The archive.

We encounter people directly, but how do we encounter a friendship, an institution, or society itself? In this essay, reprinted in 1967, Alfred Schütz examines how tangible things make present what lies beyond immediate experience. His phenomenological approach distinguishes reminders, indications, and signs from symbols that connect everyday life with such different provinces of meaning as religion, art, and science. The central tension is reciprocal: individuals inherit socially established meanings, yet symbols also enable them to apprehend the collectivities to which they belong. By separating these kinds of reference, Schütz gives readers a precise way to ask how shared meanings support communication without erasing differences of perspective—and why the same representation can sustain belonging for one group while provoking disagreement in another.

Joining the ends of a series makes a difficult sampling problem tractable—but what does that simplification buy, and when might it be useful beyond the circular case? Gerhard Tintner studies variance estimates formed from finite differences of normally distributed observations. Overlapping differences remain dependent; his distinctive move is to exploit circular symmetry, factoring their quadratic form by frequency to obtain explicit sampling distributions. Readers can see why an unbiased estimate need not have a familiar finite-sample distribution, and how sample size and the order of differencing affect its uncertainty. Examples with seven and eight observations compare exact densities with normal approximations. Tintner also cautiously proposes using the circular results for non-circular series when endpoint effects are small, making the boundary assumption both the method’s strength and its practical qualification.

Between apriorism and a crude empiricism that would test every assumption in isolation, Machlup marks out a middle path for what 'verification' can mean in economics. He lowers the stakes deliberately: verification is not access to final truth but a disciplined comparison between what a theory implies and what inquiry discloses. His pivotal distinction separates particular historical propositions, checkable directly, from general hypotheses that yield conclusions only when joined to auxiliary assumptions about conditions and change. Fundamental postulates such as rational action need no independent sense-verification; they make conduct intelligible and are judged by the fruitfulness of the systems they support. Steering past both Misesian apriorism and Hutchison-style ultra-empiricism, and drawing on physics, Einstein, and Braithwaite, he holds that economics stays empirically disciplined while a hypothesis, at most, survives as not disconfirmed.

The hypothesis is confirmed if reasonable correspondence is found between the deduced and the observed, or more correctly, if no irreconcilable contradiction is found between the deduced and the observed.

That the United States had become the world's most prosperous nation was, by 1955, a fact no one contested; what puzzled Mises was why so many treated that abundance as a crime to be redistributed rather than an achievement to be explained. Reviewing William E. Rappard's study, he accepts its four causes—mass production, applied science, the passion for productivity, competition—but drives them toward a single Austrian conclusion: American wealth was not extracted from poorer nations but built at home through capital accumulation. Better tools, plants, and mines raise the marginal productivity of labor, and technical know-how is worthless where saving is discouraged and property insecure. Against Marx, Keynes, and the anti-saving doctrines of the New Economics, he makes the secret plain—prosperity is accumulated, never seized.

America is prosperous because its people wanted prosperity and resorted to policies fitted to the purpose.

Gold seemed the one balance-of-payments figure a statistician could trust: physically definite, internationally traded, central to gold-standard theory. Applying a single reciprocal test — country A's reported gold exports to B should match B's reported imports from A — Morgenstern finds the trust misplaced. For the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, and Canada in 1900, 1907, 1928, and 1935, the paired ratios refuse to cluster near unity and sometimes turn absurd, worst of all in the classical gold-standard years. Earmarking, transit trade, misclassification of gold and silver, and traveler-carried coin all corrupt the record, and no scientific ground exists for preferring one nation's figures over another's. If the best-looking data are this poor, he warns, a sound theory cannot rest on them — and trade statistics are likely worse still.

There is no reason why, say, an American economist or a man from Mars should prefer one set of these statistics over the others.

How can ethnology compare cultures across continents without flattening them into evolutionary stages or freezing them into isolated culture areas? Composed in 1945 and published a decade later, this methodological essay answers by way of source criticism: ethnographic “facts” are produced through uneven encounters between observers who differ in patience, language, and purpose, and cannot be treated as interchangeable units. Thurnwald credits the culture-circle theory of Gräbner, Ankermann, and Schmidt with recognizing diffusion, yet rejects its rigid Kulturkreis schemata; he embraces Malinowski’s functionalism for attending to living institutions, then faults it for excluding history. Insisting that no single continent suffices for developmental history, he treats subsistence — hunting, hoe agriculture, pastoralism, seafaring — as the engine of hierarchy and assimilation, and makes cultural history a form of human self-knowledge.

