The archive.

Refuting Nazi doctrine is not the same as explaining its appeal. In this short review of Albert R. Chandler’s Rosenberg’s Nazi Myth, Eric Voegelin argues that exposing racial fallacies and distortions of Christianity leaves the central interpretive problem untouched: how a text intended to evoke a myth acquires religious and social force. He asks instead about the rise of “intramundane religiousness” and the Christian churches’ apparent helplessness before it. While crediting Chandler with useful introductory information and references, Voegelin challenges the adequacy of moral reassurance as an explanation. The review offers a sharply bounded distinction between demonstrating an ideology’s errors and understanding the power it seeks to exercise.

Military withdrawal might leave Austria independent in name yet dependent in practice. Writing after an extended visit to Vienna in 1946, Hayek examines how occupation charges, distorted prices, industrial confiscations and blocked trade frustrate reconstruction—and turn material scarcity into political vulnerability. His diagnosis rejects the claim that Austrians simply lack initiative: productive effort cannot restore prosperity when the conditions of production work against it. The article also shows Hayek advocating transitional foreign credit and economic advice, rather than expecting private investment to overcome political insecurity unaided. Its central tension is concrete: occupation must end, but outside assistance must continue if sovereignty is to acquire an economic foundation. Readers encounter an argument that connects Austrian recovery with the struggle over who will control its industries and supplies.

What did an early coin’s stamp certify—weight, metal quality, or the place where it would be accepted? Alfred Amonn makes this concrete dispute a test of how economists and historians explain the origins of money. Defending Kaulla against Herbert A. Cahn’s criticism, he argues that surviving objects cannot establish their institutional meaning without interpretation: a mark on temple property need not mean what a mark on circulating coinage means. Yet practical plausibility is not historical proof, and money need not have emerged everywhere by the same route. The article offers a pointed encounter between documentary evidence and economic reasoning, showing both why conjecture is unavoidable and why an explanation of money’s usefulness cannot substitute for an account of its actual beginnings.

Can sustaining purchasing power preserve employment once a boom begins to falter? In this 1946 newspaper article, Friedrich August von Hayek argues that the answer depends not only on how much is spent, but on where spending goes and how wages, prices, and capital respond. He accepts that easy money can check a depression, while challenging its use as a permanent guarantee of employment. His distinctive argument concerns investment: near full employment, stronger consumer demand may favor faster-turnover working capital over durable equipment, weakening capital-goods production rather than reviving it. The article offers a concrete way to examine what aggregate demand figures leave hidden—and why, in Hayek’s account, promises of painless full employment can lead toward increasingly extensive economic controls.

The problem is clearly not merely one of the total volume of expenditure but of its distribution, and of the prices and wages at which goods and services are offered.

Can civilizations follow recurring patterns without obeying fixed historical laws? Emil Kauder’s 1946 article grounds comparison in the religious and imaginative inheritance he calls “myth”: convictions that connect generations and continue to shape ostensibly secular ideals. Drawing on Vico, he argues that intellectual clarification can exhaust the beliefs that sustain collective action. Yet he refuses to turn analogies into universal sequences: Homer and Dante may perform comparable poetic tasks without their societies repeating the same political history. The article’s central tension lies between this methodological restraint and Kauder’s conviction that civilizations decline as their myths disintegrate. His treatment of freedom and progress lets readers examine what cyclical history can explain—and where claims of historical necessity leave room for creativity, cultural inheritance, and uncertain renewal.

Two rival traditions have worn the name individualism, and Hayek's Twelfth Finlay Lecture, delivered at Dublin in 1945, sets them against each other. The 'true' individualism of Locke, Mandeville, Hume, Ferguson, Smith, and Tocqueville begins from the narrow limits of any single mind's knowledge; the 'false,' Cartesian strain of Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists imagines society as something reason can design whole—and, on Hayek's reading, drifts toward collectivism. Individualism is first a theory of society, not a licence for selfishness, and its cardinal discovery is spontaneous order: the institutions that arise from human action but not human design. Because no authority can know in advance who knows best, coercion must be bounded by general rules that mark out protected spheres rather than steered toward chosen collective ends.

Man in a complex society can have no choice but between adjusting himself to what to him must seem the blind forces of the social process and obeying the orders of a superior.

