The archive.

Double-entry accounting, in the form Pacioli gave it, is for Reisch the enduring foundation of the discipline, even as the surrounding literature otherwise mirrors the broader course of economic development. He contrasts an older writing that explained bookkeeping to jurists and adapted it to new legal forms — joint-stock companies, cooperatives, limited-liability firms — with a newer one bent on modernization through machines, faster reporting, business administration, statistics, and operational control. This brief foreword praises the volume it introduces for surveying such proposed reforms systematically, while cautioning that only the passage of time will separate what proves lasting and useful from the pseudo-reforms of the moment.

So verbindet sich die Buchhaltung mit der Statistik und dient womöglich als Konjunkturenbarometer im kleinen, aus dessen Angaben dann die Konjunkturforschungsinstitute ihre großen Wetterberichte zusammenstellen können.

English translation: “Thus bookkeeping combines with statistics and possibly serves as a business-cycle barometer in miniature, from whose data the business-cycle research institutes can then compile their great weather reports.”

Engel-Janosi builds this study from the private papers of Bernhard von Rechberg to rehabilitate a long-misjudged Austrian foreign minister, Metternich's disciple in an age that had outgrown him. Across four chapters it follows Rechberg from diplomatic apprenticeship in Rio and Frankfurt to the foreign ministry he assumed in 1859, too late to realize his German program. His statecraft emerges as one of delay and defensive legal protest: preserving the Vienna settlement after the disaster of Solferino and Villafranca, threading the Polish crisis of 1863 without dragging the monarchy into war, and resisting exclusive dependence on either Prussia or France until the customs dispute of 1864 forced his resignation. Blamed afterward for the catastrophe of 1866, Rechberg is defended here as narrow and rigid, yet unswervingly loyal to the Austrian state.

Eine Starrheit, ja selbst eine Enge seiner Ansichten wollen wir ihm nicht absprechen, aber er blieb in ihnen sich selbst und seinem Staate treu.

English translation: “A rigidity, indeed even a narrowness of his views we do not wish to deny him, but in them he remained true to himself and to his state.”

If the value of each good depends on the uses of other goods, how can anyone make a decision without recalculating an entire economic plan? In this encyclopedia entry, Paul Narcyz Rosenstein-Rodan explains marginal utility as a shortcut grounded in existing allocations, experience and relatively stable needs. His defense of marginalism also challenges familiar formulations: utility need not be measurable, indivisible goods obstruct universal marginal equalization, and equilibrium means that no reallocation can improve an individual’s welfare. The distinctive interest lies in this tension between interdependent choices and manageable calculation. Readers can discover an account of marginal reasoning that takes complementarity, recurring needs and inherited arrangements seriously, rather than treating each decision as an isolated comparison.

Eine Messung der Nutzen ist weder nötig noch möglich.

English translation: “Measurement of utilities is neither necessary nor possible.”

An ineffective medicine can count as an economic good, while a property right need not add anything to society’s stock of goods. Hans Mayer’s 1927 encyclopedia entry explains these apparently contrary judgments by locating economic goods not in material substance but in relations among needs, beliefs, scarcity, and control. Working within Menger’s framework, Mayer asks what makes something available as a means to human ends—and what economists mistakenly count twice. His treatment of labor and personal services separates economic classification from ethical endorsement; his account of rights distinguishes command over wealth from additional wealth. The entry offers a precise way to examine why usefulness alone does not establish economic value, and why a marketable advantage need not constitute a separate good.

Can a convincing attack on a thinker’s policy arguments still misjudge his intellectual achievement? In this short 1927 review of Heinrich Dietzel’s lecture on Friedrich List, Schumpeter accepts much of the case against List’s trade-policy polemics, including the gap between temporary protection to educate industry and beneficiaries’ appetite for permanent rents. Yet he resists reducing List to tariffs or nationalism. His distinctive contribution, Schumpeter argues, was a historical understanding of society’s forms of production and life. The review offers a compact instance of Schumpeter’s critical judgement: exposing weak arguments and interested appropriations need not erase an economist’s achievement, nor does that achievement depend on absolute originality.

