2,793 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Discarding observations can make a statistical test more defensible. In this 1939 mathematical note, Gerhard Tintner confronts a difficulty in time-series analysis: successive differencing may remove a smooth trend, but it also creates correlations even when the original errors are independent. His response is to select differences built from disjoint observations, allowing their variances to be compared using familiar significance tests. He applies the same selection principle to lagged products in deriving a serial-covariance distribution. The note offers a precise encounter with the trade-off between retaining information and securing a tractable sampling distribution. Readers can see how the observations chosen determine which tests become available—and why the assumptions of normality, independence and a sufficiently smooth trend matter.
The multiplier, in Keynes and Kahn, arrives as a timeless ratio linking investment to income; Machlup's 1939 intervention insists it can only be understood as a dated process. Public wages become shop receipts, which become factory receipts, which only later become incomes to be spent again — and between the rounds lie inventories, pay dates, and spending habits. He builds an 'income propagation period,' tentatively about three months, to measure how long expenditure takes to become income anew, and shows that a higher propensity to consume yields a larger eventual multiple but a longer road to it, so a government minding the coming fiscal year may collect only a fraction. Leakages, he adds, need not mean hoarding; saved funds may repay debt or buy securities, deferring rather than destroying the next round of spending.
For a discussion of time lags, transition phases, and other intertemporal relationships, Keynesian terminology is not well suited.
The Ricardo Effect anchors this revision of Hayek's trade-cycle theory: when consumer-goods prices rise while money wages stay fixed, falling real wages make short-period, labour-using methods far more profitable than durable machinery, and firms retreat from the more capitalistic techniques. The result overturns the acceleration principle, for a rise in consumer demand can shrink demand for capital goods. Granting Keynes his unemployment and sticky wages, Hayek still rejects aggregate demand as a sufficient guide; he disaggregates capital into a vertical hierarchy of stage-specific industries and introduces the 'Quotient' to measure how slowly investment yields consumer goods. A boom ends not when all resources are employed but when the structure of production outruns the flow of goods, exposing a scarcity of capital whatever the money rate of interest does.
It is a cumulative process, indeed an explosive process, leading further and further away from an equilibrium position till the stresses become so strong that it collapses.
Why does construction sometimes continue when rental returns no longer justify building? In this 1940 article, Karl Pribram connects urban ground rent to the institutions that finance development. Location alone, he argues, cannot explain the returns commanded by urban land: changing construction costs, rentals, and interest rates can generate rent even on sites without special advantages. His comparison of European and American building cycles turns on whether these returns actually govern investment. Elastic mortgage credit and expectations of appreciation can sustain construction after yields deteriorate, leaving oversupply and foreclosed properties to obstruct recovery. The article offers a precise way to distinguish rising property values from rising land rent—and to examine why measures that facilitate housing finance may also weaken restraints on speculative building.
Why might urban land rise in value even without any special advantage of location? In this 1939 conference abstract on Europe, Karl Pribram shifts attention from privileged sites to the changing relation between rentals, construction costs, and interest rates. His account of building activity free from governmental interference turns on an asymmetry: rentals could retain their gains through depression while construction costs fell, enlarging the residual return attributed to land. Once capitalized in property prices, that return became a cost for subsequent purchasers. This compact argument offers a precise connection between business fluctuations and land valuation—and explains why Pribram considered “absolute” ground rent potentially more influential for European building activity than the more visible advantages of location.
Why can construction continue as ground rents fall, yet fail to revive when rental returns improve? In this 1939 conference abstract on the United States, Karl Pribram locates a possible answer in mortgage finance. Comparing American building cycles with European experience, he argues that expansive credit can sustain a boom despite declining ground rent, while foreclosed properties held by financial institutions can obstruct recovery long after rental conditions become favorable. His hypothesis challenges the view that American construction cycles arise from forces separate from general business fluctuations. This compact account offers a precise distinction: the forces initiating a cycle may be shared, while mortgage-market institutions alter its duration and amplitude—and weaken ground rent’s power to regulate new building.
Peace among formerly sovereign states, this 1939 essay argues, cannot rest on political or military union alone; it requires a genuine common market, and that market quietly disarms the interventionist state. Once goods, people, and capital move freely across internal borders, no member government can prop up local prices, shelter a monopoly, or sustain a restriction scheme dependent on territorial control—and, Hayek adds, the federation itself cannot easily replace those powers, because a large heterogeneous people will not agree on whose industries deserve protection. Economic planning presupposes a shared scale of values that diversity denies. Socialism becomes the limiting case: incompatible with free movement within, and lacking the common purpose a socialist union would require. Federation thus emerges as both a peace project and a liberal constraint, with Robbins and Streit in view.
