3,187 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Knowledge is no ornament and its diffusion no work for court jesters, Kerschagl insists — it is as materially vital as the erection of industrial plants. That conviction anchors this treatment of development aid, written just after its author took the presidency of the Austrian UNESCO Commission, which ranges across population theory from Malthus to Nurkse's circular causation, the psychology of entitlement and colonial guilt, and the institutional scaffolding of trade unions, honest bureaucracy, and stable currency. Identifying mass poverty and illiteracy as the true marks of a development area, it ranks agriculture before heavy industry, holds up the Marshall Plan as a model that cannot be transplanted into pre-industrial economies, and presses throughout the principle of Hilfe für Selbsthilfe against both beggar ideology and condescending charity.
Das Verhältnis zwischen Helfenden und Hilfe Empfangenden kann nicht das von Gönnern und Bettelnden sein, sondern nur das echter Partnerschaft.
English translation: “The relationship between those giving aid and those receiving it cannot be that of patrons and beggars, but only that of genuine partnership.”
Career prospects, occupational functions, or the feeling of not being a manual worker: what distinguishes salaried employees as a social group? In this brief 1963 review of Fritz Croner’s Soziologie der Angestellten, Hans Bayer weighs Croner’s emphasis on unequal life chances against objections to his functional theory. Bayer’s perspective is shaped by the contrast between sociological debate and trade-union practice: a distinction judged inadequate at the Dortmund conference had found receptive ground in the Austrian employees’ movement. His discussion also exposes a tension in white-collar identity—feeling separate from manual workers need not create solidarity among employees. The review offers a compact account of why Bayer regarded Croner’s work as necessary to the debate without treating its contested classification as settled.
Does a shared legal status make salaried employees a coherent social group? In this concise 1963 review of Ludwig Neundörfer’s Die Angestellten, Hans Bayer endorses the distinction between an employment category and the varied lives and workplace functions it contains. His appraisal connects that conceptual caution to a concrete finding: for most male salaried employees studied, promotion stopped at positions such as bookkeeper, administrative officer or head of a small department. Bayer values Neundörfer’s combination of historical scrutiny and empirical comparison, including comparisons with legally classified workers in the same enterprises. The review offers a focused account of why neither legal designation nor the promise of a career adequately describes salaried employees’ social position.
Material provision is not the same as recognition of another person’s freedom: this distinction anchors the ethical remedy Hans Bayer examines in his brief review of Wolfgang Kellner’s study of workplace conflict. Bayer presents Kellner’s rejection of attempts to recast social problems as merely economic ones, and his diagnosis of a gulf between conceptions of human beings and guiding ideals. Yet the reviewer stops short of endorsing the proposed solution through Christian neighbourly love. His closing reservation—that elevated aspirations sometimes compromise sober analysis and scientific grounding—gives the review its critical edge. This compact appraisal brings into focus the distance between a moral answer to workplace conflict and an adequately substantiated sociological explanation.
Addressing an international savings-bank congress in 1963, Hayek defends thrift as economic fact, moral habit, and political condition at once. Against the intuition that spending helps others while saving is sterile — an intuition he traces from Franklin and mercantilist praise of luxury through Keynesian underconsumption theory — he restates the old truth that real capital forms only when a society produces more than it consumes. Yet volume is not the point: what a nation spends on capital formation matters far less than what comes of it, and only decentralized owners testing dispersed knowledge can find its best uses. He warns that inflation, forced 'frugality' through taxation, state growth planning, and expansive social security all corrode the widely shared habit of reckoning in capital rather than income on which a free economy rests.
Ein Volk wird nur dann eine erfolgreiche Unternehmerschicht hervorbringen, wenn eine vielfach größere Zahl von Menschen Gelegenheit hat, sich in der nutzbringenden Anwendung von Kapital zu versuchen.
English translation: “A people will bring forth a successful class of entrepreneurs only if a many times greater number of people have the opportunity to try their hand at the profitable use of capital.”
Two kinds of order must be kept apart, this essay argues: the organization that someone deliberately makes, and the spontaneous, polycentric order that no one designs. From that distinction Hayek builds an account of how the coordinated action of millions can arise without a coordinator, further separating concrete arrangements that can be perceived or commanded from abstract orders that encompass many manifestations at once. Language, law, morality, money, crystal formation, and the market's division of labor all display complex order emerging without central design, sustained by general rules of conduct that let individuals use dispersed local knowledge. A free society, he concludes, must rely on such abstract general rules rather than concrete command — a thesis set pointedly against Carl Schmitt's concrete-order jurisprudence.
Die Hauptschwierigkeit ist, daß die Ordnung sozialer Geschehnisse nicht mit den Sinnen wahrgenommen, sondern nur vom Verstand nachgebildet werden kann.
English translation: “The main difficulty is that the order of social events cannot be perceived by the senses, but can only be reconstructed by the intellect.”
