4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Grant, for the sake of argument, that pollution is grave: the real question, Sennholz proposes, is whether its cause is private enterprise or political control. Answering the charge that pollution proves the failure of capitalism, he reverses the accusation—the state itself is the chief polluter, through public dumps, incinerators, sewer authorities, and navigable waters treated as common property, with Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River as exhibits. Urban smog he traces not to the automobile, which he defends as a genuine gain of enterprise, but to zoning, subsidized roads priced as free goods, and transit strangled by regulation. His deeper move recasts pollution as a failure of property-right enforcement rather than of property itself: where law exempts owners from the costs they impose, harm follows. The remedy is not a new bureaucracy but tort liability, damages, and injunctions—an early manifesto of free-market environmentalism.
As government is the prime polluter of our environment we must call on government to cease and desist.
Neither in its causes nor in its effects is inflation a purely monetary affair, this wide-ranging treatise maintains: it springs from the plain fact that too many people want everything at once. Kerschagl treats it as a fraud against savers, pensioners, and creditors and as the greatest economic revolution imaginable — expropriating money-holders, rewarding debtors including the state, and dissolving the accounting on which capitalist calculation rests. Across coin debasement in Rome, John Law's Banque Royale, the assignats, and the German, English, French, and American inflations of the twentieth century, he weighs quantity theory against Schumpeter and Keynes, dismisses gold as no reliable safeguard, and denies that full employment can ever be bought with fiduciary credit. Stable money, he concludes, is the precondition of democracy, welfare, and freedom alike.
Gold ist kein Heilmittel, auch nicht gegen Inflation.
English translation: “Gold is no remedy, not even against inflation.”
Did the alchemists ever truly make gold? Kerschagl's concise history answers no — not a single controlled specimen survives — while insisting that the quest was never mainly about gold at all: most adepts were physicians and apothecaries chasing elixirs, panaceas, and remedies. From Mesopotamian metallurgy and Alexandrian experiment through Arab transmission, Paracelsus's turn from speculation toward empirical medicine, and the frauds of Cagliostro, Casanova, and the gold-makers at Rudolf II's Prague court, the book separates genuine discovery — mercury, phosphorus, porcelain, mineral acids — from delusion and swindle. It closes with Franz Joseph's skeptical assay trials and the twentieth century's nuclear transmutation of mercury into gold, scientifically real yet economically pointless. Alchemy's failed quest, the verdict runs, nonetheless vastly enlarged human knowledge.
Nur ein kleiner Teil der Arbeit der Alchimisten war in Wirklichkeit der Suche nach dem künstlichen Gold gewidmet.
English translation: “Only a small part of the alchemists' work was in reality devoted to the search for artificial gold.”
Thirty years after The Road to Serfdom, Hayek returns to its warning from the vantage of the inflationary 1970s, insisting he never claimed that limited intervention must automatically breed tyranny, only that bad principles corrode the market order on which political freedom rests. His diagnosis is constitutional: representative democracy has been wrongly fused with unlimited parliamentary sovereignty, so that parties bidding for majorities must buy support by granting favours to organized interests. Recovering the classical distinction between law as general rules of just conduct and command aimed at particular groups, he exposes social justice as continual coercive adjustment and sketches a deliberately utopian remedy, two assemblies, one governing and administering, the other confined to general law by long non-renewable terms, with a constitutional court policing the boundary between them.
Although the threat to free institutions now comes from a source different from that with which I was concerned 30 years ago, it has become even more acute than it was then.
Conservatives, Rothbard charges, have long ceded the moral high ground to the Left, objecting to egalitarian programs only as impractical—a fatal concession, since ideals move the status quo. His 1973 essay therefore attacks the ideal itself. Equality, he argues, is intelligible only with respect to a specific attribute; taken literally it collapses into identity, and identity would demand coercive leveling of beauty, intelligence, and strength—the dystopias of Hartley's Facial Justice and Vonnegut's "Harrison Bergeron." Grounding human difference in biology as well as culture, he assails egalitarian readings of sex roles, youth quotas, and intelligence, then widens the charge from anthropology to ontology: utopian socialism from Fourier to Lenin becomes a revolt against the very structure of nature. Egalitarianism, he concludes, is not a humane ideal impeded by circumstance but something anti-human at its root.
The egalitarian world would necessarily be a world of horror fiction—a world of faceless and identical creatures, devoid of all individuality, variety, or special creativity.
Everything follows from a single axiom: no one may initiate physical violence against another person or their property. From that nonaggression principle Rothbard builds an uncompromising system that asks not for smaller government but for none at all, with privatized courts and police, homesteaded property, and the abolition of conscription, welfare, and the central bank. He grounds self-ownership in natural law rather than utilitarian calculation, derives civil liberties from control of material resources rather than treating them as a separate class of human rights, and reads the State as an organized criminal band living by taxation and war. Ranging across schooling, inflation, ecology, victimless crime, foreign policy, and stateless medieval Ireland, this manifesto casts libertarianism as the true heir of America's revolutionary radicalism.
