The archive.

Can international institutions secure cooperation when national economies are organized to obstruct it? In this 1955 review of the revised second edition of Wilhelm Röpke’s Internationale Ordnung – heute, Alfred Amonn endorses an answer that shifts attention from treaties and agencies to domestic economic and moral foundations. Competitive markets, convertible money, and limits on governmental economic power become, in his account of Röpke, conditions of international order rather than merely national policy choices. Exchange controls and persistent foreign-exchange shortages provide concrete tests of that position. Amonn’s unusually emphatic approval makes the review revealing in its own right: readers can examine how a diagnosis of monetary disorder becomes an argument against national planning, and where exposition turns into advocacy for Röpke’s liberal programme.

Building more homes does not necessarily put families into dwellings they need and can afford. In this 1955 review essay, Alfred Amonn examines eight reports from West Germany’s housing advisory council with Swiss policy firmly in view. He finds a compelling distinction between financing construction and helping households pay rent: protecting all existing tenants through frozen rents can discourage mobility and maintenance while leaving overcrowded families without relief. His support for cost-covering rents therefore goes together with targeted assistance, not the withdrawal of social protection. Particularly revealing is his attention to indirect effects—smaller new dwellings may free larger homes for families, while cheaper credit can complicate funded welfare provision. The essay offers a concrete examination of why housing finance, household needs, and social assistance must be considered together.

An economy can expand without changing how it produces or improving output per person. For Alfred Amonn, this distinction exposes a central weakness in dynamic equilibrium theory: explaining growth is not yet explaining development. In this 1956 review essay on Willy Kraus’s Wirtschaftswachstum und Gleichgewicht, Amonn tests models of expansion against the harder questions of technical change, capital deepening, and structural transformation. His criticism also separates equilibrium from two conditions often associated with it—steady growth and full employment. Readers can discover how definitions of saving, investment, and monetary equilibrium shape apparently substantive disagreements, and why Amonn regards the prevention of cumulative disturbances as a more defensible policy aim than a guaranteed programme of uninterrupted growth.

Can labour explain capital formation without treating saving as its original cause? In this critical essay, Alfred Amonn examines Alexander Kokkalis’s attempt to rebuild economic theory around human productive powers. Kokkalis locates productive advance in invention, organization, and education rather than abstention from consumption; even the maintenance of workers becomes part of production, not merely its endpoint. Amonn takes these connections seriously while testing the distinctions that sustain them: between natural conditions and controllable means, and between directive intellectual labour and executive bodily labour. The essay’s interest lies in this combination of sympathetic reconstruction and conceptual scrutiny. It allows readers to see how redefining labour changes the explanation of capital, income, and wages—and where that explanation depends on contestable premises.

Across every front of postwar economic policy—money, cartels, rents, agriculture, public finance—Amonn diagnoses the same disorder: isolated, "pointillist" interventions that each summon the next until a market order slides toward central planning. Invoking Eucken's interdependence of orders, he shows how cheap money invites credit expansion, inflation, and then price controls. He reads the 1957 Law Against Restraints of Competition as a prohibition so laced with exceptions that it becomes abuse-control by another name, defends rent decontrol against entrenched tenant privilege, attacks cost-covering agricultural prices, and rejects Keynesian deficit finance and redistributive taxation alike. His guiding maxim, aligned with Erhard's "prosperity for all," is in dubio pro libertate—when in doubt, decide for freedom.

Will man den einkommenschwachen Schichten, die es nötig haben, helfen, so kann dies — und soll dies — durch sozialpolitische Maßnahmen geschehen, wie es bis anhin als Regel gegolten hat. Das ist etwas wesentlich anderes als die Umverteilung der Einkommen.

English translation: “If one wishes to help the low-income strata who are in need, this can — and should — be done through social-policy measures, as has hitherto been the rule. That is something essentially different from the redistribution of incomes.”

Can an economy gain from foreign trade without changing its domestic institutions? In this review-essay on Ernst Heuss’s Wirtschaftssysteme und internationaler Handel, Alfred Amonn examines trade policy through the economic arrangements it sustains. His sympathetic exposition brings out the stakes of Heuss’s approach: exchange controls may undermine market coordination, while tariffs may protect not simply producers but a particular distribution of income. The tension becomes especially concrete when a centrally planned economy bargains as a single buyer and seller against dispersed market participants. By following Amonn’s presentation, readers can distinguish restrictions that Heuss regards as necessary to preserve an economic system from measures that may instead transform it—a different test from asking whether a policy merely increases trade.

