The archive.

Between 1933 and 1953, economics was reshaped by three visible debates—Keynesian macroeconomics, the theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition, and the new welfare economics of Hicks and Kaldor—but the deeper story, Lachmann contends, is the slow displacement of static equilibrium by problems of time, knowledge, and expectation. Welfare economics he dismisses as ingenious yet politically remote; Keynesian theory as coherent but valid only for extreme situations of depression or wartime inflation, where factors can be treated as homogeneous. Chamberlin, Robinson, and Harrod exposed the unreality of perfect competition yet still classified market forms statically. The constructive alternative is Swedish Process Analysis, which distinguishes the coherence of a single plan from the compatibility of all plans, together with a redefinition of competition not as a market form but as the process by which knowledge spreads and one form turns into another.

In reality, as every newspaper reader knows, politicians pursue power, not welfare.

Strip a system of its outer layers and something eventually gives way, not gradually but all at once. Morgenstern's essay builds a vocabulary for that threshold, introducing compressibility, the selective reduction of an economy or organization that preserves its defining function, against the kernel, the minimal core below which the thing ceases to be what it was. He resists the picture of total connectedness implied by input-output schemes read as if every cell were indispensable, since such a system would collapse at the first loss. Real economies, armies, and bureaucracies instead shed activities, reorganize, and substitute; war, scarcity, and damage reveal cores that abundance ordinarily hides. Part II turns to economic constants, denying that economics has physics-like constants while insisting on firmer physiological and technological bounds, from caloric minimums to reproduction times, beneath the shifting surface of prices.

A system will be said to be totally connected if the destruction of any of its parts destroys the whole system, i. e., deprives it of all of its functions.

Can a theory built around market adjustment still explain trade when governments plan, wages resist falling, and firms exercise monopoly power? In this 1954 paper, Gottfried Haberler answers Jacob Viner’s doubts by separating classical trade theory from the free-trade policies often associated with it. A government may obstruct adjustment without rendering the theory that explains the obstruction irrelevant. Haberler shows why exchange-rate depreciation can fail when compensating policies cancel its effects, and why departures from competition do not automatically justify protection. His qualified defense of free trade rests on comparing workable markets with actual administrative capacities, not ideal planning. Readers can discover how an analytical framework can accommodate exceptions without becoming either an unconditional policy rule or an excuse for intervention.

It is essential, however, that we distinguish between classical trade theory on the one hand and the free trade conclusions derived from the theory on the other hand.

Rappard, a Geneva economist who had taught at Harvard, set out to explain a fact many Europeans preferred to explain away: that the United States enjoyed a material abundance no rival approached, and had done so well before two world wars widened the gap. Offered here in the 1955 English translation of his 1954 French study, and prefaced by Henry Hazlitt, the argument marshals figures on national income, population, and production before turning to observers from Adam Smith and Tocqueville to Mill. The wealth, he concludes, springs less from virgin soil than from labor and its productivity—driven by mass production, the marriage of laboratory and workshop, a sheer passion for output, and above all the spirit of competition that European cartels had smothered. Economic superiority, he cautions, implies no superiority of soul.

The United States are today by far the richest nation in the world because they produce by far the most wealth.

Observed prices and quantities do not, by themselves, distinguish demand from supply. This problem gives concrete force to Gerhard Tintner’s account of what mathematics can—and cannot—do for economic knowledge. His 1954 article connects economic modelling with the collection of data and the estimation of relationships, insisting that useful numerical results depend on assumptions that statistical technique cannot supply. Examples from butter demand, investment and industrial production show how models acquire practical meaning, while unidentified equations and short, dependent time series expose the limits of inference. Tintner’s selective methodological pluralism also leaves room for criticism: he questions decision theory where numerical losses cannot be justified. Readers can discover why choosing a mathematical method is inseparable from deciding what an economic model claims and what its evidence can establish.

When does a research technique become an obstacle to understanding? In this joint review of books by John Madge, Arnold M. Rose, and Hans L. Zetterberg, Fritz Machlup challenges the elevation of observation, interviews, and experiments above the problems they are meant to illuminate. He faults Madge for subordinating theory to empirical research, while finding in Rose and Zetterberg alternatives that join logical deduction to empirical testing. Writing as an economist engaging sociological method, Machlup distinguishes pluralism about methods from relativism about truth. The review offers a compact way to examine why accumulated findings need explanatory connections—and why a measurement procedure must answer to the hypothesis being tested, rather than define in advance what science may ask.