Cultivation, not engineering: that metaphor governs this presidential address on 'Economic Budgeting,' the non-coercive sharing of forecasts and investment intentions among entrepreneurs. Lachmann keeps it strictly apart from Communist central direction and Nazi-style corporatism, presenting it instead as an attempt to make private plans mutually intelligible before resources are irreversibly committed. His conceptual pivot is the contrast between the neoclassical equilibrium of Walras, Pareto, and Cassel, where all plans are already consistent, and the open market economy, whose profits exist precisely because knowledge is dispersed and expectations conflict. Because capital goods are heterogeneous and complementary, isolated investment breeds excess capacity and stranded facilities; a scheme that diffuses entrepreneurial knowledge might reduce such malinvestment before it occurs. The verdict stays deliberately restrained—markets are vindicated as processes of learning, not as engines of equilibrium.
The market process tends to eliminate the results of malinvestment but cannot prevent its occurrence.
Neither the blurry category of Mittelstand nor sheer firm size captures Bayer's object: the person-shaped enterprise, formed and carried by an entrepreneur rather than run as a self-perpetuating institution. Continuing his project on the firm as economic stabilizer, this volume asks whether such medium firms still hold a stabilizing function, and why, if they do, their position keeps eroding. He credits them with pioneering, agility, specialization, individualization, and supplier roles, then separates the difficulties that policy could remove, chiefly discriminatory turnover taxes and a cartel law that treats their cooperation as suspect, from the endogenous tensions they must bridge themselves. Invoking subsidiarity and drawing on some three hundred visited firms, he argues that federative working groups, research-institute links, and reformed finance let medium firms complement the large institutionalized enterprise rather than dissolve into it.
Im September 1960 waren mehr als ein Drittel aller in der Industrie Beschäftigten (Betriebe mit zehn und mehr Arbeitnehmern) in der mittleren Industrie tätig
English translation: “In September 1960, more than one-third of all persons employed in industry (in establishments with ten or more employees) were engaged in medium-sized industry.¹⁶”
'Natural right' has hardened, over centuries of scholastic and modern doctrine, into a supposed stock of immutable norms, and undoing that hardening is the essay's whole aim. Reading Aristotle's difficult page on physei dikaion in the Nicomachean Ethics through the frame of the Politics, Voegelin recovers natural right as a symbol of noetic experience rather than a code. Aristotle's 'nature' is equivocal, physical, divine, human, so that the right by nature is at once universally valid in its divine essence and changeable in its human realization, identical not with eternal legal propositions but with the paradigm of the best constitution. The second section turns to phronesis, the existential virtue through which the divine order of the cosmos comes to its truth in concrete action, with the mature spoudaios, not an abstract rule, as the measure.
Die Wahrheit der Existenz erfüllt sich dort, wo sie konkret wird, das ist im Handeln.
English translation: “The truth of existence fulfills itself where it becomes concrete, that is, in action.”
Few economic subjects breed more confusion than money, and here — in the German translation of Rothbard's 1963 What Has Government Done to Our Money? — that confusion is dismantled by returning to the market. Money is no creature of decree but a commodity risen from barter, the most saleable good gradually accepted by all; gold and silver won the role by being durable, divisible, and independently desired. Paper circulates only by inheriting purchasing power already established in metal. From this Rothbard argues that the size of the money stock is irrelevant to real wealth, that inflation is a hidden tax enriching its first receivers, and that fractional-reserve banking issues many claims to the same specie — fraud dressed as credit. State mints, legal-tender laws, and central banks complete money's long descent into fiat disorder.
Weil Gold ein allgemeines Tauschmittel ist, ist es am marktgängigsten, kann es aufbewahrt werden, um morgen genau wie heute verwendet zu werden, und werden alle Preise in seinen Einheiten ausgedrückt.
English translation: “Because gold is a universal medium of exchange, it is the most marketable of goods; it can be stored so as to be used tomorrow just as today, and all prices are expressed in its units.”
Family ownership can preserve a business while undermining its capacity to act: heirs may inherit equal authority without equal ability, and protecting capital may become an excuse to postpone investment. In this 1963 article, Hans Bayer examines how legal arrangements can sustain medium-sized, entrepreneur-led firms without freezing their development. His focus is not the supposedly ideal legal form but the design of agreements governing succession, authority, and cooperation. Contrasting two jute factories, he shows how divided leadership can obstruct adaptation where unified direction enables it. Bayer’s preference for decisive personal responsibility is tempered by his case for outside expertise and advisory boards. The article offers a concrete way to distinguish continuity of ownership from continuity of entrepreneurial capacity—and to see where contracts can help secure both.
Long read as the skeptic who woke Kant from dogmatic slumber, David Hume reappears here as something else entirely: the most coherent theorist of liberty under law. Hayek strips away the myth of a single Enlightenment, setting French constructivist rationalism against a British-Scottish line running through Mandeville, Smith, Ferguson, and Burke, in which durable institutions grow rather than get invented. Justice, property, and promise-keeping, on Hume's account, precede government and arise from convention among partial, ignorant, and scarcity-pressed beings; law must therefore be general and inflexible, never a case-by-case reckoning of merit or utility. The closing pages set Hume against Rousseau, whose democratic enthusiasm displaced this sober Whig liberalism and fed later doctrines of popular sovereignty.
Er wußte, daß die größten politischen Werte, Frieden, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit, ihrem Wesen nach negativ sind, eher ein Schutz gegen Unrecht als positive Gegebenheiten.
English translation: “He knew that the greatest political values—peace, liberty, and justice—are by their very nature negative, rather a protection against injustice than positive givens.”