3,673 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Routinely misread as an excessive worker demand, profit-sharing in fact more often originates with employers, and Bayer refuses to judge it by tidy lists of pros and cons. Ranging across American, British, French, German, Austrian, and Soviet practice, he tests the Scanlon Plan, the Rucker Plan, the Duisburger Kupferhütte's division of results, and the statutory worker shares of Chile and Peru, then submits them all to economic theory. His sharpest distinction separates genuine entrepreneurial profit from monopoly rent: many schemes, he warns, merely redistribute rent, burdening society twice through restricted output and lost taxes. Real profit-sharing, tied to a base wage at least equal to the industry average, can smooth income during upswings and lift macroeconomic productivity, but only where trust, strong unions, and a policy of economic coordination already prevail.
So führen uns die Probleme der Gewinnbeteiligung hinein in die Gesamtzusammenhänge der Wirtschaft.
English translation: “Thus the problems of profit-sharing lead us into the overall interconnections of the economy.”
An economist who objects that an argument is “too abstract” or lacks statistical verification is already discussing methodology, whether or not he welcomes the subject. In these brief chairman’s remarks, Fritz Machlup exposes the mismatch between economists’ professed indifference to methodology and the standards they routinely invoke. His distinction is precise: researchers cannot avoid using a method, but they can avoid explicitly discussing it—though their everyday criticisms often betray them. Opening with the comic spectacle of practical-minded economists gathered to discuss metaphysics, Machlup makes a compact case for bringing assumptions about knowledge into the open, without prescribing a particular method.
When does a more realistic economic model become a less useful one? In this contribution to a published methodological discussion, Fritz Machlup challenges the demand that a single theory capture every aspect of economic conduct. Responding chiefly to Paul Samuelson and Kenneth Boulding, he defends mathematics without granting it exclusive authority, and simplified models without mistaking them for complete descriptions. His treatment of the firm makes the stakes concrete: a model suited to price determination need not explain investment or managerial power, while even a firm’s survival depends on how the firm is defined. Readers encounter a precise distinction between realism and relevance—and an argument for combining disciplinary knowledge when a particular problem requires it, rather than constructing an all-purpose synthesis.
The addition of "admittedly realistic" variables into analytical models can be defended only if they significantly modify the results.
Crusade, Reformation, Revolution: Europe's three great movements of ideas, Somary contends in this 1952 political testament, each produced results opposite to their creators' aims, and each ultimately swelled the power of the state. He denies that peoples are truly sovereign, watches modern war put a uniform on thought, food, and death alike, and charts the replacement of the measured Rechtsstaat by the boundless Machtstaat. State monopoly over money creation, he argues—abetted by Knapp's nominalism—hands governments an instrument of silent expropriation, while Jacobin primacy of politics and the doctrine of national self-determination corrode law and liberty. Against Bolshevism, which he judges to rest on power and nothing else, he sets Switzerland's organic democracy, and codifies his pessimism in twenty 'social laws of inverse proportion' explaining how tyranny thrives beneath the forms of popular sovereignty.
Je stärker die Gewalt konzentriert ist, desto geringer ist die Verantwortung.
English translation: “The more strongly power is concentrated, the smaller is responsibility.”
Faster calculation does not make an economic model true. In this 1952 article, Oskar Morgenstern asks what electronic computers can genuinely add to econometrics when observations are unreliable and the equations themselves may misrepresent economic life. His distinctive proposal is to treat computation not merely as the execution of established theory, but as a form of experiment: models can be tested against later production figures, temporal relationships explored across many series, and strategic choices calculated for competing firms. He couples this exploratory ambition with exacting demands for meaningful solutions and attention to propagated error. The result offers a concrete encounter with the promise—and limits—of computational economics before larger calculations could be mistaken for better knowledge.
Welche Gleichungen die Wirklichkeit tatsächlich löst, kann heute niemand angeben.
English translation: “No one today can specify which equations reality actually solves.”
Value theory, Shackle charges, quietly presumes perfect knowledge — that the buyer can see every satisfaction in advance — a fiction exposed by the very existence of information, a good worth having only because its contents are not yet known. The essay accordingly shifts the object of economic choice from satisfactions to actions whose consequences remain hypothetical. Each rival hypothesis carries a face-value, the gain or loss if it proves true, and a second variable measuring its claim on the imagination; numerical probability, he demonstrates through five separate objections, cannot serve as that second variable for unique, non-seriable decisions. His replacement is potential surprise: not a lesser degree of certainty but a positive recognition of some disabling incongruity, a scale on which any number of mutually exclusive hypotheses may all sit at zero.
