The archive.

Could a better science of business cycles let policymakers smooth the waves of boom and bust? Mises answers that this is a matter of policy and popular pressure, not theory. Writing in 1933 and here in English translation, he takes the circulation-credit, or monetary, theory of the cycle as the prevailing doctrine, then asks why governments keep returning to credit expansion. The appetite for low interest rates, the contradictory political demand for high producer prices and low consumer prices at once, and union wage rates held above market levels all conspire to make pump-priming perennially attractive. He warns that entrepreneurs will not take the bait once they expect expansion to be curtailed, and singles out falling prices as the terrain where economic theory remains weakest.

The credit expansion which evokes the upswing always originates from the idea that business stagnation must be overcome by "easy money."

Can economics establish laws that hold across different societies without treating human beings like objects in a laboratory? In these methodological essays, presented in the 2003 third English edition, Ludwig von Mises grounds economic knowledge in purposeful choice rather than statistical regularity or psychological motives. His claim that action is rational does not mean that people are wise or selfish: pursuing honor, religious devotion, or political power also involves choosing ends and sacrificing alternatives. Against historicism, he argues that even accounts of unique events presuppose general concepts of exchange, cost, and value. The central tension is between the universality Mises claims for economic theory and the diversity he acknowledges in human purposes. His distinctions clarify what economics can explain—and why, on his account, it can neither prescribe ultimate ends nor predict numerical outcomes.

Can monetary policy relieve a depression without preparing the next crisis? In this 1934 German essay, also intended as the preface to the forthcoming English edition of his monetary treatise, Ludwig von Mises tests promises of recovery against their deferred costs. His defense of gold is not a claim to monetary perfection: he distinguishes the damage caused by Britain’s chosen restoration parity from the gold standard itself, and regards dependence on gold production as less dangerous than political control of currency values. Particularly revealing is his extension of monetary reform into international law: secure lending, he argues, requires enforceable protections against unilateral national interference. The essay connects currency policy to the security of contracts and access to foreign savings, while insisting that neither devaluation nor credit expansion can substitute for capital formation.

A currency can return to gold without recovering the trust once attached to it. That distinction drives Mises’s 1935 review of the third edition of T. E. Gregory’s The Gold Standard and its Future. Praising Gregory’s monetary analysis, Mises questions whether restored gold parities could revive international lending while governments remain willing to depreciate currencies in pursuit of domestic objectives. Protectionism, nominal-wage commitments, and policies favouring debtors enter his account as obstacles to credible monetary restraint. This short review offers a precise way to distinguish a formal monetary rule from the political willingness to honour it—and shows why Mises regards the latter, rather than the technical act of stabilization, as the decisive problem.

Owning wool-producing territory does not spare manufacturers the need to buy wool. With this distinction between sovereignty and commercial access, Mises redirects the debate over international peace from colonial redistribution to restrictions on migration. In this 1935 essay, he argues that workers in high-wage countries defend their advantages by excluding poorer newcomers, exposing a conflict within claims of international labor solidarity. Yet he also contends that exclusion ultimately costs protected workers the gains of a wider division of labor. His warning to the League of Nations makes migration policy a question of peace, not merely wages. The essay offers a pointed account of how national labor protection can generate international grievances, while its racial and climatic framing of European settlement marks the historical limits of its perspective.

Bank-created fiduciary media, notes and current accounts unbacked by gold, expand credit, push interest rates below their natural level, and lure entrepreneurs into ventures that look profitable only under distorted conditions. Setting out the Austrian monetary theory of the trade cycle, Mises traces its lineage to the English Currency School while faulting that school for missing current accounts as engines of expansion and for confining its gaze to national rather than international credit. He separates genuine capital accumulation from the artificial boom, explains why sustained expansion must give way to either crisis or currency collapse, and reads depression as the necessary liquidation of malinvestment. Renewed pump-priming only postpones and deepens the reckoning. Wicksell, Boehm-Bawerk, Wieser, Hayek, Machlup, and Robbins stand behind the argument.

It is not the task of the banks to remedy the consequences of the scarcity of capital or the effects of wrong economic policy by extension of credit.