Switzerland, Amonn argues, has accumulated so many collectivist interventions that it can no longer honestly be called a market economy, whatever its constitution's guarantees of commercial freedom. Dedicated to Fritz Marbach, this critical survey turns a sharp eye on Swiss cartels, on the milk regime whose guaranteed prices breed gluts, on cost-covering agricultural prices that capitalize into ever-rising land values, and above all on wartime rent control, which he indicts at length for freezing the housing market, privileging sitting tenants over young families, and letting the building stock decay. He leans on the Federal Price Formation Commission's report and its standard of "possible competition," traces recent price rises to imported inflation, and warns that permanent rent control amounts, in Otto Bauer's own terms, to socialization by other means.

Economics grew out of philosophy and never fully left it, and Amonn sets out to reconnect the two. A sweeping historical survey runs from Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, Locke, Hume, Quesnay, and Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill, tracing how thinkers treated wealth, the just price, and usury under ethical norms before economics became an autonomous, quasi-natural science. From there he builds toward the socialist calculation problem—collectivist planning, lacking freely formed scarcity prices, has no reliable Knappheitsanzeiger—and toward the discipline's foundations in psychology, ethics, and the Methodenstreit over induction and deduction. The closing chapters weigh justice against expediency across property, inheritance, monopoly, taxation, and interest, which he defends through time-preference against the old Aristotelian and canon-law charge that money is barren.

Der Eigennutz im Wirtschaftsverkehr ist also keineswegs ein ethisch verwerfliches Prinzip.

English translation: “Self-interest in economic intercourse is thus by no means an ethically reprehensible principle.”

Does replacing “value” with “economic dimension” explain anything new about exchange? In this critical article, Alfred Amonn tests Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld’s proposed reform against a concrete problem: why exchange ratios exhibit regularities despite arising from decentralized decisions. Amonn distinguishes remembered and anticipated prices from the objective relations they may help explain, asking whether a supposed norm of exchange is more than a reference point for bargaining. His alternative locates economic magnitudes not in properties inherent in goods but in relations among exchanging subjects. The dispute offers a precise way to examine what economic concepts must accomplish: a money price, for example, cannot establish command over other goods unless their prices are also known. Amonn’s recognition of Gottl’s insights into exchange decisions and money sharpens rather than softens his demand for explanatory clarity.

Must wartime price increases be reversed before foreign trade can recover? In this review of Robert Liefmann’s study of monetary expansion, Alfred Amonn challenges that prescription by distinguishing exchange-rate stability from restoration of a lower price level. He accepts that new money raises prices through incomes and demand, but disputes Liefmann’s claim to have discovered this mechanism. His sharper objection concerns causation: he treats rising domestic prices and currency depreciation as parallel effects of monetary expansion, rather than the former as the cause of the latter. The review offers a compact encounter with economic criticism in practice, showing why higher import prices measured in marks do not, in Amonn’s argument, necessarily mean paying more in goods or labor.

A system of equations can represent market equilibrium without fully explaining how prices arise. This distinction anchors Alfred Amonn’s two-installment review of the first edition of Gustav Cassel’s Theoretische Sozialökonomik. Appreciative of Cassel’s clarity and theoretical advances, Amonn nevertheless challenges his attempt to dispense with subjective valuation: demand functions still require explanation, and renaming valuation does not remove it. His criticism also exposes a tension between what markets do and what an economically rational allocation ought to accomplish. Purchasing power, he argues, cannot be mistaken for a common measure of the urgency of people’s needs. The review offers a precise encounter between rival explanatory approaches, showing why acknowledging interdependence among prices, incomes and demand is not the same as explaining its foundations.

Mit einem Worte: Cassels Darstellung des Preisbildungsprozesses ist noch keine Erklärung dieses Prozesses, sondern erst der Anfang einer Erklärung.

English translation: “In a word: Cassel’s account of the price-formation process is not yet an explanation of that process, but only the beginning of an explanation.”

A stronger krone need not mean a richer Austria. In this article, Alfred Amonn challenges the demand for currency appreciation by separating money’s numerical value from the goods and services it can command. Against Emanuel Hugo Vogel, he argues that raising the exchange rate cannot create purchasing resources for the country; it can, however, redistribute income toward creditors while disrupting production. His alternative—stable domestic purchasing power—also presents a practical difficulty: Austria’s controlled prices, fiscal deficit, and delayed inflationary effects make existing monetary relationships unsuitable for immediate stabilization. The article connects a precise dispute over the aim of monetary policy with the difficult sequencing of reconstruction, showing why fiscal repair and price adjustment must, in Amonn’s account, precede durable stability.