The archive.

A seventy-one-page pamphlet on price formation in the German scholarly antiquarian book trade, trailing a bibliography of theoretical works 'von Gossen bis Wicksell,' is exactly the mismatch of apparatus and achievement Hayek finds intolerable. His single-paragraph notice grants that the subject—rare, heterogeneous goods with widely dispersed valuations—could have been theoretically revealing, then denies that Bruck makes anything of it. The yield for price theory is meagre; the factual information is thinner than a regular reader of booksellers' catalogues could assemble unaided, especially on the two matters that would have mattered most: the movement of antiquarian prices over time and the 'Streuung' of simultaneous prices for identical works. The verdict is disciplinary—casual market observation, bibliographic display and genuine value theory are not the same thing, and Bruck has confused them.

Die preistheoretische Ausbeute ist recht mager.

English translation: “The yield for price theory is decidedly meagre.”

Reviewing Husserl's newly published Cartesian Meditations—still available only in French—Schütz reads it as an attempt to ground all philosophy in transcendental subjectivity, taking up Descartes's radical doubt while correcting its errors through the epoché and the phenomenological reduction. He follows Husserl's analyses of intentionality, the noetic-noematic correlation, and the transcendental ego as a monadic field structured by habitualities and passive genesis. Special weight falls on the difficult fifth meditation and its account of how the alter ego is constituted through appresentation and pairing, yielding an objective world valid for everyone. Schütz marks the work's transcendental idealism and its opposition to psychologism, points toward the tasks it opens for a phenomenologically grounded social science, and closes with the wish that Husserl make the book available to German readers.

„Gegenstände“ sind daher – in der reduzierten Sphäre sowohl als auch in der natürlichen Einstellung – nichts anderes als intentionale Korrelate ihrer Bewußtseinsweisen.

English translation: “Objects" are therefore – in the reduced sphere as well as in the natural attitude – nothing other than intentional correlates of their modes of consciousness.”

Statutes, reserve rules, and central-bank independence all fail, Strigl warns, against the one authority that can suspend them — the state itself. Written amid the crisis after 1929, as several central banks drifted back toward expansionary “accommodating” policy, this essay asks whether a currency can be secured against political manipulation rather than mere mismanagement. Its conceptual pivot is a reversal of Gresham’s law: where people are free to denominate contracts, wages, and credit in a sounder foreign currency, good money drives out bad, and depreciating money survives only through ignorance, habit, or coercion. Strigl’s remedy is not a new currency scheme but a legal one — treaties binding states never to prohibit a partner’s currency, creating an automatic and sensitive index of monetary health. A state that cannot outlaw the foreign money cannot inflate.

Der Geist der Zeit ist inflationistisch und manche Völker werden für ihre Heilung von währungspolitischen Irrtümern jetzt wieder schweres Lehrgeld zahlen müssen.

English translation: “The spirit of the age is inflationist, and some peoples will now once again have to pay dearly to be cured of their monetary-policy errors.”

Does labor-saving machinery restore employment simply because it releases purchasing power? In this 1932 assessment of the Verein für Sozialpolitik’s Dresden meeting, Fritz Machlup insists that spending and reemployment are different problems. He tests fellow economists’ explanations against the roles of wages, capital formation, and restrictions on trade, arguing that “industrialization” too often becomes a catch-all for disturbances requiring distinct causal accounts. His defense of market adjustment also sets limits on policy expertise: understanding economic relationships does not tell officials precisely where equilibrium lies. The article offers both a record of economists’ resistance to autarky and an internal critique of their reasoning, showing why agreement against a policy is no substitute for explaining how it produces its effects.

Can a theory of prices explain whether people become better off? In this 1932 review of the first two volumes of G.-H. Bousquet’s Institutes de Science économique, Schumpeter treats that question as a test of economic theory’s reach. He admires Bousquet’s accessible presentation of Walras and Pareto, yet distinguishes equilibrium’s analytical power from its less secure application to the wider social environment. His sharpest discussion concerns Bousquet’s return to subjective satisfaction—and the claim that habit and new wants eventually cancel the felt benefits of economic improvement. Schumpeter praises the ingenuity of this argument without simply accepting its conclusion. The review offers a compact encounter with his critical standards: theoretical clarity matters, but so does recognizing the questions a successful method leaves unanswered.

Christian Jacob Kraus published little, yet his lectures reached officials who would carry out the Stein–Hardenberg reforms. In this compact 1932 encyclopedia entry, Karl Pribram makes that contrast the key to Kraus’s influence. He places the Königsberg teacher between Kant’s moral philosophy and the Scottish thinkers’ accounts of sympathy and economic freedom, then connects these commitments to Kraus’s opposition to guilds, serfdom and noble privileges. The entry offers a concise account of how Smithian ideas entered Prussian administrative circles—not principally through a major published treatise, but through the education of future reformers.