Economic and political liberalism, Mises insists, are of one stock and cannot be divided: strip away market freedom and parliamentary democracy and civil liberty go with it. This short Geneva essay presents the private-property market economy as a form of economic democracy, one in which consumers direct production through their daily purchases while political majorities increasingly vote against that very order. Drawing on William Rappard's study of Switzerland, where democratic expansion marched in step with growing state intervention, he frames the age's central choice starkly, between liberal-democratic freedom and an etatism that, left to its logic, tends toward dictatorship. Interventionism, statism, socialism, and the planned economy figure here not as moderate alternatives but as solvents of the constitutional order itself.

Jeder Groschen stellt einen Stimmzettel dar.

English translation: “Every penny represents a ballot.”

Written in 1942 for Americans wary of economists whose earlier prosperity forecasts had failed, this plain-language essay defines inflation as an increase in money and money substitutes - deposit currency and bank credit - and traces where its losses fall. Mises shows that every creditor is silently robbed: savings, pensions, insurance claims, and Social Security benefits are all repaid in depreciated dollars, while salaried professionals watch living costs outrun their incomes. He weighs the usual escapes - gold, foreign currency, farmland, stocks - and finds each blocked by law or market. Gravest of all, he argues, are the moral and political effects: inflation destroys thrift, radicalizes the ruined, and breeds support for dictators and quack remedies. Its true cause is not necessity but the government's choice to finance itself by credit expansion rather than honest taxes.

For all these millions of people, every further step toward inflation means a further decline in the real value of the claims or credits they have saved up by years of toil and sacrifice.

Can an economy remain capitalist when private ownership survives but government dictates how enterprises operate? In this 1942 review of Maxine Y. Sweezy’s The Structure of the Nazi Economy, Ludwig von Mises praises her empirical research while contesting her classification of the system she describes. His criterion is effective control over production, not legal ownership or equality of incomes; on that basis, he calls the Nazi economy socialist. A particularly revealing tension concerns managers: deprived of independent authority, they may nevertheless preserve capital in the hope of recovering their businesses after the war. This brief review offers a concentrated encounter with Mises’s distinction between the outward forms of enterprise and the power to make economic decisions—and with his attempt to explain productive incentives within a system he condemns.

Could knowledge of the trade cycle prevent entrepreneurs from helping to set one in motion? In this short response to L. M. Lachmann, Mises accepts that a credit-induced boom depends on how businesspeople interpret easier borrowing, while denying that Austrian theory had overlooked this condition. His distinctive emphasis is on calculation rather than mere optimism: interest rates can mislead investors even when they appear normal or high, if they inadequately reflect monetary depreciation. The exchange clarifies where expectations enter Mises’s monetary explanation—and why recognizing credit expansion is harder than observing abundant loans or rising demand. It also leaves open a pointed possibility: entrepreneurs who understand the mechanism might respond differently, changing the outcome the theory explains.

Did European labor succumb to inadequate leadership, or to doctrines that left it unable to answer nationalism? In this 1943 review of Adolf Sturmthal’s The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918–1939, Ludwig von Mises shifts the explanation from personalities to economic ideas. He praises Sturmthal’s portraits of labor leaders but argues that Marxism and trade unionism obscured conflicts between workers protected by immigration barriers and those excluded from opportunity. His distinctive concern is the vulnerability of industrial countries dependent on imported food and raw materials: nationalist conquest offered, he argues, a vicious and unworkable answer to problems labor failed to confront. The review makes international mobility and trade central to Mises’s indictment of interwar labor politics—and to his bleak expectations for postwar recovery.

Shared vulnerability to aggression does not necessarily make nations willing partners in peace. In this 1943 review of Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer’s Victory Is Not Enough!, Ludwig von Mises tests proposals for European confederation against the persistence of tariffs, migration barriers and exchange controls. His imagined Ruritanian worker gives the objection a concrete edge: why support a federation that preserves other countries’ wage advantages while blocking access to their markets? Mises argues that political institutions cannot secure lasting peace while their members practise economic exclusion. Yet he warmly values the reviewed author’s realism, informed by experience in the League of Nations secretariat. This short review offers a pointed distinction between recognising a common security interest and accepting the economic changes that cooperation demands.

No sophisticated union-project and no diplomatic makeshifts can make peace durable in an environment of economic warfare.