The whole armory of marketing boards and other forms of monopolistic organizations of individual industries will cease to be at the disposal of state governments.
Split cleanly in two, the Keynesian multiplier here becomes an instantaneous logical ratio implied by the marginal propensity to consume and a dynamic process by which output actually adjusts over time. The first follows at once from how income-receivers divide any increment between spending and accumulation; but that behaviour alone, Shackle stresses, cannot explain why firms would expand the output of consumption goods. Only assumptions about entrepreneurs' reactions to sales, inventories, and expected income turn the ratio into a theory of production. Where earlier writers assumed intended accumulation and realized saving simply coincide, he foregrounds their possible divergence: an attempt to raise the pace of accumulation runs down consumer-goods stocks unless output follows. The open-economy extension folds an export surplus into the same field as domestic investment, so a rising surplus can set expansion going exactly as investment does.
Hitherto in expressing the multiplier principle authors have assumed *equality*.
A comprehensive account of trade controls is not necessarily an account of trade planning. This distinction anchors Gottfried Haberler’s brief 1940 review of Heinrich Heuser’s Control of International Trade. Haberler values the book’s otherwise hard-to-find material on import quotas, exchange controls, and bilateral clearing and payment agreements, while noting its omission of the broader planning questions raised by the Russian and German systems. His judgement gives teachers of international trade a concrete assessment of the book’s usefulness, tempered by criticism of its editing and organization. The review offers a compact example of how Haberler separates descriptive coverage, theoretical analysis, and practical usability in assessing economic scholarship.
Written as Keynesian ascendancy pushed Austrian cycle theory to the margins, this reconstruction insists that its critics had mistaken its character: the theory is not a static contrast between saving and credit but a dynamic account of how investment reshapes the interdependence of industries over time. Its hinge is irreversibility—investment transforms fluid resources into specific, complementary capital that mistaken expectations can no longer unwind. Lachmann gives the theory a sectoral anatomy of consumers' goods, equipment, raw-material, and 'dynamic key' industries, and joins the Lundberg effect to the Ricardo effect to show how falling real wages during a boom divert entrepreneurs from long-period deepening toward speculation. Candid about limits, he finds the nineteenth-century railway booms fit the model but concedes that the 1929 crisis, with its stable prices and rising raw-material stocks, does not.
Once "free Capital" has been converted into buildings and machinery, any failure of events to conform to expectations will upset everything.
What began as a 4,000-word review for Economica, commissioned by Hayek, had swollen into a 20,000-word analysis—"a monster," Schütz calls it—of Talcott Parsons's The Structure of Social Action. This 1940 letter opens the celebrated transatlantic exchange between the émigré phenomenologist and the Harvard theorist of social action. Schütz reports reading Parsons's unpublished second manuscript three times, reserves his sharpest comments for an oral meeting he proposes in New York or Cambridge, and presses gently on their differences over the foundations of a theory of action. He encloses his essay "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" from Farber's Husserl memorial volume and mentions his forthcoming paper on William James, folding a personal letter into a document at the crossroads of phenomenology and American sociology.
Ich verdanke Ihren Theorien auch dort unendlich viel Gewinn und Anregung, wo ich von ihnen abweiche.
English translation: “I owe your theories an infinite amount of profit and stimulation, even where I depart from them.”
Do the so-called primitive peoples truly lack logical and causal thought? Thurnwald, drawing on first-contact encounters in New Guinea, the Solomons, and Africa and citing Jung on the limits of the psyche, answers no. Hunting, planting, house-building, and trapping all proceed by sound causal reasoning; magic enters only where causal relations turn opaque, as when a Buin man's festering arm is traced to coconuts stolen from a tabooed palm and healed through payment, rite, and appeal to the demon Orómrui. He reads headhunting, name magic, tjurunga stones, omens, and totemism as internally coherent theories of where life-force resides, and holds that all knowing is interpretation, modern minds included. Primitive thought, diffuse and unexact, survives in the fatigued and the neurotic today.
Doch beurteilen wir die Gedanken und Riten nur zu oft von unserem Standpunkt am Schreibtisch und im geheizten Zimmer mit hochgezogenen Augenbrauen und überlegenem Lächeln.
English translation: “Yet all too often we judge these ideas and rites from our vantage point at the desk in a heated room, with raised eyebrows and a superior smile.”