3,673 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
What should determine the gold value of a gulden when its purchasing power no longer tracks the silver it contains? In this 1892 review of official publications prepared for Austria-Hungary’s currency deliberations, Robert Zuckerkandl tests the evidence behind monetary reform. He welcomes the statistical compilations but exposes the limits of their apparent precision: combined gold and silver totals conceal discrepancies, while an export surplus may service foreign debt rather than accumulate wealth. His distinctive concern is how monetary institutions and international obligations shape the meaning of the figures. By distinguishing traded from local goods, wholesale from retail prices, and wages from both, he shows why choosing a conversion rate requires more than a calculation of metallic content—and why its consequences cannot be read from aggregate prices alone.
Can a statesman depart from private moral rules while remaining answerable to morality’s highest purpose? In this brief review of F. W. Neurath’s 1891 pamphlet, Siegmund Feilbogen isolates precisely that distinction. He reports Neurath’s proposed end—a realm of perfected spirituality and love—and places it within an idealistic worldview grounded in Kantianism and Darwinism. Feilbogen offers exposition rather than sustained criticism; the review’s interest lies in this compact account of a position that separates political judgment from individual moral prescriptions without abandoning an ethical goal.
Scholarly merit need not follow doctrinal allegiance: in this 1892 review of recent economic literature, Carl Menger praises Adolph Wagner’s work while marking its state-socialist standpoint, and welcomes Philippovich’s textbook as a bridge between Austrian and German economics. These judgements give the survey its distinctive interest. Menger considers not only what economists argue, but how their knowledge becomes usable—through reference bibliographies, compact university teaching, translation, and archival research. His attention to Austria’s contribution runs alongside an appreciation of international exchange and work serving administrators as well as scholars. Readers encounter Menger as a critic weighing intellectual mediation and practical usefulness, rather than simply defending a theoretical school.
If Turgot had already formulated many doctrines associated with Adam Smith, what made The Wealth of Nations a scientific achievement rather than a successful repetition? In this 1892 monograph, Siegmund Feilbogen shifts attention from disputed borrowing to the difference between announcing an idea and making it demonstrable, coherent, and available for further inquiry. His comparison turns on concrete cases: division of labour, subsistence wages, and the competing claims of land, freedom, and productive labour as sources of prosperity. It also challenges the identification of Smith with unrestricted nonintervention: Feilbogen finds the more uncompromising programme in Turgot, while emphasizing Smith’s concern with employer collusion, higher wages, and public provision. The result offers both a reconsideration of Smith’s economic priorities and a demanding account of what distinguishes scientific explanation from conviction.
Agreement on gold did not mean agreement on how to reach it. In this short 1892 review of the Vienna currency inquiry’s proceedings, Robert Zuckerkandl singles out the dispute over converting existing gulden into gold: when should the rate be fixed, and which price should govern it? His account distinguishes near-unanimity on the monetary standard from unresolved choices about transition. It also preserves an important procedural limit: the experts spoke and debated but did not vote, so any majority on contested questions remained conjectural. Declining a detailed verdict as legislation approached, Zuckerkandl values the inquiry as material for judging reform rather than as a binding decision. The review offers a compact view of what expert consultation clarified—and what it left unsettled.
Professor Macvane, defending Ricardo, had charged the Austrians with smuggling cost into their theory as an afterthought once marginal utility failed. Wieser's rejoinder — which swells from polemic into a full essay against Ricardo himself — turns the accusation around: cost is no rival to marginal utility but a special modification of it, the form value in use assumes under capitalistic production. He dismantles the reduction of all costs to labor, insisting that no actual cost-account contains labor alone, since machines are built with machines and materials with materials. Wages, too, are graded by productive service and scarcity, not by the pain of toil. Exchange itself, he argues, is intelligible only as a mutual gain in use-value; and against Jevons, he holds that value in an age of capital reckons the sacrifice of material means, not merely of effort.
By no form of computation can the factor ‘capital’ be eliminated from the cost of capital.
Defending a gold reserve need not mean making credit dearer for every domestic producer. In this 1892 memorandum on Austro-Hungarian currency reform, Julius Landesberger distinguishes demand for productive credit from demand for gold to send abroad. His proposal combines ordinary discount policy with an intermittent charge for obtaining gold, supported by silver retaining full legal-tender status. The distinctive concern is who pays for monetary stability: large financial houses may evade official interest rates that bind smaller firms and provincial traders. Landesberger supports international monetary integration but questions its terms. His analysis lets readers examine a concrete alternative to reserve defence through general credit restriction—and the reserves, redemption arrangements and independence from financial interests that he considers necessary to make it work.
