter. This distinction anchors Helene Lieser’s short 1928 review of Gustav Gratz and Gustav Bokor’s third Ungarisches Wirtschaftsjahrbuch, covering 1926. She credits the yearbook’s effort at objective documentation without mistaking numerical precision for reliable knowledge. Her concrete objections concern estimates of private interest payments and foreign securities purchases, whose uncertain foundations should constrain the conclusions drawn from them. A forecast of cheaper foreign borrowing receives a similarly pointed check against subsequent experience. The review offers a compact example of economic source criticism: Lieser values the survey while showing exactly where its figures and expectations call for caution.

A prosperity index may fail because the statistics are inadequate—or because what it is supposed to measure remains unclear. In this short review of Albert von Mühlenfels’s Steuerkraft und Wohlstandsindex, Gottfried Haberler keeps these objections distinct. He accepts the practical criticism of the Dawes Plan’s index but asks a prior question: how would prosperity or tax capacity be measured if all the necessary data were available? He also challenges the demand that a composite index show both an overall magnitude and its internal composition. The review offers a compact encounter with Haberler’s critical method: agreement about statistical limitations does not settle the conceptual possibility of measurement.

What can surviving coins tell us about monetary policy when records of laws and governmental motives are almost absent? In this brief review of Arthur R. Burns’s Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times, Gottfried Haberler praises the economic interpretation of numismatic evidence while keeping its limits in view. His distinctive interest is in how familiar monetary problems emerged within ancient institutions: small Greek states faced pressures toward monetary union and constraints on depreciation, while Roman rulers pursued extensive fiscal debasement. The review offers a compact encounter with Haberler’s economic reading of ancient money—and with the difficulty of inferring policy from material remains rather than explicit testimony.

Do inflation, tariffs, and cartels indict capitalism—or the policies imposed upon it? In this short 1928 review of Eduard Heimann, Ludwig von Mises disputes the move from identifying economic harms to assigning responsibility for them. He turns Heimann’s own concessions about governments, worker-supported parties, and academic economists against the claim that entrepreneurs bear the chief blame for inflation. For Mises, the disorders Heimann condemns arise from interventionism, not capitalism. A parallel dispute concerns whether a morally approved end can justify class struggle when Gospel injunctions prohibit its means. The review offers a compact encounter between Heimann’s religious socialism and Mises’s liberal economic criticism, sharpening the distinction between condemning an outcome and explaining its causes.

A catalogue of economic disturbances is not yet an explanation of crisis. This distinction drives Gottfried Haberler’s review of Walter Heinrich’s attempt to ground crisis theory in Othmar Spann’s universalism. Haberler grants Heinrich’s diligence but questions what his hierarchy of institutions and disturbances actually explains: listing tariffs, banking errors, war, and changing consumption patterns does not establish how a boom turns into a crisis. His objection is not simply to unfamiliar terminology or broad definitions, but to their failure to yield corresponding analytical gains. Sharply polemical, the review offers a concrete test of theoretical synthesis: does a new framework identify causal relations, or merely rearrange familiar textbook knowledge?

A tennis player’s racket interrupting a ball in flight gives Strigl his governing image: economic theory can explain motion between externally given changes in the data, but not the intervention itself. This inquiry into the applicability of economic theory maps the border between economic law and everything that alters its material — needs, technology, law, organization, nature, expectation, and social psychology. Strigl’s central taxonomy divides exogenous data changes, which theory must accept as altered facts, from the narrower endogenous ones that arise within the economic process through saving and the intertemporal ranking of wants. Where an exogenous shift breaks the chain, theory meets a Bruchstelle it cannot bridge; it can only register that something has changed. From this boundary work he projects a future Datentheorie to discipline the application of economic law.

Es ist nun ganz unbezweifelbar, daß außer diesen exogenen Datenänderungen auch noch endogene Datenänderungen möglich sind, das sind solche, welche aus dem wirtschaftlichen Geschehen selbst und kraft der Gesetzlichkeit der Wirtschaft folgen.

English translation: “It is now quite beyond doubt that, apart from these exogenous changes in the data, endogenous changes in the data are also possible—namely, those which follow from the economic process itself and by virtue of the lawful regularity of the economy.”

Buying Kant out of snobbery, paying extra to support a disabled veteran, or choosing a nearby shop for convenience: are these exceptions to economic explanation, or ordinary instances of valuation? In this essay, presented in its 1933 German republication, Ludwig von Mises argues that price theory must explain actual choices without first approving their motives. His distinctive target is not subjective value theory’s opponents but inconsistencies in its founders, Menger and Böhm-Bawerk, whose substantive achievements he defends. Mistaken beliefs, generosity, and national loyalty enter exchange through buyers’ preferences, not as departures from economic law. The essay makes precise why explaining a purchase differs from judging its purpose—and why monetary gain alone cannot define the conduct economics seeks to understand.