The archive.

In 1956 nuclear power seemed a natural answer for coal-poor, grid-rich economies like Europe and Japan; three years later, Rosenstein-Rodan argues, that case had quietly collapsed as coal and oil cheapened and technical progress favoured conventional thermal plants instead. Turning to underdeveloped countries, he marshals four structural objections—reactors demand large generating units, dependable grids, very high base-load factors, and punishing capital intensity—and insists India apply a shadow interest rate near 10 percent. Recomputed on realistic load factors, coal-fired power comes out 50 to 60 percent cheaper than nuclear. The essay dismantles H. J. Bhabha's proposed million-kilowatt programme and the optimism surrounding third-generation thorium reactors, counselling India to wait rather than sink scarce capital into uneconomic early plants it could ill afford.

When a man is hungry he may pay a high price for a meal, but he should not proceed to buy a restaurant.

Government is neither evil nor dispensable: peace among people requires an apparatus able to restrain violence, and Western history is largely the effort to confine that apparatus by rights and law. From this limited defense Mises turns to the deception named in his title, the interventionism that claims to preserve private property while subjecting every business decision to official permission whenever rulers invoke the public interest. Such a policy, he argues, is no coherent third system between the market economy of consumer sovereignty and the command economy of political orders; the two assign final authority to different agents and cannot be fused into a workable composite. Each intervention disappoints its own authors and provokes the next, until the market determination of production and consumption is, decree by decree, eliminated.

The subjugation of a free nation by the forces of the most tyrannical regime history has ever known is called "liberation."

Affluence has not made people happier: that unsettling premise drives this 1964 study of modern industrial society. Full employment, rising productivity, and mass consumption are genuine achievements, yet Mahr sees them breeding new pathologies, a wage-price spiral as governments bound to full employment accommodate every union demand, consumer egoism and status display in Veblen's sense, monotonous work, empty leisure, falling birth rates, and swelling cities. The social market economy of Müller-Armack and Erhard is defended as the best available order, but framework alone cannot suffice. His remedy is twofold: decentralized industry paired with garden-home settlements that restore meaningful activity outside the factory, and a moral renewal led by a nonpartisan elite schooled in Christian ethics and noble simplicity against the artificially inflated needs of prosperity.

Demzufolge sind die Regierungen einzugreifen gezwungen, wenn in irgendwelchen Bereichen der Volkswirtschaft ein Rückgang der Beschäftigung einsetzt.

English translation: “Governments are consequently compelled to intervene whenever a decline in employment sets in in any sector of the economy.”

No one can narrate the whole of human history exhaustively; every attempt must select, symbolize, and philosophically order. From that premise Engel-Janosi builds a genealogy of the modern effort to write universal history, tracing the underlying Grundeinstellungen that shape it—providence, secular progress, cyclical decline, national mission, cultural morphology, mythic meaning. Polybius first grasps world-historical interconnection, Augustine gives it a providential architecture, and the Enlightenment shifts its center from salvation to civilization. Ranke narrows practice to the Roman-Germanic world, Hegel excludes the peoples not chosen as vehicles of spirit, and Marx secularizes providence through modes of production. Spengler forces historians to stop equating Western development with world history, and Toynbee ends by turning history back toward myth. The essay validates no final system, only the enduring problem of the whole.

Wie immer man die geistige Leistung dieses Zeitalters beurteilen mag, eines ist gewiß: es sah und wollte Geschichtsschreibung im Sinne von Universalgeschichte.

English translation: “However one may judge the intellectual achievement of this age, one thing is certain: it saw and willed historiography in the sense of universal history.”

Every standard objection to development aid gets its hearing here first — that recipient states expropriate foreign property, drift toward socialism, squander funds through corruption, and repay generosity with nationalist ingratitude — before Kerschagl answers them one by one. Aid can check communist expansion as the Marshall Plan once did, even if friends cannot be bought; a new humanitas demands it; and corruption is met not by withholding help but by devising controls that spare the delicate matter of sovereignty. He contrasts Western dollar loans, repayable in hard currency, with Eastern credits settled in goods, calls for a coordinating umbrella over the IFC, IDA, and Export-Import Bank, and argues — invoking Nehru's claim that knowledge matters as much as bread — that material aid is worthless without education.

Diese Hilfe müsse aber so rasch wie möglich geleistet werden; denn es sei besser, einen Brand in seinen Anfängen zu löschen als bereits niedergebrannte Ruinen nutzlos unter Einsatz einer wirtschaftlichen oder politischen Feuerwehr zu retten.

English translation: “But this aid, it is said, must be rendered as quickly as possible; for it is better to extinguish a fire at its beginnings than uselessly to try to salvage already burned-out ruins by deploying an economic or political fire brigade.”

Rather than beginning in practical need, science begins in wonder and in the recognition of patterns, and some patterns, Hayek argues, can be explained but never precisely predicted. He defines complexity by the minimum number of variables required to instantiate a pattern, and places biological, mental, and social phenomena firmly on the far side of that threshold. A simple theory of an inherently complex order is likely false unless padded with a ceteris paribus clause that destroys its simplicity; statistics, treating elements as unconnected, cannot rescue it. Darwinian natural selection becomes his model of legitimate pattern prediction, falsifiable because it excludes certain sequences, yet unable to forecast actual forms. Economics and linguistics, built on systems of equations that yield no numerical prices, share the same standing and the same humility.

