The archive.

Expanding trade can look stagnant when the goods crossing borders fetch lower prices. In this 1890 article, Karl Theodor von Inama-Sternegg examines that discrepancy in Austro-Hungarian commerce between 1875 and 1888, revaluing traded quantities at the average unit values of 1875–1879. His comparisons distinguish growth in physical trade from falling monetary valuations, while contrasts among coffee, cotton, sugar, wheat and timber show why imports and exports cannot be treated as uniform aggregates. The revealing tension lies in his method: he assumes that quantities developed independently of falling prices, yet acknowledges that official trade valuations can differ substantially from world-market prices. Readers can trace both the explanatory power of constant-price comparisons and the limits of turning statistical differences into claims about economic causes.

Economic theory can become dogma—but does exposing its limits justify abandoning it? In this 1890 newspaper review of Maurice Block’s two-volume survey, Carl Menger praises an alternative to both French attachment to classical doctrine and what he calls the “theoretical nihilism” of newer German historical economists. His distinction is precise: archives, inquiries, and institutional descriptions contribute to economic knowledge, but cannot replace explanation of the connections among economic phenomena. Menger values Block’s international scholarship as a means of revising inherited theory without discarding its defensible insights. The review offers a compact view of Menger’s standards for scientific progress: neither loyalty to Smith nor methodological novelty suffices; criticism must make theoretical reconstruction possible.

A fine that costs one offender a luxury may cost another food or warmth. In this 1890 article, Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg brings Carl Menger’s theory of subjective value to a problem of penal justice: how can equal culpability receive comparable punishment when money has unequal significance? He defends fines against abolition but argues that neither fixed sums nor uniform percentages of income secure equal sacrifice. Progressive assessment must account for dependants, health, and the difference between earnings and property income. The article’s distinctive tension lies between this individualized standard and what courts can actually learn from imperfect tax records. It shows why adjusting a fine to poverty need not mean forgiving an offence: it may instead be necessary to make punishment equally burdensome.

A good may be reproducible without its buyer being able to reproduce it. This distinction sharpens Robert Zuckerkandl’s reply to Dietzel’s defence of classical value theory: whose alternatives matter when value is assigned? Defending Menger, Zuckerkandl argues that replacement costs do not constitute a separate principle of valuation; they matter through the satisfactions or effort sacrificed in replacing a loss. His focus on buyers under the division of labour exposes the limits of reasoning from an isolated, self-sufficient household. The article also presses a methodological challenge: observing that prices tend towards production costs is not yet explaining how prices arise. Readers can discover here a concrete marginal-utility critique of cost-based explanation—one that accepts the cost-price relationship while disputing its explanatory independence.

A census can count individuals accurately yet obscure how they live together. In this 1890 article on Austria’s forthcoming census, Karl Theodor von Inama-Sternegg locates the remedy less in additional questions than in the processing of individual returns. Central analysis, he argues, can recover relationships lost when local authorities supply only totals: between birthplace and legal belonging, occupation and dependants, shared accommodation and family ties. His concern is not merely technical. He challenges an atomistic picture of society while treating the family as its foundation. The appended ordinance, forms and instructions let readers compare these analytical ambitions with the practical rules of enumeration—and see why a common address cannot by itself identify a household, or a single occupational label adequately describe a livelihood.

An economic dictionary can make knowledge accessible while diverting its most capable contributors from original research. This tension shapes Carl Menger’s 1890 review of the first completed volume of the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. He values its legislation, statistics, and bibliographies for officials and parliamentarians, yet refuses to equate descriptive abundance with theoretical progress. His judgement turns partly on form: alphabetical entries can accommodate disagreements that would undermine a systematic handbook. Menger also reads the prominence of Austrian contributors as a rebuttal to dismissive accounts of Austria’s intellectual dependence on Germany. The review offers a concrete view of his standards for useful scholarship—how a reference work can serve public decisions without resolving the theoretical divisions of economics.

Do production costs explain value, or do they already presuppose values that need explaining? In this short polemical intervention, Böhm-Bawerk asks Heinrich Dietzel to specify his alternative to marginal utility theory before a substantive rebuttal can begin. Mines and vineyards make the difficulty concrete: might productive assets derive their value from their products rather than determine it? Writing as a defender of marginal utility, Böhm-Bawerk distinguishes agreement that prices tend toward costs from agreement about why they do so. The interest lies less in a completed refutation than in watching him sharpen the dispute—showing how apparently opposed theories may share observations while disagreeing over the direction of explanation.

