The archive.

Ranking wants by urgency is not the same as measuring satisfaction—and measuring one person’s satisfaction would not establish that it can be added to another’s. This distinction drives Hayek’s 1923 review of L. V. Birck’s The Theory of Marginal Value. Hayek questions the foundations of Birck’s claim that equal incomes maximize aggregate utility, while praising his detailed analysis of price formation and his engagement with Wieser’s theory of imputation. The review offers a compact view of Hayek’s standards of theoretical criticism: analytical finesse cannot compensate for unsupported premises, especially in a textbook. His reservations about mathematical notation sharpen the point: treating economic relations as an equilibrium problem does not, he argues, require an exposition burdened with mathematical apparatus.

Opposition to Marxism does not necessarily imply a defence of liberalism: this distinction frames Eugen Peter Schwiedland’s affirmative 1923 review of Mises’s Die Gemeinwirtschaft. Writing in English, Schwiedland places the book against German nationalist alternatives that reject liberalism alongside Marxism. He foregrounds Mises’s shift from the unequal distribution of wealth to the conditions of its production: could socialism increase output, and could it calculate rationally without market prices? His account also presents consumer choice, rather than control of the workplace, as the basis of economic self-determination. This short review offers a concrete instance of Mises’s early reception, showing which arguments a sympathetic contemporary selected and why he regarded a liberal defence of capitalism as a distinctive intervention.

Adding more ploughs to a farm is not the same as equipping it differently. This distinction drives Franz Xaver Weiss’s 1923 article on diminishing returns: can a law about physical productivity explain wages, rent, and interest when productive inputs must themselves be measured by value? Weiss argues that capital expansion ordinarily changes the composition of equipment, not merely its quantity, and that known techniques may become economical without any new invention. His analysis separates technical limits from economic choices, challenging attempts to derive distribution from productivity alone. Readers can discover why comparisons between differently managed farms do not straightforwardly test the law, and why diminishing returns and diminishing utility answer different questions.

A central bank can count its notes precisely and still misread the monetary conditions it faces. In this 1923 article, Richard Kerschagl draws on Austrian experience to ask what makes monetary statistics economically meaningful under inflation. Gold reserves valued at legal parity tell a different story from reserves valued at current exchange rates; separate lending categories can obscure the extent of government financing; a monthly exchange-rate average may describe a quotation that never occurred. His distinctive concern is not simply to collect more figures, but to distinguish the processes those figures measure—and acknowledge what they cannot establish. Readers can discover how choices of valuation, timing, and classification shape the evidence available for monetary policy, especially when depreciation unsettles familiar accounting conventions.

Does waiting for consumption create a production cost, or does it change what future goods are worth today? In this 1923 encyclopedic article, Franz Xaver Weiss makes that distinction the test of abstinence theory’s explanation of interest. He credits Senior with connecting interest to time and rejects the charge that his theory merely rationalizes capitalist income. Yet, following Böhm-Bawerk, Weiss argues that postponement lowers present valuations rather than adding a separate sacrifice to labor and material outlays. His treatment shows why replacing “abstinence” with “waiting” does not settle the dispute. Readers gain a precise way to distinguish two explanations that acknowledge the same reluctance to defer enjoyment but assign it different economic roles.

Schumpeter recasts supply not as a stock of goods or an independent "cost side" opposed to demand, but as a relational category within the whole exchange economy. The primordial act of exchange, he argues, breaks down for every agent into alienation and acquisition, so that each participant is in principle both supplier and demander; supplying and demanding are reciprocal standpoints, not separate classes. From this he builds definitions of individual and marginal supply, cases of alternative and joint production, and three types of supply law - rising output at rising price, rising output at falling price, and the labor-and-saving case of falling supply at a rising price. Costs are reinterpreted through marginal valuation and opportunity cost, quasi-rent explains the returns of inelastic plant, and monopoly forms the limiting contrast. Supply emerges as a system-wide, time-bound, expectation-laden relation.

Das Anbieten ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung für effektive Nachfrage und das Nachfragen die notwendige Voraussetzung dafür, daß etwas angeboten wird.

English translation: “Supplying is a necessary precondition for effective demand, and demanding is the necessary precondition for anything to be supplied.”

