The archive.

Royal authority in Hammurabi’s Babylon depended on institutions it did not simply replace: lineages, temples, households, and privileged associations. In this completed section on the state, Richard Thurnwald reads laws alongside royal letters and contracts to ask how kingship cut across inherited dependencies while continuing to govern through them. His distinctive emphasis falls on overlapping functions: temples stored and lent as well as taught, while figures translated as merchants also collected dues and directed exchange. Legal distinctions between free people, royal dependents, and enslaved people make these relationships tangible through unequal compensation and punishment. Readers encounter a reconstruction of government through personal obligations rather than an impersonal apparatus—one whose tentative institutional identifications and evolutionary assumptions remain open to scrutiny.

An economist’s books have no buyers: in Felix Kaufmann’s comic song, even the defence of marginal utility suffers from insufficient demand. A Vienna-trained scholar greets his school’s supposed demise with theatrical despair, turning Menger’s work into a devotional object and his pen into a dagger—until economic polemics summon him back to battle. Set to Schumann’s music with an acknowledged debt to Heine, the song makes scholarly allegiance look at once ridiculous and resilient. Its humour lies in the uneasy overlap between devotion to a theory and concern for one’s own professional survival. Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation and arrangement preserve this small drama of intellectual loyalty, in which economic terminology itself joins the heroic posturing.

An invitation to refute a doctrine becomes comic when the speaker declares in advance that no critic can succeed. Felix Kaufmann’s two-stanza song turns economic conviction into a performance of certainty: marginal utility supplies the recurring answer, while Vienna claims privileged access to liberalism’s reasons. The sharper joke concerns values, which the speaker holds at a distance before insisting that thought cannot proceed without them. In Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation, with music by Gustav Pick, readers encounter a compact satire of theoretical allegiance and methodological self-contradiction. Although the title names Mises and Mayer, the lyrics leave their respective positions unassigned; the interest lies in the confident voice and the tensions it cannot quite conceal.

A scientist writes through the night until a methodologist compares his prose to beer foam and dismisses his a priori assumptions. In Felix Kaufmann’s satirical song, scholarly correction becomes mock-tragic catastrophe: the manuscript turns to ashes, taking its author’s sense of purpose with it. Yet the scientist’s increasingly elaborate “knots” of thought leave his own intellectual pretensions exposed. Presented in Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation, with music by Friedrich Silcher and an acknowledged debt to Heinrich Heine, this miniature stages a pointed tension between critical scrutiny and the confidence inquiry requires. Its comedy lies in the disproportion between a methodological rebuke and the ruin it brings.

Why did economists who defended liberty come to resist democracy? In this three-part article, William Emmanuel Rappard examines Sismondi, Rossi and Cherbuliez as participants in Geneva’s parliamentary life, rather than simply as authors of economic doctrines. Speeches, correspondence and diaries expose the distance between humanitarian convictions and confidence in popular rule: Sismondi defended the poor while resisting universal suffrage; Cherbuliez moved from liberal reform to embittered conservatism. Rossi offers a contrasting aptitude for practical compromise, legal distinctions and committee work. Rappard’s comparison is attentive both to intellectual commitments and to the loyalties, financial pressures and political fears that tested them. These careers reveal how little economics itself sometimes governed economists’ public conduct—and how much that conduct can disclose about their thought.

Goods can remain in a warehouse while their ownership changes and their value finances fresh trade—but what legal documents make this possible? In this 1869 offprint, Emil Sax argues that Austria’s warehouse policy neglects the machinery of commodity credit. His concrete test is whether a merchant can sell stored goods while they remain pledged to a lender. Drawing on Belgian practice, he shows how separate, coordinated documents for ownership and security can protect both transactions, whereas Austria’s single receipt risks confusing them. Sax approaches commercial infrastructure through the rights it must sustain, not merely the buildings it requires. His examples reveal why an apparently simpler rule can obstruct credit, expose owners to loss, and undermine confidence in a promising commercial institution.

