4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Why would a financially strained government offer its creditors higher interest? In this 1949 historical essay, William Emmanuel Rappard examines three Genevan debt operations of 1863 and 1866 that reversed the usual logic of conversion. Legislative debates and treasury accounts reveal what the higher coupons purchased: relief from repayment obligations or the retirement of depreciated securities. Rappard distinguishes these immediate savings from any lasting restoration of public credit, questioning arrangements that weakened creditors’ repayment expectations. His perspective brings contractual rights and political confidence into the calculation of fiscal advantage. The later resistance of institutional lenders to lower interest sharpens the tension: measures that ease a public budget can unsettle the relationships on which its borrowing depends.
A commemorative commission poses a scholarly problem: how can a history sponsored by Austria’s chambers of commerce establish their importance without assuming it? In his 1949 preface to Hundert Jahre österreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung 1848–1948, editor Hans Mayer insists that their prominence follows from research, while explicitly championing their role in reconciling economic freedom with social obligations. His account of the project brings documentary inquiry into contact with administrative experience: legislation, chamber proceedings and political speeches are to disclose motives behind economic change, not merely record events. This short preface offers a focused view of Mayer’s conception of useful economic history—and of the tension between his commitment to scholarly independence and his confidence in the institution commissioning the work.
Small businesses can prosper while losing their independence: this tension anchors Hans Bayer’s 1949 article on American corporate giants. Bayer locates their power not merely in efficient production but in financial resources that sustain advertising, research, service networks, and expansion into other industries. An automobile manufacturer’s ability to enter locomotive production makes the mechanism concrete: accumulated capital can challenge specialist producers far beyond its original market. Against assurances that the survival of small firms proves competition remains healthy, Bayer asks who controls the conditions under which those firms survive. His argument offers a way to distinguish business growth from economic autonomy—and explains why he regards regulation as capable of restraining corporate abuses, but not of restoring an earlier competitive order.
When does efficient coordination become an abuse of economic power? In this 1949 article, Hans Bayer examines American antitrust policy without assuming that either large enterprises or unrestricted competition are inherently desirable. His concrete test is basing-point pricing: buyers can be charged freight calculated from a designated production centre, regardless of where their goods actually originate. Such arrangements expose the difficulty of distinguishing useful coordination from practices that suppress competition—and of proving collusion from identical prices. Bayer argues that law should target the abuse of concentration rather than combinations themselves. His consideration of public supervision and cooperative self-help lets readers explore what protecting consumers might require when breaking up firms is neither practicable nor economically sound.
Hayek reads Margaret Cole’s commemorative collection through a pointed tension: how did the Webbs’ Fabian gradualism lead to admiration for Soviet communism? In this short 1950 review, he highlights their associates’ testimony that the Soviet allegiance continued, rather than overturned, their earlier political philosophy—including a reported preference for Lenin’s abandonment of workers’ control. He also challenges the collection’s biographical balance, arguing that Beatrice’s prominence obscures Sidney’s intellectual originality and political influence. The review offers a compact encounter with Hayek as a critical reader of socialist biography: appreciative of firsthand testimony, alert to its omissions, and intent on distinguishing recollections of a partnership from an explanation of how its governing beliefs were formed.
Do British industrial employment and labor supply respond to real wages, or separately to money wages and prices? In this brief conference-paper abstract, Gerhard Tintner reports estimates for 1920–1938, distinguishing employers’ wholesale-price measure from workers’ cost of living. His demand estimates suggest that the wage–price ratio matters, but the estimated elasticity changes from −0.4 to −0.7 when a time trend is included. On supply, he is more guarded: the negative elasticities are interesting, yet dependence on wages and prices remains uncertain. The abstract offers a compact encounter with an empirical tension—how much an econometric estimate can establish when its magnitude depends on specification and the underlying relationship itself is doubtful.