Does the loan market determine how future income is valued, or does lending draw its interest rate from valuations already embedded in prices? In this 1927 article, reprinted in 1977, Frank Albert Fetter argues for the latter: choices between differently timed satisfactions shape the prices of land, machinery, and other durable assets before any explicit loan calculation. His historical and psychological perspective challenges explanations that derive interest from physical productivity alone. The practical stakes emerge in his distinction between new money spent into circulation and bank credit entering first as loanable funds—a distinction that helps explain why rising prices can coexist with low discount rates. Readers can discover how a theory of asset valuation becomes a criterion for judging central-bank stabilization, and why Fetter regards cheap credit as no substitute for confronting scarce resources.

Can separating law from social purposes make those purposes more open to democratic challenge? In this English-language review essay, Erich Voegelin presents Hans Kelsen’s Allgemeine Staatslehre to American readers as both a theory of legal norms and a resource for constitutional criticism. His distinctive emphasis falls on the political consequences of technical precision: if law specifies authorized acts and jurisdictions rather than sanctifying existing interests, those interests must be defended on their merits. The Austrian Constitution supplies a practical test, while American judicial restrictions on labor legislation sharpen the stakes. Readers can discover why Voegelin sees Kelsen’s identification of state and legal order not merely as an abstract reduction, but as a challenge to governmental powers claimed to stand beyond law.

Schumpeter’s 1927 review of R. G. Hawtrey’s The Economic Problem distinguishes an objection to an economist’s declared purposes from criticism of his actual analysis. He challenges Hawtrey’s commitment to deliberate economic coordination on grounds of scientific neutrality, yet concedes that it does not distort the book’s reasoning. His sharper objection is that its breadth leaves too little room for demonstration. Entrepreneurial profit provides a revealing test: Hawtrey rightly rejects risk and managerial remuneration as sufficient explanations, Schumpeter argues, but fails to supply an adequate alternative. This brief review shows what Schumpeter demands of an ambitious economic inquiry—conceptual precision and evidence—and how he separates those demands from respect for an author’s talent and the urgency of his questions.

A reference work can be theoretically uneven yet remain useful: this distinction governs Fritz Machlup’s brief 1927 review of Dierschke and Müller’s Die Notenbanken der Welt. Covering 57 note-issuing institutions, the two-volume compilation required thirteen contributors to bring its accounts to a common, reasonably recent endpoint. Machlup recognizes the cost of that collaboration in divergent theoretical outlooks and judgments, though he names no specific error. His interest lies in weighing those shortcomings against the practical value of the assembled histories, statutes, and institutional descriptions. The review offers a compact instance of his critical priorities: interpretive consistency matters, but its absence need not disqualify a documentary resource.

A diagram can show how prices and quantities depend on one another without explaining the social relations they express. This distinction guides Emil Lederer’s 1927 review of Enrico Barone’s theoretical economics in its German edition. Lederer welcomes Barone’s graphical method as training in rigorous thought, yet questions what equilibrium analysis leaves unexplained. His treatment of interest makes the objection concrete: capital’s capacity to yield a surplus does not by itself explain why interest exists. Neither rejecting formal theory nor accepting its explanatory sufficiency, Lederer asks readers to recover the economic circumstances behind its constructions. This short review offers a precise account of what mathematical discipline can contribute to economic understanding—and why it needs historical and social interpretation alongside it.

A dictionary can mislead not only by omitting a term, but by explaining it too confidently. In this 1927 review of the English–German part of Hereward T. Price’s economic dictionary, Ludwig von Mises welcomes a useful reference while testing its translations against technical meaning and scholarly usage. A monetary “hoard” need not be secret; Tawney’s “acquisitive society” should not acquire extra moral condemnation in German. These concrete objections reveal Mises’s standard for specialist lexicography: provide the context ordinary dictionaries lack without turning a translation aid into an economics textbook. The review offers a compact encounter with the judgement required to translate economic language—especially where a seemingly helpful gloss narrows a disputed concept or strengthens an author’s evaluative tone.

Greater productive capacity does not guarantee a market for what factories can make. In this closing contribution to a 1927 conference discussion, Emil Lederer argues that rationalization can undermine its own gains when wage restraint and high prices leave capacity unused. His distinctive move is to treat rising production costs not simply as an objection to higher wages, but as a possible consequence of insufficient demand. Cartels sharpen the tension by financing expansion while restricting output; wage increases, he contends, may supply the adjustment that lower prices should have delivered. These compact replies to fellow speakers let readers follow a concrete dispute over how technical efficiency becomes—or fails to become—greater consumption, while showing why Lederer insists that theoretical disagreement needs a shared empirical basis.