What becomes of economic self-interest when prestige depends on giving valuables away? In this 1923 review of Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Eugen Peter Schwiedland treats Kula exchange as a challenge to textbook accounts of early economic life. He emphasizes how custom, ceremony, and public recognition organize exchange without eliminating the desire for gain. His distinctive concern is what economists can learn from ethnographic observation: generosity and acquisitiveness need not be opposing explanations, and practical usefulness cannot alone account for value. The review offers a compact encounter between fieldwork and economic theory, while Schwiedland’s bourgeois-versus-Bolshevik comparison exposes the contemporary political categories he brings to Malinowski’s findings.

External supervision can enforce economies, but can it make a depressed economy yield the revenues a balanced budget requires? In this 1923 article, Moriz Dub examines Austria’s financial reconstruction under League of Nations oversight, supporting fiscal discipline while testing its practical limits. Dismissals bring severance costs and the loss of experienced officials; higher tobacco prices and railway tariffs risk reducing consumption and traffic rather than increasing receipts. His commercial scrutiny of state enterprises does not lead to an automatic case for privatization: sales backed by government guarantees would leave public risk intact. The article offers a concrete account of the tension between administrative resolve and economic capacity, showing why a sharply reduced projected deficit is not yet a secure financial recovery.

By 1923 the German banking world was consumed, as Hahn puts it, from morning to night with a single anxiety, the preservation of its capital substance, yet the third edition of Adolf Weber's textbook still fought the prewar battle against the great credit banks. Reviewing it, Hahn dismantles three inherited doctrines: Weber's moralized contrast between English deposit banks and German speculation banks, his loose account of liquidity, and his theory of credit and capital. Genuine risk, he insists, sits with merchants and manufacturers, not with bankers. Liquidity, in a clearing economy, means access to central-bank money rather than idle cash. And the only thing that matters about any credit is whether it enlarges the purchasing power already circulating. Inflation, on this reading, came from state finance, not from weak reserves.

Das Kontokorrentgeschäft aber ist zweifellos das unspekulativste Geschäft, das überhaupt möglich ist, denn seine Gewinnchancen sind in den bedungenen Zinsen und Provisionen von vornherein festgelegt.

English translation: “The current-account business, however, is undoubtedly the least speculative business that is possible at all, for its profit prospects are fixed in advance by the stipulated interest and commissions.”

Protection against inflation appears here not as social relief but as a “curious monopoly” enjoyed by wage-earners and salaried employees. That reversal captures the standpoint of Eugen Peter Schwiedland’s 1923 review of Siegfried Strakosch’s book on Austria’s economic crisis. Strongly endorsing Strakosch’s practical and scientific authority, Schwiedland argues that socialist labour protections weakened production and burdened business. He also acknowledges the destructive effects of the peace settlement, new frontiers, trade barriers and currency instability. The interest of this short review lies in how these explanations are weighted: readers can see an economic indictment of labour policy taking shape around business uncertainty and middle-class losses, even while the reviewer describes pressures extending far beyond domestic legislation.

A reading society founded by Viennese jurists and officials in 1840 becomes, in this early study, a delicate instrument for registering the political pressures of the Austrian Vormärz. Engel-Janosi reconstructs the associational law of pre-1848 Austria, the natural-law background, the police suspicion of reading circles, the concession system, and shows how elite patrons such as Sommaruga shielded the club while Sedlnitzky, Kolowrat, and Metternich eyed it warily. Its history, he argues, is largely the chronicle of its skirmishes with the censorship: the struggle to obtain foreign political newspapers, to hold lectures, and to maintain a library under constant supervision and confiscation. Though the society never acted as a revolutionary body in March 1848, Engel-Janosi reads in its restrained conduct a loyal, sorrowful opposition to the imperial order.

Es liegt viel Schwäche darin, gewiß, aber auch Trauer und Treue.

English translation: “There is much weakness in it, to be sure, but also sorrow and fidelity.”

Once the public stops believing that the inflation will halt, Mises contends, a paper currency financed by the note press is doomed to sudden collapse rather than to endless gradual decline—as the American continentals and the French mandats collapsed before it. The first step of any reform is therefore to shut down the printing press; the second is to bind the mark again to gold, whose quantity answers to mining profitability rather than to state decree. He refutes the balance-of-payments theory of the exchanges, insisting that inflation, not poverty or trade deficits, drives foreign-exchange rates upward, and proposes a monetary constitution forbidding any note issue not covered by gold or foreign exchange. The disorder, he closes, is at root ideological.

An die Stelle des Schlagwortes „Los vom Golde“ muß die Lösung treten: „Los von der staatlichen Beeinflussung des Geldwertes“.

English translation: “In place of the slogan "Away from gold" must be substituted the solution: "Away from state influence on the value of money.”