The archive.

What can economic measurement establish—and what must remain beyond its authority? In this 1949 French article, Gerhard Tintner places econometrics between mathematical deduction and statistical description: theory makes assumptions explicit, while observations test their consequences. His distinctive concern is how to identify economically meaningful relationships in data that do not come from controlled experiments. An estimate of agricultural demand shows what numerical analysis can reveal; a discussion of tariffs shows why estimating consequences cannot decide which social goals to pursue. Readers encounter a defence of econometrics that also marks its limits, distinguishing the testing of individual coefficients from the still unresolved task of judging competing economic theories as wholes.

Toutes les lois économiques sont conditionnelles.

English translation: “All economic laws are conditional.”

A cinema or a house: who should decide which deserves investment? In this essay, first published in 1949 and reprinted here in 1952, Ludwig von Mises uses Harold Laski’s preference for housing over cinemas to expose the question of authority behind economic planning. His defence of laissez faire rests not on the absence of plans, but on the freedom of individuals to make competing plans and revise them through exchange. Against arguments from human ignorance, he asks why rulers should be exempt from the failings attributed to everyone else. The essay offers a pointed account of consumer choice as a political freedom, while its stark opposition between markets and dictatorship makes clear how firmly Mises rejects the promise of a middle way.

The alternative is not plan or no plan. The question is: whose planning? Should each member of society plan for himself or should the paternal government alone plan for all?

Monopoly prices fall less sharply in a depression than competitive prices — a regularity Alexander Mahr had observed in 1932 and here places on a fuller analytical footing. Starting from the elasticity of demand as the decisive determinant of the monopoly price, he shows that under inelastic or unit-elastic demand a cost reduction is largely pocketed as profit rather than passed to buyers, so that monopoly price adjustment is systematically less elastic than competitive adjustment. Real monopolists, he argues, are nonetheless hemmed in by substitutes, latent competitors, tariffs, and the threat of state intervention. The stakes are macroeconomic: by defending prices through cuts to output and employment, monopoly and cartel pricing convert cyclical contractions into cumulative ones, and Mahr rejects the claim that cartels stabilize the Konjunkturzyklus.

Bei unelastischer Nachfrage oder wenn die Nachfrageelastizität gleich eins ist, wird also der Monopolpreis trotz Änderung der Kosten ganz überwiegend unverändert bleiben, während der Konkurrenzpreis sich durchaus der Kostenänderung anpassen würde.

English translation: “With inelastic demand, or when the elasticity of demand equals one, the monopoly price will therefore, despite a change in costs, remain overwhelmingly unchanged, whereas the competitive price would fully adjust to the change in costs.”

Buying machinery does not guarantee cheaper farming when fields remain scattered and equipment stands idle. This practical objection anchors Hans Bayer’s 1949 critique of Austria’s four-year agricultural programme, prompted by the Marshall Plan. Accepting the need for planning, Bayer asks whether recovery should restore prewar production or redirect it towards economically viable branches. He tests investment promises against farm costs, land consolidation, cooperative marketing, and the wider economy’s need for affordable food. His distinctive insistence is that agricultural labour belongs inside this calculation: wages and housing are not secondary concerns to be addressed after output rises. The article offers a concrete way to distinguish expenditure from productive reform—and to see why production targets cannot be judged apart from the conditions of those who work the land.

A familiar face can conceal a gap in the historical record. In this 1949 letter to the Times Literary Supplement, republished here with editorial notes, F. A. Hayek asks readers to help locate two early portraits of John Stuart Mill, whose appearance was chiefly known through images of his old age. Preparing the Mill–Harriet Taylor correspondence for publication, Hayek follows a medaillon through published reproductions, Caroline Fox’s recollections, and an unpublished letter by John Sterling. His concern is concrete: the originals may have passed through a sale without being recognised. This brief appeal offers a glimpse of Hayek at work as a historical researcher, distinguishing a surviving image from a traceable object and seeking evidence that could restore a younger Mill to view.

A Chinese sentry, Kwong Hui, weighs loyalty against treachery in a choice he can make only once — and for whom, as Shackle drily observes, a severed head is rather final. From Keith West's parable Shackle draws his standing objection to orthodox decision theory: frequency-ratio probability describes a series of repeatable trials, but says nothing about the single occasion whose outcome absorbs a person's whole future. Such crucial experiments may destroy the very conditions under which they were run, so they cannot be rerun. In their place he offers not calculation but imaginative appraisal, where rival hypotheses are ranked by their power to stir hope or fear and by their degree of potential surprise, and choice settles on a representative focus-gain and focus-loss. It is a founding statement of the Knight–Keynes–Shackle line dividing calculable risk from genuine uncertainty.

