4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
An accounting identity can be correct and still mislead a student about what causes economic change. This is the tension Fritz Machlup pursues in his 1949 review of the first volume of Erich Schneider’s Introduction to Economic Theory. He welcomes Schneider’s effort to build national-income accounts from the bookkeeping of individual firms, but questions formulations that make taxes and budget deficits appear to determine entrepreneurial income merely by definition. His criticism turns on a precise distinction: quantities recorded after the event do not, by themselves, explain how policy changes affect behaviour. The review offers a compact lesson in reading macroeconomic equations critically, while preserving Schneider’s case for aggregation as a practical necessity rather than a substitute for understanding individual decisions.
British merchants imagined China as a vast market worth opening by force; the Foreign Office doubted that trade could pay for the responsibilities conquest would bring. In this review of Nathan A. Pelcovits’s study, Eric Voegelin accepts that explanation of British restraint but questions what an archival demonstration leaves unevaluated. He asks how competition between Chinese textiles and Western machine goods changed, and distinguishes prudent short-term calculation from the longer reach of industrial ambition. His distinctive suggestion is that the merchants’ program of railways, reform, and industrialization survived under Chinese nationalist leadership, while Britain lacked the strength to carry it out. The review lets readers follow the point at which approval of a documented policy history becomes an argument about the limits of imperial power.
Can a logical measure of confirmation genuinely learn from experience if its starting weights are chosen for simplicity? In this brief written reply to a journal discussion, Gerhard Tintner defends Carnap’s inductive logic on precisely that ground. He contrasts a weighting procedure that leaves confirmation untouched by previous observations with a predictive rule whose results approach observed relative frequencies as samples grow. His defence remains qualified: the language must satisfy demanding conditions, the notion of a simple predicate presents difficulties, and application to continuous variables awaits further theory. The reply offers a compact view of how Tintner tests a formal construction against empirical learning without concealing its unfinished foundations.
Can European countries open their markets to one another without surrendering control of their external trade policies? In this 1949 article, Richard Schüller argues for a free-trade area rather than a customs union, drawing on his experience negotiating Austro-Hungarian commercial arrangements to expose the political demands of a common tariff. His alternative preserves national independence, but offers no escape from monetary reform: duty-free trade means little while individual imports still require licenses. Concrete examples—including American aid that obstructs sales of Italian tractors and Polish coal—show how measures intended to relieve scarcity can impede European exchange. The article distinguishes what trade agreements can accomplish from what depends on stable currencies, adjusted exchange rates, and governments’ willingness to relinquish controls.
Neither these schemes nor the usual tariff agreements have any meaning so long as each individual import transaction depends on the granting of a license.
Numerical probability divides a fixed unit of belief among rival hypotheses; that additive structure, Shackle contends, is exactly what makes it useless for describing genuine uncertainty, where several incompatible outcomes may each be perfectly possible with nothing known against them. The remedy proposed is potential surprise, a non-additive measure of disbelief that lets rival hypotheses coexist without competing for a common total. Dividing experiments into 'divisible' series, where frequency ratios can render an aggregate outcome knowable in advance, and unique 'non-divisible' acts, where such ratios are meaningless, he weighs an integrative decision rule, drawn via Ralph Turvey from Ingvar Svennilson, against his own focus-values solution and rejects the former as psychologically artificial. Expectation, he concludes, is an act of creative imagination, not rational calculation on incomplete data.
For a non-divisible, unique experiment it is plain that no frequency-ratio can have any meaning or relevance.
These are not the famous treatise but dense student notes from a 1949 Institute of World Affairs lecture, circulated by Arthur Smithies as the fullest exposition he knew of Schumpeter's late thought. Against Trotsky's claim that imperialism is capitalism's last stage, Schumpeter advances laborism: a society, exemplified by Britain, where labor's interests become the state's governing purpose. Higher wages, shorter hours, subsidies, and cheap money redirect the fiscal state away from capital renewal and defense toward present labor consumption. His feudal analogy is deliberately provocative, since modern redistribution does not abolish the class use of the state but inverts it. A laborist Britain, he predicts, cannot sustain great-power burdens and grows dependent on America, while a dictatorial Russia mobilizes for power politics Britain cannot match.
The working class has replaced Mme. du Barry, and we have the inverse of the feudal system.
