4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Can separating law from social purposes make those purposes more open to democratic challenge? In this English-language review essay, Erich Voegelin presents Hans Kelsen’s Allgemeine Staatslehre to American readers as both a theory of legal norms and a resource for constitutional criticism. His distinctive emphasis falls on the political consequences of technical precision: if law specifies authorized acts and jurisdictions rather than sanctifying existing interests, those interests must be defended on their merits. The Austrian Constitution supplies a practical test, while American judicial restrictions on labor legislation sharpen the stakes. Readers can discover why Voegelin sees Kelsen’s identification of state and legal order not merely as an abstract reduction, but as a challenge to governmental powers claimed to stand beyond law.
Schumpeter’s 1927 review of R. G. Hawtrey’s The Economic Problem distinguishes an objection to an economist’s declared purposes from criticism of his actual analysis. He challenges Hawtrey’s commitment to deliberate economic coordination on grounds of scientific neutrality, yet concedes that it does not distort the book’s reasoning. His sharper objection is that its breadth leaves too little room for demonstration. Entrepreneurial profit provides a revealing test: Hawtrey rightly rejects risk and managerial remuneration as sufficient explanations, Schumpeter argues, but fails to supply an adequate alternative. This brief review shows what Schumpeter demands of an ambitious economic inquiry—conceptual precision and evidence—and how he separates those demands from respect for an author’s talent and the urgency of his questions.
A reference work can be theoretically uneven yet remain useful: this distinction governs Fritz Machlup’s brief 1927 review of Dierschke and Müller’s Die Notenbanken der Welt. Covering 57 note-issuing institutions, the two-volume compilation required thirteen contributors to bring its accounts to a common, reasonably recent endpoint. Machlup recognizes the cost of that collaboration in divergent theoretical outlooks and judgments, though he names no specific error. His interest lies in weighing those shortcomings against the practical value of the assembled histories, statutes, and institutional descriptions. The review offers a compact instance of his critical priorities: interpretive consistency matters, but its absence need not disqualify a documentary resource.
A diagram can show how prices and quantities depend on one another without explaining the social relations they express. This distinction guides Emil Lederer’s 1927 review of Enrico Barone’s theoretical economics in its German edition. Lederer welcomes Barone’s graphical method as training in rigorous thought, yet questions what equilibrium analysis leaves unexplained. His treatment of interest makes the objection concrete: capital’s capacity to yield a surplus does not by itself explain why interest exists. Neither rejecting formal theory nor accepting its explanatory sufficiency, Lederer asks readers to recover the economic circumstances behind its constructions. This short review offers a precise account of what mathematical discipline can contribute to economic understanding—and why it needs historical and social interpretation alongside it.
A dictionary can mislead not only by omitting a term, but by explaining it too confidently. In this 1927 review of the English–German part of Hereward T. Price’s economic dictionary, Ludwig von Mises welcomes a useful reference while testing its translations against technical meaning and scholarly usage. A monetary “hoard” need not be secret; Tawney’s “acquisitive society” should not acquire extra moral condemnation in German. These concrete objections reveal Mises’s standard for specialist lexicography: provide the context ordinary dictionaries lack without turning a translation aid into an economics textbook. The review offers a compact encounter with the judgement required to translate economic language—especially where a seemingly helpful gloss narrows a disputed concept or strengthens an author’s evaluative tone.
Greater productive capacity does not guarantee a market for what factories can make. In this closing contribution to a 1927 conference discussion, Emil Lederer argues that rationalization can undermine its own gains when wage restraint and high prices leave capacity unused. His distinctive move is to treat rising production costs not simply as an objection to higher wages, but as a possible consequence of insufficient demand. Cartels sharpen the tension by financing expansion while restricting output; wage increases, he contends, may supply the adjustment that lower prices should have delivered. These compact replies to fellow speakers let readers follow a concrete dispute over how technical efficiency becomes—or fails to become—greater consumption, while showing why Lederer insists that theoretical disagreement needs a shared empirical basis.