Staunen und unbefriedigte Wünsche haben den Menschen zu wissenschaftlicher Forschung angetrieben.

English translation: “Wonder and unsatisfied desires have driven man to scientific inquiry.”

That eternal being realizes itself in time is the lecture's lapidary thesis, and Voegelin at once refuses to let it become a closed philosophy of history observed from outside. The knower here is an actor within the very process he interprets, so the subject-object model breaks down. He organizes the inquiry around four relations between philosophy and history and locates its metaphysical center in the soul, understood not as a substance but as the sensorium of transcendence. Plato's Symposium and Gorgias supply the governing symbols, Eros, the metaxy, the judgment myth, and the key term fließende Präsenz, the flowing presence of eternity within experiential time. From this vantage he criticizes the ideological systems and imperial world-theologies that objectify being into pseudo-objects, and closes on an Augustinian note: history is an exodus from Babylon, wherever love for eternal being awakens.

Auch heute noch sind wir mit den Reichen geplagt, die ihre Welt auf dem Weg der Expansion suchen, anstatt in das metaxy der fließenden Präsenz vorzustoßen.

English translation: “Even today we are still plagued with empires that seek their world by the path of expansion, instead of pressing forward into the metaxy of the flowing presence.”

As the Goldwater campaign was being branded a 'radical right,' Sennholz set out to reverse the label, arguing that true extremism means allegiance to collectivism rather than distance from the reigning liberal consensus. His Extreme Right is Jeffersonian—committed to private property and limited government—and appears radical only because the political center has drifted left. He then prosecutes three men of the Kennedy circle: Walt Rostow, whose stages of economic growth he reads as disguised Marxian materialism; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., convicted of importing class conflict into American politics; and McGeorge Bundy, whose call for a presidentially defined 'national purpose' he likens to Führer and Gefolgschaft. Closing with Hayek's Road to Serfdom, this 1964 American Opinion essay recasts the political axis as liberty versus collectivism.

The materialism of Marx and Rostow denies man's freedom of choice. Instead it makes everything a superstructure of man's material basis, especially of his state of technology.

When economists identify cycles by picking peaks and troughs, how much information do they leave unused? In this 1964 foreword to C. W. J. Granger’s Spectral Analysis of Economic Time Series, written in association with M. Hatanaka and republished here in 2015, Oskar Morgenstern sets computational methods against familiar habits of economic interpretation. His account is also personal: he recalls plans with John von Neumann to apply Fourier analysis to economic data, frustrated by computing constraints and ultimately ended by von Neumann’s death. The distinctive interest of this brief introduction lies in Morgenstern’s view of computers not merely as calculating aids but as tools for exploration that could guide theory—and force economists to reconsider what they believed they saw in fluctuations.

Delivered for Henry Hazlitt's seventieth birthday in November 1964, this short tribute expands a birthday homage into a statement of the classical-liberal vocation. Mises honors Hazlitt not as a friend alone but as the writer who, across books, essays, a novel, and a weekly Newsweek column, refused to concede that freedom is an obsolete prejudice—an assumption Mises had lately heard voiced aloud when a listener demanded to know why liberty was worth aiming at. Into the homage he folds his own doctrine: the material lot of the masses can be raised by one method only, the accumulation of capital faster than population grows. Hazlitt is cast as the economic conscience of the nation, heir to Cannan and Bastiat, and the address ends by turning from his generation's defeats to the hope that a rising cohort of liberty's defenders will yet succeed.

But our meeting is not simply a private affair because you do not belong only to us, you belong to the nation and to the world.

Regional integration schemes like the European Common Market are new, this presidential address contends, only in a narrow institutional sense; the deeper story spans two centuries of world economic history. Haberler discerns three great waves of integration that dwarf the postwar regional projects: the internal unification of national markets (the German Zollverein, the U.S. Constitution, Italian unification), the nineteenth-century movement toward freer world trade under British leadership and the gold standard, and the post-1945 restoration of multilateral exchange after the disintegration of 1914 to 1945. That interwar collapse he blames on monetary destruction and institutional failure, not on any contradiction internal to capitalism. His closing warning is pointed: regional blocs such as LAFTA and the EEC may themselves endanger the wider multilateral order they claim to advance.

It was mainly due to the wholesale destruction of money, which in turn was largely the consequence of institutional weaknesses and incredibly poor policies, on the national and international level.

Setting aside Marx the revolutionary, sociologist, and prophet, this retrospective judges only Marx the economist — and finds the system wanting on every count that matters. Haberler locates the fatal defect in the value theory itself: once Volume III introduces equalized profit rates and prices of production, commodities no longer exchange at the labour values Volume I requires, so Böhm-Bawerk's old charge of internal contradiction still stands, now reinforced by Samuelson's analysis of the transformation problem. From logical failure he turns to practical sterility, arguing that even socialist planners improved only by smuggling back interest, scarcity pricing, and comparative cost. The prophecies fare no better: working-class immiseration, the imperialism thesis, and predictions of ever-deepening crises all founder against the economic record.

The assertion that in the capitalist countries real wages have a secular tendency to decline flies in the face of what everyone knows of economic history.