Wir dürfen uns diese Vorgänge nicht statisch vorstellen, sondern im ganzen dynamischen Ablauf.

English translation: “We must not conceive these processes statically, but in their entire dynamic course.”

A currency may buy goods without giving its holder freedom to choose what to buy. This distinction anchors Richard Kerschagl’s 1955 article on convertibility and economic organization. Ration cards provide his concrete test: when purchasing requires a personal entitlement as well as money, equal nominal incomes no longer confer equal command over goods. Kerschagl argues that monetary rules cannot function independently of the institutions governing production, credit, and trade. Yet his criticism of intervention does not become a blanket rejection of transitional arrangements: multilateral clearing, including the European Payments Union, can help advance convertibility. The article offers a way to distinguish restrictions that diminish money’s general usefulness from arrangements that may widen it, making convertibility a question of economic freedom and institutional compatibility rather than exchange technique alone.

Building more homes does not necessarily put families into dwellings they need and can afford. In this 1955 review essay, Alfred Amonn examines eight reports from West Germany’s housing advisory council with Swiss policy firmly in view. He finds a compelling distinction between financing construction and helping households pay rent: protecting all existing tenants through frozen rents can discourage mobility and maintenance while leaving overcrowded families without relief. His support for cost-covering rents therefore goes together with targeted assistance, not the withdrawal of social protection. Particularly revealing is his attention to indirect effects—smaller new dwellings may free larger homes for families, while cheaper credit can complicate funded welfare provision. The essay offers a concrete examination of why housing finance, household needs, and social assistance must be considered together.

Do economic theories resolve their authors’ psychological conflicts, or answer problems imposed by their methods of reasoning? In this 1956 review of Walter A. Weisskopf’s The Psychology of Economics, Karl Pribram tests the limits of a psychoanalytic history of economic thought. He accepts that ethical tensions can illuminate doctrine, but challenges the inference that Smith’s labor theory of value chiefly glorifies work: inherited scientific procedures offer another explanation. Ricardo, in turn, appears as a logician concerned with consistent premises rather than a moralist reconciling labor with property. More receptive to Weisskopf’s treatment of Marshall, Pribram avoids a blanket rejection of psychological interpretation. This brief review offers a concrete test of competing explanations for economic ideas: unconscious motives, historical inheritance, and the internal demands of analysis.

How much theoretical abstraction helps explain the practical problems of a firm—and where does it obscure them? Walter Fröhlich brings this question to his review of Erich Gutenberg’s production volume in its second edition and sales volume in its first. He values Gutenberg’s sustained application of economics to management and marketing, yet identifies consequential ambiguities: variable input proportions are not clearly separated from returns to scale, and short-run constraints from long-run possibilities. His distinctive judgement rests on choosing the right comparison—not specialist price theory, but management textbooks and Joel Dean’s more empirical Managerial Economics. This compact review offers a concrete test of theoretical ambition: abundant diagrams and business examples can extend analysis without supplying either conceptual precision or empirical evidence.

Does a growing literature on business cycles necessarily mean better understanding? In this brief 1956 review, Richard Kerschagl defends the nearly unchanged republication of Arthur Spiethoff’s early-1920s study while acknowledging its distance from contemporary model-based economics. His pointed judgment is that subsequent research, for all its volume, has added comparatively little to Spiethoff’s treatment of the central problems. Yet his defence is not simply retrospective: he singles out the statistical tables as evidence of what historical inquiry can contribute to economic theory. The review offers a compact statement of Kerschagl’s standards for intellectual progress—analytical reach and useful evidence rather than novelty or quantity.

Can economic planning preserve the market mechanism, and can unions of sovereign states reconcile welfare with defence? These are the possibilities Richard Kerschagl finds worth examining in his brief 1956 review of Meade’s Probleme nationaler und internationaler Wirtschaftsordnung. His interest is qualified by a sharp suspicion: what Meade calls liberal-socialist thinking, Kerschagl argues, begins with liberal theory but ends in socialist practice. Yet this objection does not prevent him from valuing the discussion of economic union or welcoming the German translation. The review offers a compact encounter with a critic who tests Meade’s proposals both against their political implications and against continental scholarship he believes Meade has neglected.