Can Kant’s account of scientific knowledge survive the physics that overturned his assumptions about space? In this essay, Felix Kaufmann examines Cassirer’s answer: preserve the inquiry into the conditions of objective experience while relinquishing Kant’s commitment to Euclidean geometry. Scientific objects emerge through relations and laws, not as ready-made things merely copied by observation. Kaufmann tests this perspective against relativity, quantum indeterminacy, and mathematical concept formation, asking what allows changing theories to remain comparable. His sympathy is qualified: Cassirer illuminates the organization of knowledge, but Dewey offers a stronger account of how claims are tested. The resulting tension gives readers a precise way to distinguish a philosophy of scientific objectivity from an account of the procedures that warrant scientific belief.
Generating models that oscillate is not the same as explaining actual business cycles. In his contribution to this 1949 collective discussion, Gottfried Haberler asks how researchers can choose among proliferating theories without dismissing what they already know. His criticism cuts both ways: ambitious econometric techniques may promise more than they deliver, but failed research programmes can still leave useful evidence and methods. Against the search for one encompassing explanation, he proposes testing narrower causal claims through historical as well as statistical evidence. Readers can discover a concrete alternative to both theoretical overconfidence and theory-free measurement: inquiry centred on income, employment, and the limited propositions that economists can reasonably share.
However, the more models we have, the less we seem to know of the real business cycle.
A wage increase cannot protect living standards if rising food prices, utility charges and production costs absorb it. In this 1949 article, Hans Bayer treats Austria’s third wage–price agreement as a necessary emergency compromise, not a programme for recovery. His distinctive concern is what stabilization buys time to do: coordinate investment with export markets, redirect labour, and distinguish spending that expands productive capacity from spending that merely raises costs. He challenges both the dismissal of planning as hostile to private initiative and the promise that fiscal repair can burden the population without reducing its purchasing power. The article offers a concrete way to examine the agreement’s limits: not simply by asking who pays for reconstruction, but by asking whether economic policy makes those burdens smaller.
Italy’s factories could produce more without providing enough work for its unemployed. This tension drives Hans Bayer’s 1949 article, which moves from Rome’s fashionable Via Veneto to a working-class suburb and judges reconstruction by the livelihoods it promises. His sharpest example is steel: modernization could cut jobs while lowering costs for manufacturers who might then employ more people. Against projected industrial output growth of roughly 50 percent, Bayer sets anticipated employment growth of only 10–15 percent. His social-policy perspective makes visible what production targets conceal: recovery, competitiveness, and employment are distinct achievements. The article offers a concrete account of why industrial expansion seemed indispensable to postwar Italy—and why, in Bayer’s judgement, even successful expansion would leave its central social problem unresolved.
Money has no essence independent of its economic order; it is a creature of a particular economic form, and once that order changes so does money itself. From the wartime and postwar experience of rationing, blocked balances, black markets, and administrative allocation, Kerschagl rereads the classic problems—deposits and credit creation, quantity theory, exchange rates, gold, inflation, currency reform—around a single insight: legal payment power and general purchasing power can come apart. Ration cards, coupons, price controls, and occupational privileges shift access to goods from money toward administrative entitlement, so that identical nominal incomes carry unequal real content. Planning alters money qualitatively, personalizing it until, at the limit of full socialism, it decays into a mere Rechenpfennig. Sound policy, he insists, demands clarity in the creation of money and truth in monetary accounting.
Jede Planwirtschaft — und dabei muß es sich noch keineswegs etwa um eine vollsozialisierte Wirtschaft handeln — ändert sofort grundlegend den Charakter des Geldes.
English translation: “Every planned economy — and this need not by any means be a fully socialized economy — immediately alters the character of money in a fundamental way.”
The claim that every line of a consumer's spending is pushed to the same weighted marginal utility—Gossen's second law, and the hinge of the equilibrium systems of Jevons, Walras, and Pareto—is here dismantled as an aprioristic construction unsupported by experience. Following Hans Mayer, Mahr argues that consumption does not adjust in equal infinitesimal steps: as income rises some quantities stay fixed, inferior goods give way to better ones, and new wants awaken, so no common marginal level is ever revealed. Bread and potatoes remain 'overmarginal' for the well-off, their utility above that of money; genuine leveling appears only in the poorest budgets. What survives the critique is narrow—the marginal utility of money—and a warning that elegant equations must not be allowed to remake economic fact. First published in 1949.
Fällt das Gesetz vom Grenznutzenniveau, dann werden auch die n (m—1) Gleichungen — n repräsentiert dabei die Zahl der Individuen und m die Zahl der Waren —, in denen dieses Gesetz zum Ausdruck kommt, hinfällig.
English translation: “If the law of the marginal-utility level falls, then the n(m−1) equations—where n represents the number of individuals and m the number of goods—in which this law is expressed, also become invalid.”