Production takes time—but does taking longer make it more productive? In this review of the second edition of Walter Eucken’s Kapitaltheoretische Untersuchungen, Emil Kauder tests capital theory against technological evidence, drawing on observations of American steelmaking to challenge any simple link between duration and efficiency. He also asks where a production period could actually begin: with the allocation of iron, leather, or a factory building? These concrete difficulties sharpen his objection to Eucken’s measurement procedure. Yet Kauder finds greater promise in Eucken’s treatment of interest, especially where price expectations and interdependent industrial investment loosen the original theoretical framework. The review distinguishes the problems Eucken exposes from the solutions Kauder finds convincing.

That production is time consuming does not necessarily imply that the theory of roundabout production is correct.

Can economics expose hidden value judgments without abandoning abstract theory? In this 1955 review of Gunnar Myrdal’s The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, Fritz Machlup accepts the demand that economists make the normative premises of policy recommendations explicit, but resists the claim that scientific analysis is therefore necessarily evaluative. His sharpest objection concerns Myrdal’s proposal to ground economics in people’s social attitudes: how can conflicting, changeable dispositions supply the foundation that supposedly objective welfare concepts could not? Reviewing the English translation, Machlup also distinguishes the original argument from Myrdal’s revised methodological position. The result offers a precise way to separate values required for policy, interests that guide research questions, and judgments made within economic analysis.

Low recorded profits need not mean that monopoly costs society little: rents may be absorbed into inflated costs rather than appear in shareholders’ returns. In this contribution to a 1955 joint conference discussion, Fritz Machlup challenges reassuring estimates of monopoly’s effects while asking how much complexity economic explanation actually needs. His account of innovation distinguishes the incentive to invent from the social benefit of rapid imitation; his methodological argument distinguishes useful simplification from careless generalization. Responding to Clark and Weintraub, he defends competition without demanding that every model reproduce every feature of business behaviour. The reader encounters a pointed connection between policy and method: both monopoly’s costs and a theory’s usefulness can be misjudged when an easily measured quantity or an impressive label replaces a precisely framed question.

American trade policy of the 1950s contained a puzzle Haberler sets out to resolve: Washington condemned imperial preferences and discriminatory tariffs while applauding customs unions, even though a customs union discriminates against outsiders more sharply than a mere preference does. His resolution turns on economic effect rather than the degree of discrimination. A preferential regime keeps separate national tariffs and invites product-by-product bargaining and capture by protected interests; a complete customs union abolishes internal barriers wholesale, adopts a common external tariff, and is far likelier to create trade than to divert it. He judges genuine unions rare, Benelux being the modern instance, and insists Japan's viability depends on worldwide markets rather than an Asian bloc, holding throughout to multilateralism and the most-favoured-nation clause.

If tariff preferences are bad because they imply discrimination, then a customs union should be worse because it implies a higher degree of discrimination.

Where classical physics can specify its variables with precision, the sciences of complex order cannot, and Hayek builds an entire method around that limit. Accepting Popper's view that theories are deductive systems which forbid events and invite falsification, he rejects the further demand that science must always uncover new laws yielding exact predictions. Prediction, on his account, comes in degrees: to exclude a single outcome, narrow a range, or state a disjunction is still to predict. His central instrument is the explanation of the principle, which begins from familiar mechanisms and asks whether their combined operation could generate an observed pattern, evolution by natural selection being the paradigm. For biology, economics, and institutions, the honest goal is orientation and cultivation, not the control the physics template falsely promises.

The practical value of such knowledge consists indeed largely in that it protects us from striving for incompatible aims.

There is no such thing as 'the' interest rate, only a plurality of rates differing by term, market, risk, and realizability—and from that dismantling Mahr builds his central claim. Interest, he holds, has no determinate effect on how much people save but a decisive effect on the form savings take, and thus on the supply of funds for productive investment. Offered here in the German version of a 1955 Italian essay, the study separates risk premia from a narrowed notion of liquidity and faults Keynes for grounding interest wholly in the striving for liquidity. Since saving depends chiefly on income, the rate matters most by steering wealth toward productive credit or away into cash hoards, land, and durable Sachsparen; net interest, Mahr concludes, could never sink to zero of its own accord.

Aber es geht viel zu weit, die Zinserklärung zur Gänze auf dem Liquiditätsstreben zu basieren, wie dies Keynes tut.

English translation: “But it goes much too far to base the explanation of interest entirely on the striving for liquidity, as Keynes does.”