A history of capitalism can open new questions without adequately explaining the processes it describes. This distinction governs Schumpeter’s 1927 review of the third volume of Werner Sombart’s Der moderne Kapitalismus, here republished in 1954. Schumpeter values Sombart’s historical synthesis while testing its categories against economic mechanisms: does a vivid portrait of entrepreneurs explain their function, and does business concentration necessarily improve efficiency? His counterexample of bank-led combinations preserving inefficient firms makes the stakes concrete. The review offers a revealing encounter between historical construction and causal analysis, showing why Schumpeter regards entrepreneurship, credit creation, and cyclical movement as connections an account of capitalist development cannot leave unresolved. Its criticism also preserves a distinction easily lost in scholarly disputes: theoretical weaknesses need not cancel a work’s historical value.
Industrial capitalism, in Emil Lederer’s account, threatens the family and village solidarities that earlier conquests of China had left intact. Yet their disruption also creates new possibilities for collective action through factories, unions, student organizations, and a political party. Writing in 1927, Lederer asks what makes this upheaval more than another cycle of dynastic collapse. His distinctive emphasis falls on the social foundations of state power: how people secure livelihoods, acquire education, and organize beyond inherited obligations. The Kuomintang’s coalition of workers, intellectuals, and nationalist business interests becomes a test of whether new solidarities can sustain public authority despite sharpening class conflict. Read as a contemporary interpretation rather than a settled history, the article offers a concrete account of the connections Lederer draws between industrialization, political organization, and China’s capacity to resist foreign domination.
Compulsory protection against sickness, accident, invalidity, and old age marked, for Lederer, something historically new: neither charity nor the older law shielding workers at the bench, but the incorporation of wage earners into state-organized security. He traces its origins to Bismarck's conservative answer to socialist agitation and the Sozialistengesetz, weighs Brentano's liberal objections, and identifies compulsion as the decisive innovation that voluntary mutual aid could never supply. Comparative chapters set Britain's approved societies against Soviet Russia's employer-financed system; accident insurance, he argues, matters most where it shifts industrial risk onto the Berufsgenossenschaften. After the war, inflation and mass unemployment loosen the tie between contribution and benefit, turning insurance into public provision. Part of the Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, the chapter reads social insurance through a set of durable oppositions: insurance versus provision, compulsion versus the self-administration of the insured.
Mit Recht sieht man in der Unfallverhütung ein volkswirtschaftlich wichtigeres Ziel als in der Unfallentschädigung.
English translation: “Accident prevention is rightly regarded as an economically more important goal than accident compensation.”
Classical economists had shown a general glut impossible and crises probably intrinsic to capitalism; it was Juglar who transformed the puzzle by revealing crises as one phase of a broader cyclical movement. Reviewing Pigou's Industrial Fluctuations, Schumpeter distinguishes seasonal swings, the business cycle, long waves, and secular trend, then presses past Pigou's many-sided survey of causes toward a single center. His answer is innovation, new combinations in products, methods, markets, and organization that cannot be reached by marginal steps, clustering because one entrepreneur's success draws imitators into a swarm called prosperity, with depression the forced readjustment that follows. Bank credit supplies the mechanism: purchasing power created before the goods exist, forced saving, then self-deflation as loans are repaid. Against Hawtrey he denies the cycle is merely monetary.
Our science is past its childhood, but has not reached its manhood yet.
Bread is the same physical object for a chemist and a household manager, but not the same object of knowledge. This distinction anchors Karel Engliš’s account of what makes economics a separate science. His 1927 contribution to Die Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart places his own Brno perspective within a survey of Czech economic scholarship, tracing its institutional emergence and distinguishing historical, philosophical, and socialist tendencies. The survey becomes a methodological argument: economic goods, needs, and costs acquire meaning through what someone wants, not through physical properties alone. By separating causal explanation, relations between means and ends, and the validity of norms, Engliš offers readers a precise way to examine assumptions concealed in familiar economic terms—including whose purposes make something useful or costly.
If entrepreneurial innovation improves workers’ living standards, why do employers and workers remain antagonists? In this 1927 article, Schumpeter separates the entrepreneur’s function—putting new productive and commercial combinations into practice—from ownership, routine management, and the many other sources of business income. He argues that entrepreneurial profits are temporary rewards: competition erodes them, passing innovation’s gains to consumers through lower prices. Yet his defence of enterprise does not erase the experience of subordination at work. Discipline, employers’ claims to authority, and resistance to social reform help explain hostility where he sees no necessary economic conflict. Read together, these arguments expose the tension between Schumpeter’s account of capitalism’s material benefits and his recognition that productive achievement does not automatically confer social legitimacy.