Hans F. Sennholz, On Democracy (1956)

Hans F. Sennholz’s essay examines communist and Western claims to democracy through the relationship between economic organization and political power. Moving from a critique of communist doctrine to a warning about Western interventionism, it identifies democracy’s central achievement as peaceful adjustment between government and public opinion. Its preservation, Sennholz argues, depends on constitutional restraints and economic arrangements that protect individuals from dependence upon officials.

Sennholz challenges the Marxist claim that capitalism necessarily produces exploitation and antagonistic class interests. His response begins with competitive wage determination:

That is to say, the supply of labor and of other factors of production and the anticipated future prices of the ultimate product determine the height of wage rates.

Wages here reflect production conditions and anticipated consumer demand, rather than an inherent conflict between owners and workers. Sennholz places this explanation within a broader account of productive interdependence:

In a free market society it is in the vital interests of all its members that the social division of labor be fully developed and each member be most productive.

Market exchange, in this account, creates reciprocal interests in cooperation. Consumer choices discipline ownership by directing income and control over capital toward the satisfaction of demand. Sennholz’s rejection of Marxist politics thus rests on an economic premise: coercive interference, rather than private property itself, generates the conflicts attributed to capitalism.

The institutional critique turns to the revolutionary promise of proletarian dictatorship followed by the disappearance of the state. Sennholz argues that collective ownership instead requires continuing administrative coercion. Nationalized production demands enforceable decisions about labor and resources, while distribution according to ability and need leaves officials to judge contributions and competing claims. Worldwide planning would extend disputes over leadership, migration, and allocation while eliminating market-based economic calculation.

Property is divested of its social function and becomes a privilege for officials whose power of management is absolute.

This passage reverses the socialist critique of ownership. Whereas private property supposedly remains accountable to consumers, collectivization concentrates control in administrators. Promised emancipation becomes dependence on political authority. Sennholz also treats workers’ electoral strength in free political systems as an argument against revolutionary violence: where peaceful change is possible, revolution serves minority domination rather than necessary popular liberation.

His criticism extends to the formation of character. Compulsory collective ends make dissent obstructive, favor ruthless leadership, and reward bureaucratic obedience over initiative. Dependence on official decisions threatens independent judgment and voluntary moral responsibility. Sennholz presents these effects as consequences of concentrated power, not simply as abuses by particular rulers.

Western democracy receives a more favorable but conditional assessment. Elections permit changes of government without civil war, but guarantee neither sound decisions nor individual freedom. Popular authorization must therefore be distinguished from constitutional limitation: electoral accountability alone cannot prevent majority oppression.

Sennholz argues that economic intervention weakens democracy’s pacifying function by creating favored beneficiaries and burdened outsiders. Taxation, subsidies, and protective measures redirect allocation from consumer choice toward struggles over government-granted advantages. This reverses the Marxist causal account: political intervention produces the antagonisms attributed to capitalism.

The discussion of representation gives this concern institutional specificity. Complex legislation impedes scrutiny, while organized groups possess incentives and resources unavailable to a dispersed public. Agricultural price supports, including peanut legislation, illustrate how concentrated interests secure benefits whose costs fall more widely. Broader legislative referendums appear as a possible corrective, provided participation extends beyond prospective subsidy recipients.

The conclusion connects domestic intervention with economic nationalism and executive concentration. Protection of favored industries and wages encourages restrictions on trade and migration. Disappointing interventions invite further controls, whose coordination enlarges executive authority. Sennholz nevertheless defends democracy’s capacity for peaceful political change. His central contention is that this capacity becomes insecure when government increasingly determines economic opportunity. The essay integrates market coordination, constitutional restraint, and electoral accountability, while depending on a sharp contrast between cooperative market relations and conflict-producing political intervention.