In fact, there are no human rights that are separable from property rights.
Beneath the questions of money, banking, and policy technique lies a deeper subject—human action itself. Framing Percy L. Greaves's Buenos Aires lectures on the dollar crisis, Mises grounds monetary economics in a broader anthropology of purposeful conduct, dividing the world into events action can influence and those beyond its reach, and rejecting alike fatalism and the fantasy of technocratic omnipotence. Growing knowledge enlarges human power, he insists, without ever making man omniscient. The section on gold treats it not as an arbitrary convention but as the historically evolved medium whose supply is fixed by nature rather than political discretion—a standing check on the interested parties who would manipulate purchasing power. Neither inflation nor deflation, on this account, can serve as a lasting policy; the dollar crisis is the wage of abandoning that discipline.
The gold standard made the marvelous evolution of modern capitalism technically possible.
What counts as rational conduct when the outcome depends on someone else’s choices? In this encyclopedia entry, Oskar Morgenstern explains why strategic interaction cannot be reduced to an individual maximizing a quantity under personal control. Writing as a co-author of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, he challenges economic models that make participants too small to influence one another and shows why deliberately randomizing a decision can be rational rather than evasive. Coalition bargaining raises a further difficulty: there may be several stable distributions of gains, not one uniquely best settlement. The entry offers a participant’s account of game theory’s conceptual ambitions alongside its limits, including computational obstacles and the possibility that people who learn a social theory will change the behavior it describes.
Rational behavior is not an assumption of that theory; rather, its identification is one of its outcomes.
After Nixon closed the gold window and Bretton Woods came apart, Sennholz set out the Austrian case in its starkest constitutional form: inflation is not high prices but the authorities' creation of new money, and rising prices merely its later, uneven effects. The true target is political power over money, which lets governments tax, borrow, and redistribute without open consent—financing a welfare state whose social programs are too popular to oppose while credit expansion breeds the boom-bust cycle and hidden transfers from savers to debtors. Against this he defends the gold-coin standard as the monetary constitution of a free society, distinguishing it from gold-bullion and gold-exchange arrangements that keep gold's name while centralizing reserves and inviting suspension. His reform is liberal, not technocratic: legal gold ownership, enforceable gold clauses, private minting, and competing monies rather than a parity decreed by the same state that destroyed convertibility.
It is not money, as is sometimes said, but the depreciation of money — the cruel and crafty destruction of money — that is the root of many evils.
When Washington suspended the dollar's convertibility into gold in August 1971, it exposed how deeply American inflation had become the world's problem, the theme of this 1973 essay, collected in Haberler's volume on inflation and business cycles. Because the dollar served as reserve and intervention currency, U.S. price rises under Vietnam and Great Society financing were transmitted abroad in amplified form, forcing Germany, Switzerland, and Austria to resist inflation they had not created. Haberler distinguishes a pure dollar crisis from a mark or yen crisis, locates the fundamental defect in the adjustable peg, and defends greater exchange-rate flexibility through managed floating. Only domestic monetary restraint, he insists, can end inflation itself, but floating spares the system disruptive one-way speculation.
But let me repeat, the compulsion to submit to imported inflation arises only under a regime of fixed exchanges and convertibility.
Behind the fashionable slogan of “international liquidity,” Machlup finds a cluster of distinct problems the phrase conveniently blurs: reserve adequacy, exchange-rate adjustment, the status of gold, and the institutional meaning of Special Drawing Rights. Replying to Teschner in a tightly timed conference intervention, he refuses any single-cause story of the Bretton Woods collapse — rapid reserve growth let countries postpone adjustment, but shrinking American gold cover mattered too. He defends the original SDR as an unbacked reserve asset distributed gratis, warns against schemes that would smuggle back the notion of “coverage,” and turns his “Mrs. Machlup’s wardrobe” parable against simplistic reserve-demand estimates. The lecture’s force lies in dismantling the pseudo-precision of monetary reform and asking what its concepts actually measure.
Die Währungsbehörden sind in der Regel optimistisch und glauben immer, daß der gegenwärtige Kurs auch der richtige ist.
English translation: “The monetary authorities are as a rule optimistic and always believe that the prevailing rate is also the correct one.”
Between the grown order that no one designed and the made order that serves a chosen purpose lies the whole of Hayek's mature legal and political theory. Across three volumes gathered here in the one-volume form he originally intended, he distinguishes cosmos from taxis, the judge-discovered law of liberty (nomos) from legislative command (thesis), and the market's spontaneous catallaxy from the deliberate economy. The middle volume mounts a sustained assault on 'social justice,' which he calls an empty, quasi-religious incantation, since a spontaneous process assigns rewards to no one's design and so can be neither just nor unjust. Behind these arguments stands a warning that unlimited democracy, captured by organized interests, drifts toward the very totalitarian power classical constitutionalism was built to restrain, a danger he answers with proposals for constitutional redesign.
The tragic illusion was that the adoption of democratic procedures made it possible to dispense with all other limitations on governmental power.