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The Common Sense of Econometrics

Joseph A. Schumpeter · 1933

The Common Sense of Econometrics

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Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Common Sense of Econometrics (1933)

Schumpeter’s journal article explains the scientific purpose of the Econometric Society and its journal. Its central claim is that econometrics makes explicit a quantitative tendency long embedded in economics, while providing the cooperation needed to connect theory, statistical technique, and observed facts. The opening defines a deliberately pluralist undertaking: members share a belief that economics is a science with an important quantitative aspect, but need not agree on particular problems. Schumpeter acknowledges the value of historical, sociological, and other non-quantitative investigations. His case concerns a particular sector of economic inquiry, not the displacement of every other approach.

The first section, “Economics, the Quantitative Science,” makes a stronger argument than the familiar claim that economic phenomena can be measured. Some economic facts already possess numerical form as part of their existence. Physical movement occurs independently of the procedures used to measure it; prices do not stand in the same relation to numbers.

There would be movement even if we were unable to turn it into measurable quantity, but there cannot be prices independent of the numerical expression of every one of them, and of definite numerical relations among all of them.

Econometrics thus responds to the constitution of its subject matter rather than imposing an alien mathematical ideal upon it. Schumpeter attributes the delayed recognition of this fact partly to economics’ classification among the “moral” sciences and partly to economists’ preoccupation with immediate practical answers. Patient, disinterested investigation is necessary precisely because urgent policy questions cannot substitute for scientific development.

His historical reconstruction presents econometrics as the continuation of an interrupted achievement. Quesnay, Ricardo, and Böhm-Bawerk displayed mathematical habits of thought even without advanced mathematical training. Petty and Gregory King supplied early examples of numerical investigation, while Italian monetary analysis developed a durable connection between reasoning and evidence:

What we have before us there is nothing less than a conscious attempt to weld into one indivisible argument theorems and statistical facts.

This union is the article’s governing ideal. Even controversies over value, often dismissed as speculative, can be understood as searches for economic units of measurement. Earlier economics was therefore not simply unempirical: its quantitative reasoning was constrained by inadequate techniques and statistical materials. The Society’s task is to remove obstacles from an existing intellectual current.

“Later Developments” identifies three improvements: greater availability of evidence, advances in statistical technique, and a more powerful theoretical apparatus. Schumpeter then distinguishes contributions that might otherwise be grouped together as mathematical economics. Jevons asserted the necessity of mathematics, but Cournot designed theory with its eventual application to statistical facts already in view. Thünen demonstrated how theory could grow from business practice, including bookkeeping and cost accounting. These neglected materials also reveal an avoidable separation between economics and business administration, whose specialists often investigate the same problems without exchanging their analytical resources.

Walras occupies a different position. Schumpeter regards equilibrium theory as foundational while carefully distinguishing quantitative relationships from their numerical determination:

It is true that while he made the decisive step in the quantitative, he failed to move in the numerical line, the junction of which two is characteristic of econometrics.

This distinction prevents econometrics from becoming merely another name for abstract mathematical theory. Its distinctive work lies in joining analytical structures to numerical evidence. Marshall likewise belongs to this lineage because concepts such as elasticity, quasi-rent, and internal and external economies provide usable connections between theory and business statistics. Schumpeter’s historical account gives the new undertaking intellectual depth without suggesting that its predecessors had already completed its program.

“The Present State” turns from resources to their fragmented use. Although elementary quantitative reasoning and higher mathematics are logically continuous, acquiring unfamiliar mathematical habits creates a substantial professional barrier. Economics lacks both a broadly shared technical foundation and coordinated training. Collectors of facts may disregard theory and refined statistics; statistical specialists pursue regularities on their own terms; theorists treat empirical findings too narrowly as possible confirmations of established propositions. The problem is not an absence of productive work but a failure to make its different forms cooperate.

“The Program” proposes an international forum sufficiently inclusive to accommodate disagreement, yet sufficiently specialized to move beyond repeated introductory controversies. Cooperation should arise through concrete investigations rather than declarations about correct method:

The individual problems themselves are, as it were, to teach us how they want to be handled.

The practical demonstration of tools, their limitations, and their results should expose misunderstandings and gradually establish appropriate relations between theoretical and factual research. Agreement is to emerge from achievement, not from an imposed creed.

Schumpeter closes by resisting promises of immediate policy usefulness. Numerical investigation has scientific value even before it supplies actionable answers:

We do not stress the numerical aspect just because we think that it leads right up to the core of the burning questions of the day, but rather because we expect, from constant endeavor to cope with the difficulties of numerical work, a wholesome discipline, the suggestion of new points of view, and helps in building up the economic theory of the future.

The article’s relevance lies in this institutional and conceptual definition of econometrics: numerical work disciplines theory, while cooperation makes specialized competence cumulative. Practical authority remains a long-term possibility, dependent on developing arguments precise enough to support advice rather than merely asserting economics’ usefulness.

Sections

This work was divided into 5 sections when it entered the library's research corpus—an apparatus for search and citation, not necessarily the author's own table of contents. Each title opens its summary.

  1. 1Introduction: The Scientific Aims and Intellectual Pluralism of Econometrics▾
  2. 2Economics as a Quantitative Science: Numerical Facts and Historical Antecedents▾
  3. 3Later Developments: Mathematical Theory, Statistical Evidence, and Business Facts▾
  4. 4The Present State: Mathematical Training and the Fragmentation of Economic Research▾
  5. 5The Program: International Cooperation and the Scientific Discipline of Numerical Work▾

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