Discarding a metaphysical sentence does not necessarily dispose of the problem it was meant to express. This distinction guides Felix Kaufmann’s examination of logical positivism: can linguistic analysis clarify knowledge without presupposing meanings and standards that linguistic conventions cannot supply? In this 1950 essay, Kaufmann reads the disagreements between Wittgenstein and Carnap as substantive conflicts, not merely successive refinements of one programme. Drawing on Husserl, he distinguishes propositions and their logical relations from assertions accepted provisionally in scientific inquiry. The distinction lets readers see why deductive entailment and the revisable procedures of science require different accounts—and why, for Kaufmann, positivism’s achievements in clarification leave its central questions about meaning, experience, and truth unresolved.
Why do warnings about harmful economic policies so often fail to persuade? In this review essay, republished in 1952, Ludwig von Mises finds an answer in the ideological commitments through which policy failures are interpreted. His appreciation of Benjamin M. Anderson’s posthumous Economics and The Public Welfare places a practicing bank economist’s warnings about credit expansion and intervention against what Mises regards as progressive faith in socialism’s historical inevitability. The tension is between economic diagnosis and political conviction: consequences that discredit a policy to one observer may justify further intervention to another. Readers encounter both Mises’s polemical classification of rival doctrines and his more personal account of the historian’s responsibility to warn contemporaries—a responsibility he connects with Anderson’s insistence on trust and promise-keeping in monetary affairs.
A useful textbook can still teach distinctions that obscure the processes it seeks to explain. In this 1950 review of the third edition of Elmer Clark Bratt’s Business Cycles and Forecasting, Joseph A. Schumpeter combines a strong teaching recommendation with scrutiny of statistical and conceptual habits. He questions trend fitting, the separation of short cycles from longer movements, and the neglect of individual industries in accounts of economy-wide fluctuations. His concern is causal: do the categories clarify mechanisms, or merely organize observations? Especially revealing is his distinction between factors external to a formal model and those external to business activity. This compact review shows how Schumpeter’s welcome for complementary cycle theories coexists with exacting demands on the assumptions used to classify and explain economic change.
Why should interchangeable factors guarantee determinate values? In this brief conference abstract, Oskar Morgenstern challenges that familiar economic assumption through game theory. He treats the extra value created by combining factors not as an awkward exception, but as something the characteristic function of an n-person game can describe. His sharper challenge concerns substitution: he points to games involving six players or factors in which substitutability does not permit values to be assigned. The examples are announced rather than demonstrated here, but the distinction is clear: interchangeability need not secure the determinate equilibrium economists seek. This compact statement shows why Morgenstern redirects attention toward the different, more complex game-theoretic notion of a “solution.”
A military program can demand more tanks and ships yet undermine itself by diverting steel from the railroads needed to move them. This concrete tension anchors Oskar Morgenstern’s 1950 article on economic computation: requirements cannot be assessed separately when industries compete for resources and depend on one another’s output. He argues for mathematical analysis while confronting its limits—delayed statistics, information lost through aggregation, and an economy coordinated by decentralized decisions rather than commands. An interindustry calculation traces how an order for chemicals and munitions generates still larger demands elsewhere. The reader discovers both what computation can expose beyond administrative intuition and why proving a program feasible does not establish that it is the best available choice.
Written in the aftermath of a catastrophe its author dates to 1932–1945, this closing synthesis measures humanity's ascent against its recurring descent into madness. Thurnwald traces self-domestication from foragers through plant cultivators and pastoralists to the Metal Age and the archaic state, giving Überschichtung—the superimposition of specialized groups, herders over cultivators—pride of place as the engine of caste, serfdom, and slavery. Institutions of kinship, economy, law, and religion are read through cases from Maori communal redistribution and Buin shell money to the Sumerian temple economy, while universal religions appear as reforms against aristocratic cults. The verdict is somber: technical command of external nature has far outrun any comparable command of social life, whose domestication remains grievously unfinished.
Die Menschen haben die Natur in nicht unerheblichem Ausmaß zu meistern verstanden, doch nur wenig ihr Zusammenleben.
English translation: “Human beings have managed to master nature to no small extent, but their common life only very little.”