But the theory of consumer’s behaviour assumes that we always know what we are going to get.
Temporary tariff cuts promise a useful bargain during rearmament: more civilian goods for Americans and more dollar earnings for their allies. Karl Pribram’s 1952 article asks whether that promise survives the constraints of actual trade. Foreign factories also face military demands, scarce materials, and limited investment capital; uncertain access to the American market gives them little reason to expand. Combining attention to import composition with scrutiny of executive authority, Pribram distinguishes the case for lower tariffs from the case for continually adjustable ones. His alternative—selective, negotiated reductions of indefinite duration—makes dependable market access part of Atlantic defense cooperation. The article offers a concrete account of how an apparently flexible emergency measure can undermine the investment and international commitments needed to make it effective.
The conditions that make freedom possible can also become instruments of domination: tools impose new necessities, commerce turns means into ends, and representatives acquire interests distinct from those they govern. In this review essay, republished in 1964, Alfred Schütz examines how Santayana’s Dominations and Powers understands these reversals through humanity’s dependence on nature and social arrangements. He takes Santayana’s philosophical ambition seriously without accepting its biological foundation as an adequate explanation of social meaning. The resulting tension gives the essay its particular interest: Schütz preserves Santayana’s account of embodied, constrained agency while questioning his treatment of economic life and activities beyond subsistence. Readers can discover precisely where recognition of human dependence becomes, in Schütz’s judgement, an unwarranted reduction of human possibilities.
Can a tax intended to reduce inequality instead protect established wealth against new competitors? In this review essay, presented in its 1953 English translation, Friedrich August von Hayek uses Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven Jr.’s examination of progressive taxation to challenge its claims to justice. His distinctive objection concerns the treatment of identical services: annual progression can leave two people with different net rewards for the same work because their earlier earnings differ. He also argues that restricting new fortunes can obstruct upward mobility. Yet his position is not an unconditional demand for flat income-tax rates: he allows progression where it offsets indirect taxes borne by poorer people. The essay makes that distinction central, exposing the tension between redistribution, equal treatment, and political power over a taxpaying minority.
When the prestige of physics and biology tempts social thinkers to borrow their methods wholesale, the result, Hayek argues, is not science but scientism: a prejudiced approach that decides how to study society before examining it. This volume gathers his studies on that abuse of reason, first defending a subjectivist, compositive method in which institutions such as money, law, and markets exist only as the beliefs and purposes of those who use them, and collective terms like 'society' name patterns of individual conduct rather than agents. It then narrates the counter-revolution historically, from the École Polytechnique and Saint-Simon's engineers through Comtean sociology and its convergence with Hegel, tracing how impatience with evolved orders turned science into a model for social command. The through-line is epistemic: planning fails because dispersed knowledge exceeds any single directing mind.
So far as human actions are concerned the things are what the acting people think they are.
For the seller who feels himself one among very many, rivals are colleagues rather than threats—and it is this state of mind, not the sheer count of firms, on which Machlup rebuilds the theory of selling. He coins pliopoly for the pressure of potential newcomers, setting it beside polypoly, oligopoly, and monopoly, and defines a true monopolist by the triple absence of all three. Against businessmen who claim they price by average or full cost, he reinterprets such rules as competitive responses to expected demand elasticity, treating cartel ethics and break-even charts as evidence rather than refutation. The analysis ranges across perfect and imperfect polypoly, artificial scarcity and monopoly rents, and the kinked demand curve, always parting the economist's objective calculus from the trader's rough feel for the market.
The concept of the industry is nothing but an expedient device for ruling out negligible or too uncertain interdependence.
Positivism, by reducing science to method and ruling metaphysical questions out of bounds as mere "values," had hollowed out political science at its root — such is the charge these six Walgreen lectures level before setting out to restore the discipline. Voegelin recovers a classical and Christian concern with the order of the soul, distinguishing the constitutional sense of representation from the deeper existential sense by which a society first becomes capable of action in history. His central diagnosis of modernity is that ideological movements from progressivism to National Socialism revive gnosticism, converting Joachim of Flora's three ages into an immanentized eschatology that promises salvation within time. Hobbes and Puritanism supply his cases; the recovery of experience against method and revolutionary fantasy supplies his guarded hope.
The existence of man in political society is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the same time be a theory of history.