For a non-divisible non-seriable experiment the concept of frequency-ratios is wholly irrelevant.

How does bias enter a science whose tools, time series, value theory, marginal productivity analysis, are in principle neutral? Schumpeter locates it not in open advocacy, which may be perfectly honest, but in the pre-scientific act of vision: the moment before proof when the investigator perceives which phenomena connect and matter. Models and statistics can be tested and refuted; vision cannot, and so it becomes the true gateway of ideological bias. He tries the thesis on three economists: Smith, whose natural-law slogans did little harm because his analysis stayed sober; Marx, who discovered ideology yet let his creed of class struggle and increasing misery sterilize his analysis; and Keynes, whose stagnationist vision gained technical armor and then dissolved into professional controversy. Ideology, he concludes, both retards science and supplies the vision without which it might never advance.

And so—though we proceed slowly because of our ideologies, we might not proceed at all without them.

What can an estimated demand curve tell policymakers—and what can it never decide for them? In this 1949 article, Gerhard Tintner connects the methodological claims of econometrics to the difficulties of measuring American agricultural demand and supply. Prices and quantities do not identify those relationships unaided: economic assumptions must first make them distinguishable. His empirical results sharpen the point. Demand estimates yield interpretable elasticities, while insignificant supply coefficients expose missing influences, including weather and possibly lagged prices. Tintner treats such failures as grounds for revising models, not concealing uncertainty. The article offers a concrete account of how theory becomes a testable numerical claim, while keeping estimates of policy consequences distinct from judgements about which social objectives deserve priority.

When does an emergency exception become permanent protection? In this 1949 article, Josef Herbert Fürth tests the Havana Charter’s escape clauses against the economic problems they were meant to address: depleted monetary reserves, industrial disruption, and trade distorted by inconvertible currencies. He accepts a bounded role for intervention while asking whether domestic policies can perpetuate the very imbalances invoked to justify restrictions. His distinctive approach separates economically defensible exceptions from politically unavoidable concessions, and legal permission from practical restraint. Readers can discover why nondiscrimination does not always prevent avoidable trade losses, why monetary policy matters to trade liberalization, and why Fürth places greater weight on international economic scrutiny than on legal rules alone.

The misery of English factory hands, the gluts of 1818 and 1826, and the depopulation of the countryside posed a puzzle Sismondi could not leave to sentiment: why did the liberal market and its machinery breed crises, unemployment, and want? This second volume presents his 1819 Nouveaux Principes as a dynamic and welfare economics set against the static equilibrium of his earlier work—and against Say's law and Ricardo, who conflated income with capital and imagined consumption almost limitless. Amonn follows Sismondi's demand that production stay proportioned to income and effective demand, his critique of Ricardian rent, his defense of small proprietorship, and his call to bind employers to their workers in sickness, age, and unemployment. Throughout, the editor marks the circular-flow insight as Sismondi's real advance while faulting the confusions that blur it.

Die statische Theorie oder Gleichgewichtstheorie stimmt nicht für die tatsächliche Entwicklung der Wirtschaft.

English translation: “The static theory, or equilibrium theory, does not accord with the actual development of the economy.”

Sealed bids for cement and steel that match to the penny are no accident but the signature of a pricing formula — and this 1949 study, rushed out after the Supreme Court's Cement Institute decision, anatomizes how that formula works and why it should go. Under basing-point pricing a delivered price is reckoned from a designated base point whether or not the goods ship from there, so 'phantom freight' and 'freight absorption' erase local cost advantages and make rival quotations converge. Machlup treats this as geographic price discrimination and, tracing case histories in steel, cement, and corn products, as a cartel embedded in freight books and classifications rather than open conspiracy. Against warnings of chaos he sets uniform f.o.b. mill pricing, under which distance again becomes visible and buyers can hunt for genuinely cheaper sources.

Almost all economic change leaves some people worse off.

What survives of the Communist Manifesto once it is read strictly as science, stripped of centenary celebration and debunking alike? Schumpeter answers by treating the 1848 pamphlet as economic sociology, separating that interpretive achievement from its thin technical economics. He ranks Marx's economic interpretation of history beside Darwin's in originality, credits him with hauling the theory of the state down from metaphysics into realistic analysis, and salutes the Manifesto's unrivalled panegyric to bourgeois enterprise as a 'constant revolutionizing of production.' Yet he dismantles the predicted polarization into two classes, the overlooked new middle class, and the doctrine of the withering state. What remains is an ideological document read as analysis, the prelude, Schumpeter says, to the whole of Marx's later work.

it is but steam that rises from the galloping horse.