Why do businessmen report that borrowing costs scarcely affect investment when economic theory gives interest rates a central role? In this 1946 article, G. L. S. Shackle locates the tension in the difference between equipment’s physical durability and the period over which its earnings can credibly be forecast. Lower interest rates give particular weight to distant receipts; uncertainty can make those receipts count for little. Reading business questionnaire responses alongside valuation calculations, Shackle shows why high required returns matter only when doubt has a particular temporal pattern. He also distinguishes an influence on decisions from one entrepreneurs consciously notice. The result is a conditional account of interest-rate policy: weak effects where future earnings are doubtful need not imply weak effects for relatively predictable investments such as houses.

Written weeks after Keynes's death, this memoir refuses to separate the theory from the man who made it: a Cambridge and Eton mind, mathematically gifted yet impatient with technique that did not bear on public action. Schumpeter reads the whole career as the slow forging of a single vision, first glimpsed in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, that laissez-faire capitalism had ended in 1914 and that thrift no longer served accumulation. The General Theory supplies that vision its machinery, reducing the economy to three schedules: the consumption function, the marginal efficiency of capital, and liquidity preference. Admiring the elegance yet insisting on the narrowness, Schumpeter accepts Hicks's verdict that this is the economics of depression, and grants Keynes a genuine school rivaling the Physiocrats and Marxists.

It does not make us Keynesians, it makes us better economists.

Empirical critics of the 1940s claimed that interviews and questionnaires had caught firms behaving in ways marginal analysis could not explain; the reply here is that they had misunderstood the theory they meant to refute. Economic theory, Machlup argues, is essentially a theory of adjustment to change, and its variables are the entrepreneur's own expected costs and revenues, not the observer's accounting magnitudes — a driver overtaking a truck responds to speed and distance without computing them. Reports of 'full-cost' pricing dissolve on inspection: average cost may smooth fluctuations over time, discipline a cartel, or hint at rivals' demand elasticity without contradicting marginalism. He is hardest on Richard Lester's wage-employment surveys, whose 'importance' ratings confuse frequency with marginal effect. The theory has not been disproved, he insists, though better empirical work, grounded in theory, is badly needed.

The business man does what he does on the basis of what he thinks, regardless of whether you agree with him or not.

Anti-Prussian sentiment ran high in the monarchy of 1870, yet at the Crown Council of 18 July—Franz Joseph, Andrássy, Beust, Kuhn, and Potocki around the table—Austria-Hungary chose neutrality with only preparatory armament. Engel-Janosi reads that choice not as simple weakness but as the sum of converging constraints. Potocki's federalist ministry, which would have granted the crownlands almost the status of American federal states, had deepened rather than resolved the monarchy's internal paralysis, while the Eastern Question tied any western war to Russia's designs on Constantinople and to unrest in Serbia, Romania, and Egypt. Drawing on ministerial protocols and American diplomatic reports, the essay presents neutrality not as grand design but as the only policy the Dual Monarchy's divided structure could sustain.

Prokesch hatte recht: es war, als seien die Segel eines Schiffes so gesetzt, daß sie gegeneinander wirkten.

English translation: “Prokesch was right: it was as though the sails of a ship had been set so as to work against one another.”

Agreement with a cause need not mean accepting its evidence. In this short review of John R. Baker’s Science and the Planned State, Felix Kaufmann supports scientific independence but challenges Baker’s use of an Oxford-generated list of discoveries to establish the harmful effects of Soviet state control: other factors could explain the comparison. Writing amid debates over atomic research, Kaufmann also shifts the grounds of opposition from scientific productivity to human freedom. His particular concern is the social sciences, where political supervision threatens inquiry into rulers’ own doctrines. The review offers a compact encounter with a critic who separates sympathy from proof—and asks whether the strongest defense of free research rests on the discoveries it produces or the liberty it preserves.

A statistical relationship may predict well without explaining what happens when economic policy changes. This distinction gives Gerhard Tintner’s 1946 article its central tension. Working through commodity prices, production indexes, and agricultural markets, he shows how multivariate methods can classify observations, construct aggregate measures, and connect sets of variables—while asking when those constructions have economic meaning. His wheat-market example makes the stakes concrete: a historical price–quantity regression need represent neither supply nor demand, yet price intervention requires precisely that distinction. Readers can discover both the possibilities of structural estimation when all variables contain disturbances and the limits imposed by identification, uncertain error estimates, and aggregation. Tintner’s doubts about an economy-wide production function keep statistical ingenuity from becoming unwarranted economic certainty.