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The Complete “Austrian School of Economics” Collection


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The archive.

4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.

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3,961–3,972 of 4,366 matches · 4,366 works total (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents)Page 331 of 364; every summary opens into its work.
  1. 1989
    The Savings and Loan Bailout: Valiant Rescue or Hysterical Reaction?

    The Savings and Loan Bailout: Valiant Rescue or Hysterical Reaction?

    Hans F. Sennholz · 19 sections

    The savings-and-loan collapse is usually blamed on private greed or reckless deregulation; Sennholz reads it instead as the predictable failure of a politically designed housing-finance cartel. Tracing the thrifts from voluntary building societies through federal chartering, the Home Loan Bank System, and flat-rate deposit insurance, he argues that Washington restricted entry, socialized risk, and forced institutions to borrow short while lending long on favored mortgages. When 1970s inflation lifted market rates above regulated ceilings, the protected structure buckled. The 1989 Reform and Rescue Act, in his account, merely renamed agencies and shifted losses to taxpayers while prosecuting managers and sparing the legislators who built the system. His remedy is abolition: liquidate insolvent firms through bankruptcy and privatize deposit insurance entirely.

    Federal deposit insurance subsidizes risk in direct proportion to the degree of risk taken.

  2. 1989
    The State of the World Economy: Global Imbalance, Exchange Rates and the World Debt

    The State of the World Economy: Global Imbalance, Exchange Rates and the World Debt

    Gottfried Haberler · 14 sections

    Three disorders defined the late-1980s world economy, and Haberler traces each to the same root: not technical malfunction but domestic policy failure. The persistent US budget and trade deficits, matched by German and Japanese surpluses; the volatility of a managed float in which governments pretend to know equilibrium rates and unsettle markets with interventions and communiques; and a debt crisis, opened by Mexico in 1982, that he reads less as a liquidity shortage than as the fruit of inflation, exchange controls, and bloated state enterprises. Rejecting Ricardian equivalence as psychologically false, he prescribes a credible multi-year phaseout of the structural deficit, funded by a stiff gasoline tax, and would leave currencies to competitive markets, contrasting Argentina's squandered decline with Chile's liberalization.

    People just don’t think that way. Nobody knows what his future tax liabilities will be, let alone those of his children and grandchildren.

  3. 1989
    World War I as Fulfillment: Power and the Intellectuals

    World War I as Fulfillment: Power and the Intellectuals

    Murray N. Rothbard · 9 sections

    For Murray N. Rothbard, American participation in World War I did not interrupt progressive reform: it gave reformers powers they had long sought. This essay asks how moral campaigns and claims to professional expertise became warrants for directing other people’s lives. From prohibitionists invoking food conservation to economists building the statistical machinery of planning, Rothbard traces the convergence of religious purpose, corporate interests, and administrative ambition. His explicitly libertarian perspective makes the coercive implications of benevolent reform central, especially where intellectuals defended wartime conformity or hoped to preserve emergency controls in peace. The revealing tension is between expertise as independent inquiry and expertise as a claim to govern—a distinction readers can test against his accounts of John Dewey, Richard T. Ely, and the institutions that carried wartime planning ambitions forward.

  4. 1990
    A Gold Standard for Russia?

    A Gold Standard for Russia?

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    Federal Reserve governor Wayne Angell's advice to a Gosbank official—define the ruble as a fixed weight of gold and make it convertible at once, before any gradual reform—gives Rothbard the occasion for a broader case against fiat money. Monetary credibility, he argues, is not liberalization's final reward but its precondition: a ruble ruined by inflation and official overvaluation cannot be trusted merely by pegging it to dollars or marks. Gold functions as a public test of restraint, tying money to something the state cannot conjure at will. The essay's sharpest turn comes when the Gosbank man asks why the West itself has not restored gold—and Rothbard reads Angell's reply as a confession that Western currencies coast on the borrowed prestige of a convertibility long abandoned.