The Methodenstreit, the bitter quarrel over whether economics should proceed by historical description or by exact, isolating analysis, supplies the occasion for this review-essay on Schmoller's memorial volume to Wilhelm Roscher. Böhm-Bawerk reframes the dispute: the real question is not whether the historical method is legitimate, which no one denies, but whether Menger's isolating method deserves equal standing beside it. Deduction, he notes, serves physics and astronomy without scandal; the classical economists erred not from want of facts but from having distilled them wrongly. He then turns the historians' own practice against them, since they cannot discuss price, cost, or interest without smuggling in inherited abstractions, and closes with a plea for tolerance: let economists write less about method and work more with every method.

Meine Absicht ist vielmehr, den Streit zu versöhnen als ihn weiter zu verschärfen.

English translation: “My intention is rather to reconcile the dispute than to sharpen it further.”

Does a country lose wealth when its workers leave? In this 1890 article, Eugen von Philippovich challenges calculations that count emigrants as exported capital, asking instead how departures alter employment, access to land, and opportunities for those who remain. His comparisons connect economic reasoning to migrants’ actual circumstances: subsidized passages and land grants could open prospects, while Brazilian plantation contracts could turn transport debts into lasting dependence. Migration emerges not simply as flight from poverty but as movement sustained by expectations, established connections, and the possibility of return. Readers can discover an argument for migrant protection that resists blanket judgements about national gain or loss, alongside a revealing tension in Philippovich’s racialized outlook: overseas settlement extends European influence while fostering societies capable of challenging Europe’s predominance.

Delivered as a commemorative address before the statistical Central Commission, this appraisal presents Lorenz von Stein not as a statistician, for he conducted no surveys himself, but as the thinker who made statistical inquiry more necessary and more self-conscious. Inama-Sternegg prizes orientation over exactness: Stein opened questions of social masses, causal relations, and institutional form that statistics could later test and correct. He traces the life from Schleswig origins and a Parisian encounter with socialism to the long Vienna professorship of 1855 to 1888, and reads the doctrine as a binding of three movements, the law of goods, the ascent and conflict of classes, and the legal-administrative order of the state, mediated by the concept of soziales Koenigtum. A speculative constructor, yes, but one whose reach disclosed problems narrower methods had not yet learned to formulate.

Er wollte, wie er mir oft mit Stolz erzählte, zeigen, daß er den Adel seiner Familie nicht brauche, sondern ihn sich selbst zu erwerben wisse.

English translation: “He wanted to show, as he often told me with pride, that he did not need the nobility of his family, but knew how to earn it for himself.”

A textbook must offer beginners settled truths, yet by 1890 political economy no longer possessed an uncontested doctrinal core, and it is through this pedagogical bind that Böhm-Bawerk reviews S. M. Macvane's Working Principles of Political Economy. He credits its clarity and independence while faulting its conservatism: Macvane retains cost as the ultimate regulator of value, rejects Jevons's route from utility to exchange value, and rests wages on a fund of contemporary savings scarcely distinct from the classical wages-fund doctrine. Against this, Böhm-Bawerk argues that the annual mass of consumable goods is not fixed in advance but shaped by saving, demand, and the division of production between consumption and capital goods. The review becomes a workshop in which Austrian capital theory emerges as a bridge between marginal productivity and distribution, labor priced by its Grenzprodukt.

Where shall we find nowadays a stock of undoubted, clear, and simple truths?

A controversy over smallpox vaccination becomes, in Inama-Sternegg's hands, an occasion to work out a theory of statistical proof. Following J. Koeroesi, he denies that the protective force of vaccination can be settled by physiological experiment alone and defends inference from mass facts. The essay dismantles the objection that vaccination statistics is worthless because the total living vaccinated and unvaccinated populations are unknown: many valid measures relate an event to its nearest causally relevant collective, not to the whole population. Koeroesi's method of relative intensity compares general morbidity and mortality against specifically smallpox morbidity, mortality, and lethality, using Budapest and Hungarian provincial-city material. Underlying all of this is a distinction between two directions of proof, progressive experiment moving from cause to effect and regressive observation moving from effect to cause, which makes statistics indispensable precisely where experiment cannot reach.

Bei der ersten Methode (Zerfällung der Gesamtheiten) scheidet man alle fremden Faktoren aus; bei der letzteren (Intensitätsberechnung) berechnet man den Einfluß eines unausgeschiedenen oder unausscheidbaren Faktors durch die gegebenen übrigen Werte.

English translation: “In the first method (decomposition of totals) one excludes all extraneous factors; in the latter (intensity calculation) one computes the influence of an unexcluded or inextricable factor by means of the other given values.”