Never, Böhm-Bawerk writes, has interest in economic questions been so lively—and this inaugural essay for a new journal turns that public urgency into a program for the vocation of economic science. Modern life has grown interdependent: harvests, currencies, tariffs, transport, and labor conflict now bind individual welfare to remote causes, piling the tasks of the age into a threefold structure of daily policy, new economic forms, and the enduring social question. Against methodological warfare he pleads for cooperation among theory, statistics, history, and law, and for a journal that hosts unsettled questions rather than proclaiming finished truths. Invoking Bastiat's distinction between the seen and the unseen, he defends theory's power to reveal hidden causes, and favors durable social reform—insurance, schooling, regulated hours—over gains that wage competition might dissolve.
So türmen sich die wirtschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Aufgaben unserer Zeit gleichsam in dreifachem Aufbau.
English translation: “Thus the economic and social-political tasks of our time pile up, as it were, in a threefold structure.”
Knowing how capital moves is not the same as explaining what it is. In this 1892 review of Otto Wittelshöfer’s book, Julius Friedrich Gans von Ludassy respects a banker’s practical knowledge while testing the concepts built upon it. His sharpest objection concerns Wittelshöfer’s division between objective and subjective capital: are these distinct categories, or the same wealth viewed as productive goods and private property? Concrete counterexamples give the methodological dispute its force. Provision for one’s children challenges an economics confined to material needs; teachers’ and lawyers’ services test a definition of labour tied to consumable goods. The review shows how apparently technical definitions determine what economic theory can recognize—and why, for Ludassy, classification alone cannot supply an explanation.
Addressed to an audience of jurists, this lecture presents the silver gulden as an institutional anomaly whose purchasing power has come loose from its metal content — a coin that holds its ground while the bar silver inside it falls. Menger explains the split historically, from the post-1848 paper regime through the vanishing of the silver agio in 1878 to the 1879 halt on private minting, and warns that a return to a genuine silver standard would mean outright devaluation. The heart of the argument is juridical: conversion to gold must follow the Valutenrelation, the market value of coined gulden, not the Barrenrelation of raw bullion, for a debtor borrowed money with full purchasing power. What justice demands is neither a large nor a small gulden but a just one, working no shift of wealth.
Es wäre demnach eine grobe Ungerechtigkeit, nach der Barrenrelation überzugehen.
English translation: “It would therefore be a gross injustice to transition on the basis of the bullion ratio.”
Can costs be the final explanation of value, or only an intermediate link within it? Against Heinrich Dietzel's defense of cost theory, Böhm-Bawerk concedes the empirical force of a law of costs for freely reproducible goods and then denies its finality: the value of the cost-goods themselves still demands explanation, and that explanation runs back to marginal utility. He dismisses the charge that his theory hides inside Robinson Crusoe examples, insisting Robinson is merely a methodological test dummy, and shows cost theory caught between a Scylla of labor-quantity facts it cannot fit and a Charybdis of circular reasoning. Even the exact-looking cost figures of the market, he argues, are only stabilized resultants of countless subjective valuations, moods and whims included, so that costs do not eliminate feeling from value but aggregate it.
Die simple Wahrheit bleibt doch, daß es endgültig eine Lokomotive ist, die den letzten Wagen zieht, und nicht ein letzter Wagen, der die Lokomotive zieht!
English translation: “The simple truth remains that in the end it is a locomotive that pulls the last carriage, and not a last carriage that pulls the locomotive!”
Werner Siemens hailed the dawn of a natural-scientific age; others warned the coming century would belong to politics and socialism. Delivered at the Karlsruhe Museum in March 1892, this lecture refuses the opposition, arguing that the political question is generated by technical modernity rather than opposed to it. Railways, steel, telegraphs, and mechanized agriculture have multiplied productive power, yet Philippovich measures genuine Kulturentwicklung not by inventions but by the household — dwelling, food, clothing, bodily care, and working time. Surveying peasants, Zittau handweavers, Baden cigar workers, and Mannheim factory hands, he finds output risen and lives scarcely improved. That contradiction between what technology can do and how people actually live, he holds, is what gives socialism its power over the masses; his answer is neither complacent liberalism nor collective ownership, but a broad Sozialreform of hours, wages, housing, and association.
In dem zur Zeit bestehenden Widerspruch zwischen dem, was die Produktionstechnik an sich vermag und der tatsächlichen Kulturentwicklung liegen die Kräfte verborgen, durch welche der Sozialismus die Massen beherrscht.
English translation: “In the contradiction currently existing between what productive technology is in itself capable of and actual cultural development lie hidden the forces by which socialism dominates the masses.”