    Without gold, however, Angell warned that the Soviet reform program might well collapse under the blows of rampant inflation and a progressively disintegrating ruble.

  5. 1990
    A Radical Prescription for the Socialist Bloc

    A Radical Prescription for the Socialist Bloc

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    Socialism cannot be repaired piecemeal—so runs the anti-gradualist thesis of this transition-economics essay, which holds that a market is an interconnected latticework whose parts must operate together. The Western advice to "phase in" freedom slowly merely shelters vested interests and perpetuates distortions, above all through price controls that mask monetary inflation and breed shortages. Rothbard prescribes the whole institutional order at once: total price decontrol, hard-currency convertibility, a genuine stock market, and immediate privatization of state assets. His most radical move is a property theory of transition—"homesteading," by which present users and workers receive negotiable ownership shares rather than buying back from the state assets it never legitimately held. Invoking Mises, he insists that only private ownership can generate genuine prices and profit-and-loss signals.

    Better to have a bar of soap cost ten rubles and be available than to cost two rubles and never appear.

  6. 1990
    Carl Menger and the Subjectivist Tradition in Economics

    Carl Menger and the Subjectivist Tradition in Economics

    Israel M. Kirzner · 9 sections

    Menger's real revolution, on this reassessment occasioned by the facsimile reprint of the Grundsaetze, was not diminishing marginal utility but a teleological vision of the whole economy: production as the conversion of higher-order into lower-order goods, every price, wage, rent, and interest an expression of subjective valuation reaching back from consumer wants. Kirzner defends that language against Frank Knight, then presses an immanent critique that Menger founded subjectivism without carrying it far enough. His theory of needs stays half-objectivist, and he writes as if consumer valuations transmit themselves automatically to factor prices, the very lapse Hayek exposed in Schumpeter, since only an omniscient mind could make that deduction without entrepreneurial discovery under uncertainty. Treating error as merely pathological, Menger missed the market process his heirs would supply. The Grundsaetze founded the Austrian School; Mises and Hayek completed it.

    This perspective transmutes all the phenomena of the economy from being simply physical transformations, relationships or ratios into direct or indirect expressions of human valuations, preferences, expectations and dreams.

  7. 1990
    Discovery, Private Property and the Theory of Justice in Capitalist Society

    Discovery, Private Property and the Theory of Justice in Capitalist Society

    Israel M. Kirzner · 11 sections

    Condemn capitalism, and the indictment almost always circles back to a single target: entrepreneurial profit, a surplus attributable to no productive input and so, critics insist, undeserved. Kirzner answers not with a new moral axiom but with a corrected economic picture. Accusers and classic defenders alike—John Bates Clark's marginal-productivity theory, Robert Nozick's entitlement account—share what he calls the 'given-pie' perspective, treating resources and opportunities as simply there to be divided. Against it he sets discovery: an unnoticed price gap, like an undiscovered island, enters social existence only when someone perceives it, so the entrepreneur who seizes a pure-profit opportunity has, in the relevant sense, created it. On this 'finders, keepers' ethic, private property and profit gain a defense that Lockean labor-mixing could never supply.

    A newly discovered island rich in natural resources has been created, for purposes of social science, in the act of its discovery.

  8. 1990
    From the Bench—Down With the De-e-e-fense

    From the Bench—Down With the De-e-e-fense

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    This pugnacious sports column turns a fan's grievance into a manifesto: games are better when they reward scoring, offensive imagination, and heroic individuals, and worse when rules and timid referees let defense strangle play. The Detroit Pistons' bruising basketball becomes Rothbard's chief villain, their "great defense" redescribed as legalized interference, while Michael Jordan stands as the offensive genius a "just basketball order" would crown. Modern soccer he treats as a decline into stalemate, where formations and the offside rule crowd the field until a one-goal lead is nearly insurmountable. Professional football is the hopeful exception, redeemed by the passing game and Mouse Davis's improvisatory run-and-shoot. Beneath the abrasive fandom runs a familiar sensibility: spontaneous adjustment over command planning, entrepreneurial brilliance over brute obstruction.