A prediction come true frames this 1932 pamphlet: the crisis, its author had forecast, would end only after Italian banking reconstruction, the collapse and reorganization of Germany's banks, Britain's suspension of gold, and the fall of the Kreuger concern. With those grim preconditions fulfilled, Somary asks whether the turn has come. He indicts moratoria and the German Stillhalteabkommen as evasions that postpone necessary write-downs, argues that commodity prices have reached a despair point from which raw-material countries will lead recovery, and reads France's vast hoarded gold reserve—explained through the memory of John Law and the assignats—as a latent support. His proposals bind reparations to guaranteed purchases of American wheat, cotton, and copper, cut expenditure to revenue, and rehabilitate currencies by telling the truth and writing down claims.

Mit „Kreditschöpfung“ ist wenig zu erreichen, es fehlt nicht an Kapital noch an Kredit, sondern an guten Schuldnern.

English translation: “Little can be achieved with "credit creation"; what is lacking is neither capital nor credit, but sound debtors.”

Haberler delivered this lecture with the Depression as backdrop, but treats panics, bank failures and crashes as secondary drama; the real object of explanation is the recurrent rhythm of expansion and contraction in business activity. Money is a necessary condition of the cycle, though not in the crude quantity-theory sense: stable prices in the 1920s, he argues, concealed a "relative inflation" in which credit expansion masked the fall that rising productivity should have produced. The decisive shift is from the level of prices to the vertical structure of production. When bank credit pushes the market rate of interest below the rate warranted by voluntary saving, entrepreneurs lengthen production into more roundabout, capital-intensive projects that consumers have not chosen to fund — a maladjustment that the depression, painfully, corrects. Reflation aimed merely at purchasing power risks reviving the very disproportions that need liquidating.

The fundamental appearance of the business cycle is a wavelike movement of business activity

By 1932 capitalism had, on Lederer's reading, long ceased to be a purely free economy: tariffs, cartels, subsidies, emergency decrees, and bank rescues had already rewritten circulation and investment. The real question was not whether planning should enter an untouched market, but whether the planning everywhere present would stay defensive and irrational or become conscious coordination. Free economy and planned economy, he argues, are opposites only in principle; in practice they interpenetrate. He proposes a planned emergency sector, idle factories and unemployed hands producing necessities distributed outside ordinary sale, and locates the true lever in credit, whose control becomes control over production itself. Planning, he insists, is not nationalization; a socialized firm still bound to the market must obey it. Against Mises he holds that prices, money, and consumer choice survive the plan, leaving economic calculation intact.

Das Problem der „Wirtschaftsrechnung“ in der Planwirtschaft ist also ein Scheinproblem.

English translation: “The problem of "economic calculation" in the planned economy is thus a pseudo-problem.”

Protecting prices can leave production and employment less secure: this is the tension Erich Schiff examines in his 1932 essay on the Depression. Following support schemes for wheat, coffee, rubber, and cotton, he argues that maintained prices encouraged output and accumulating stocks, preparing sharper collapses when support failed. His distinctive concern is not price flexibility as an end in itself, but the difference between stabilizing monetary values and sustaining real economic activity. Cartelized industrial inputs bring the conflict into focus: protecting suppliers’ prices can squeeze downstream firms exposed to competition. Schiff’s qualified case—more receptive to direct production cuts, and explicitly short of a complete explanation of the Depression—offers readers a concrete way to examine who bears the adjustment costs when particular prices are held steady.

Must workers displaced by machinery accept lower money wages before they can find employment again? In this short 1932 intervention, Gottfried Haberler challenges Alvin Hansen’s claim that unemployed workers’ lost purchasing power cancels consumers’ gains from cheaper goods. His distinctive move is to follow money through successive payments: eliminating one stage of expenditure can bring demand to other producers sooner. Haberler argues that, with money quantity and circulation velocity unchanged, reemployment need not require lower equilibrium money wages. The value of this tightly focused dispute lies in the distinctions it forces: technological displacement is not monetary contraction, and an equilibrium result is not a promise of painless adjustment. Haberler explicitly leaves room for losses and frictions as workers move between industries.

Defending free trade, Haberler argues, requires admitting that tariffs can sometimes confer benefits—even on a country as a whole. In this 1932 review of the committee report chaired by Sir William Beveridge, he praises a method that concedes theoretical possibilities while testing how plausible their conditions are in practice. His concern is both analytical and persuasive: absolute claims leave free traders vulnerable to objections they have failed to answer. Britain’s departure from gold gives that distinction a concrete setting, removing, in his assessment, the basis for Keynes’s proposal to use tariffs instead of devaluation or wage reductions. This short review shows why Haberler regarded qualification not as a retreat from free trade but as a condition of its credible defense.