Should a stock of identical goods be valued by adding the different utilities its units secure, or by multiplying their number by marginal utility? In this first installment of his study, Hans Mayer reopens the dispute between Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser without accepting that either formula must hold universally. His distinctive move is to separate a valuation rule’s applicability from the soundness of its proof: defective reasoning need not invalidate an observed practice. Mayer shows why uniform market prices cannot establish equal subjective valuations and why calculations that assume consumption all at once may misrepresent economic planning. The positive derivation remains for a later installment; here readers discover how the timing of consumption changes the terms of an apparently mathematical dispute.

A profitable bank of issue need not be a secure one. This distinction drives Robert Zuckerkandl’s 1899 encyclopedia article on the Austrian Nationalbank and its Austro-Hungarian successor, covering 1816–1898. He shows how lucrative treasury dealings left notes payable on demand backed by government debts that could not readily be turned into cash—and why decades of successful redemption could conceal that vulnerability. His institutional perspective also exposes tensions within reform: reserve restrictions could impede emergency lending, while political equality between Austria and Hungary complicated unified management. The account culminates in preparations for gold currency and proposed charter changes still awaiting enactment. Readers can discover how monetary stability depended not simply on metallic reserves, but on the arrangements governing state borrowing, public reporting, crisis lending and shared control.

Full employment conjured from uncovered credit repeats, on Kerschagl's reading, John Law's old error: trying to replace scarce capital with purchasing power. This 1953 essay argues that printing money before consumable goods exist does not abolish scarcity but forces present consumers to finance future production through lower real consumption or higher prices—there are, he warns, no miracle cures. Keynes is placed within that line of reformers, and Dobretsberger's scheme to finance hydropower by note issue serves as the test case: domestically buildable, perhaps, but the new purchasing power would arrive long before the electricity. Against the illusion Kerschagl sets a real-factor remedy of deliberate austerity—new capital formed only through saving and work, weak accumulation traced to three inflations, and employment secured not by protected inefficiency but by rising productivity across all sectors.

Erhöhte Arbeitsleistung je Arbeiter zerstört nicht Arbeitsplätze, sondern schafft neue.

English translation: “Increased output per worker does not destroy jobs; it creates new ones.”

People compete, cooperate, and act on unequal knowledge; atoms do not. This distinction anchors Oskar Morgenstern’s first-edition preface to Morton Davis’s book on game theory, dated February 1972 and presented here in its 2005 version. Morgenstern argues that social inquiry needs mathematical concepts fitted to purposeful interaction, rather than borrowed from physics. Yet his demand for precision leads not to a dismissal of nontechnical writing but to a defence of it: accessible explanation succeeds when grounded in detailed theoretical knowledge. His endorsement of Davis thus offers a compact account of what rigorous popular exposition should accomplish—and why, in Morgenstern’s view, explaining emotionally charged social problems need not entail passing value judgments.

Never before, Meyer observes, had Austrian taxation asked how much a man possessed altogether rather than taxing each source, land, buildings, trade, salary, rent, in isolation. Written as a practical Wegweiser to the 1896 personal income-tax reform, this second booklet walks the taxpayer through the new law: the progressive scale rising from roughly 0.6 to nearly 5 percent, the exemption of subsistence income below 600 florins, the combined taxation of a household's income, and the deductions allowed for debt interest, illness, and dependents. Meyer defends the reform's institutional novelty, assessment by commissions half-elected by the taxpayers themselves, and insists throughout that consumption and expenditure serve only as a basis for estimating income, never as the object of tax. Rentiers, long escaping the net, now become taxpayers.

Der Haushalt ist keine Abzugspost vom Einkommen, sondern eine Verwendung des Einkommens.

English translation: “The household is not a deduction from income, but a use of income.”

Why should interest persist in an economy without innovation or growth? In this signed encyclopedia supplement, Franz Xaver Weiß defends the temporal core of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory while correcting its appeal to the technical superiority of longer production processes. Machinery, railways, and durable housing promise future services, but building them commits resources that could satisfy present needs. For Weiß, that sacrifice—not productivity alone—helps explain interest. His criticism of Schumpeter makes the disagreement concrete: familiar, unbuilt investments can sustain demand for capital without entrepreneurial innovation. The same perspective informs his account of bank credit, which can redirect resources but cannot indefinitely remove their scarcity. Readers can follow how a dispute over capital’s productivity becomes a question about the competing claims of present consumption and future provision.