    The “great defense” is, of course, accomplished by thuggery: by physically preventing the offense of the other team from shooting.

  9. 1990
    Government Medical "Insurance"

    Government Medical "Insurance"

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    A Misesian principle anchors this dissection of American health care. Government intervention, Rothbard argues, breeds new dislocations that are then cited as reasons for still more—and no industry illustrates the process better than medicine. On the demand side, subsidized third-party payment through Medicare and Blue Cross insulates patients from price calculation, breeding moral hazard and "assembly-line" care while providers meet little resistance to higher charges. On the supply side, the Flexner Report of 1910 and AMA-backed licensing cartelized the profession, closing half the country's medical schools and lifting doctors' incomes. Artificial demand expansion meets artificial supply restriction; prices rise, quality falls, and the wreckage is blamed on too little state provision. National health insurance, he warns, would complete the very process that produced the crisis.

    One of Ludwig von Mises’s keenest insights was on the cumulative tendency of government intervention.

  10. 1990
    Government-Business "Partnerships"

    Government-Business "Partnerships"

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    "Partnership" between business and government sounds like public-spirited cooperation; Rothbard reads it as the oldest name for privilege. What passes for a modern reformist compromise is, in his account, warmed-over mercantilism—the state granting monopolies, subsidies, cartels, and bailouts to favored firms at the expense of consumers and excluded competitors. He runs the pattern from English monopoly grants and tax farming through the American Civil War, where the Whig-Republican "American System" of tariffs, excise taxes, railroad subsidies, greenbacks, and income tax replaced the freer order of the 1840s. Jay Cooke and Salmon P. Chase supply the banking corruption; the National Banking Act becomes a halfway house to the Federal Reserve. His target, he insists, is never commerce but political capitalism—and the Bush establishment is its heir, not its exception.

    The “partnership of government and business” is a new term for an old, old condition.

  11. 1990
    Inflation and the Spin Doctors

    Inflation and the Spin Doctors

    Murray N. Rothbard · 1 sections

    When the January 1990 cost-of-living index jumped 1.1 percent in a single month—an annualized rate above thirteen percent—no one panicked, and that calm is exactly what Rothbard sets out to explain. Commentators, he charges, simply subtracted the fastest-rising categories, food and energy, and christened the remainder the "core rate," turning measurement into reassurance. He traces the maneuver's lineage from Reagan-era housing exclusions to 1923 Germany, where prices measured against gold could show deflation even as the mark collapsed. The Establishment, he argues, keeps economic spin doctors as surely as political ones. Rejecting wage-push explanations, Rothbard locates the real culprit where officials least like to look: the money supply created by the federal government itself.

    We consumers don’t have the privilege of paying only for “core” goods; nor, unfortunately, do we enjoy the luxury of paying in gold.

  12. 1990
    Knowledge Problems and Their Solutions: Some Relevant Distinctions

    Knowledge Problems and Their Solutions: Some Relevant Distinctions

    Israel M. Kirzner · 11 sections

    Hayek's claim that a society's knowledge exists only as scattered, incomplete fragments underwrites his account of markets, and he stretched it to explain how law, language, money, and measurement standards evolve without design. That extension is where Kirzner presses. He splits the dispersed-knowledge failure in two. Knowledge Problem A is disappointed optimism about what others will do, and it corrects itself through failed plans; Knowledge Problem B is the unnoticed mutually beneficial trade, revealed only by entrepreneurial alertness to pure profit. Markets solve both, because a missed opportunity is also a private profit opportunity. Institutions solve mainly Problem A: a stable rule needs only that everyone expect it, not that it be the best rule. A society may cling to feet and inches, no entrepreneur able to capture the social gain of the metric system. Hayek's analogy, Kirzner concludes, is only half right.

    There appears no obvious way in which any private entrepreneur could be attracted to notice the superiority of the metric system – let alone any chance of it being within his power to effect its adoption.

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