3,187 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
How can economic conduct obey regular laws if individuals are free—and what does freedom mean for people constrained by poverty? Emil Kauder finds these tensions in Carl Menger’s annotations and unfinished revisions, preserved in his library at Hitotsubashi University. This research report reads those materials against the published economist’s more settled positions. Kauder reconstructs a liberalism that accommodates social reform without abandoning private production, and an economic theory whose formation involved repeated revisions rather than a single breakthrough. His archival perspective also brings less familiar intellectual debts into view. Attentive to missing documents and incomplete arguments, the report lets readers distinguish Menger’s exploratory thinking from his published conclusions—and see why analytical individualism need not entail an unconditional defence of laissez-faire.
The salaried employee, caught between the working class and management, is the figure through which Bayer traces a wider mutation in economy and society. Three shifts organize the essay: in macroeconomic aims, now converging on dynamic stabilization; in the functions of the enterprise; and in the roles of those who carry it. He coins Blankobedürfnisse, blank general needs whose concrete content advertising and mass production increasingly supply, to explain the swelling tertiary sector and its white-collar ranks. Concentration, objectification, and long-run corporate planning together yield not a return to free competition but an organized market economy, and an institutionalized firm whose enduring tasks bind everyone in it. The old entrepreneur gives way to the manager, whose growing social power makes managerial ethics and countervailing forces urgent against the ever-present danger of Grenzmoral.
Die Entscheidung für die Freiheit aber bedeutet die Aufgabe geistiger Trägheit; sie verlangt Mut und Selbstverantwortung.
English translation: “The decision in favor of freedom, however, means giving up intellectual inertia; it demands courage and self-responsibility.”
Marx's Communist Manifesto lists ten transitional measures for wresting capital from the bourgeoisie, and Sennholz turns them into a scorecard for the United States of 1961. Point by point—land ownership, progressive income and estate taxes, centralized credit, regulated communications and transport, state production, labor obligations, public education—he argues that America has quietly realized much of the program not through outright nationalization but through control that leaves private title merely nominal. The Federal Reserve, in his reading, has already achieved the Manifesto's fifth plank; confiscatory taxation makes government the controlling partner in every enterprise. What separates America from the Iron Curtain, he concludes, is only surviving markets, constitutional restraints, and due process. A 1961 American Opinion polemic fusing Austrian economics with Cold War anti-communism.
As the second item in the communist program, the Manifesto demands “a heavy progressive or graduated income tax.” In this regard we are probably more communistic than the Russians and Chinese.
Two detained men’s testimony anchors Hayek’s protest against police coercion in South Tirol. In this letter to The Times, published in 1961 and republished here in 2022, he describes prolonged forced standing, beatings and interrogation without language assistance, citing medical certificates he personally inspected. His perspective is that of an informed visitor, not an eyewitness to the abuse; the letter allows readers to distinguish the evidence he examined from the more severe allegations he relays. Its central concern is the political cost of coercion: Hayek argues that such treatment was turning even residents reconciled to incorporation into Italy against Italian rule. This brief intervention connects the treatment of individual detainees to the loss of acceptance of state authority, without proposing a constitutional settlement or defending the bombings.
Foreign aid, in this MIT report, is a temporary instrument for crossing a threshold, not a permanent redistribution of income. Rosenstein-Rodan judges assistance less by the income it creates per dollar than by the additional domestic effort it elicits, higher marginal savings, bolder planning, stronger administration, arguing that a marginal savings rate well above the average is the main lever of any development program. Absorptive capacity, broadly defined to include skilled labor, entrepreneurship, and public administration, sets the amount a country can use well, while repayment capacity should govern the terms, whether grants, soft loans, or local-currency schemes. He distinguishes aid sharply from ordinary capital flows, proposes burden-sharing among donors on a progressive-income principle that would place the largest share on the United States, and closes with country-by-country projections of capital requirements to 1976.
"Foreign Capital Inflow" and "Aid" are not synonymous terms.
A concertgoer and a solitary Crusoe both belong within economics as Rothbard understands it: neither money-making nor exchange defines its limits. In this short review of Israel Kirzner’s The Economic Point of View, republished in 2016 as Israel Kirzner and the Economic Man, Rothbard uses Kirzner’s history to defend Mises’s science of purposeful action. His central tension is how economics can remain value-free while qualifying as a “moral science.” The answer turns on distinguishing the analysis of means and ends from prescribing what those ends should be. Readers encounter both a pointed challenge to the caricature of “economic man” and Rothbard’s explicitly polemical claim that deductive economics, unlike behavioral social science, respects individual purpose and freedom.
Calling economic improvement “growth” can make it sound as automatic as a child gaining weight. In this essay, Mises argues that the metaphor conceals the saving, investment, and decisions about capital use on which higher living standards depend. His Austrian account of capital gives concrete force to two questions: can measured productivity gains be attributed wholly to labor, and does a poorer country’s faster percentage expansion demonstrate economic superiority? His answers challenge both wage-bargaining practices and Soviet–Western comparisons. The essay offers a pointed distinction between aggregate expansion and improved material provision, while exposing Mises’s broader political contention that governments promise growth through policies that obstruct its capital-forming conditions.
Cheap housing, guaranteed employment, higher wages: who pays when policy promises to make these benefits affordable? In this 1961 article, Richard Kerschagl compares market and command economies by tracing costs that neither institutional system can abolish. His defence of competitive prices and capital maintenance is qualified by recognition of neglected social needs, concentrated economic power, and the political necessity of employment. He also challenges market advocates who demand protection or subsidies for themselves. The article’s distinctive tension lies between social obligations and his insistence that lasting improvements depend on productive performance. Readers can examine how a benefit received as a worker or tenant may return as a burden on the same person as consumer, taxpayer, or saver—and why economic labels alone cannot settle policy choices.
Economics grew out of philosophy and never fully left it, and Amonn sets out to reconnect the two. A sweeping historical survey runs from Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, Locke, Hume, Quesnay, and Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill, tracing how thinkers treated wealth, the just price, and usury under ethical norms before economics became an autonomous, quasi-natural science. From there he builds toward the socialist calculation problem—collectivist planning, lacking freely formed scarcity prices, has no reliable Knappheitsanzeiger—and toward the discipline's foundations in psychology, ethics, and the Methodenstreit over induction and deduction. The closing chapters weigh justice against expediency across property, inheritance, monopoly, taxation, and interest, which he defends through time-preference against the old Aristotelian and canon-law charge that money is barren.
Der Eigennutz im Wirtschaftsverkehr ist also keineswegs ein ethisch verwerfliches Prinzip.
English translation: “Self-interest in economic intercourse is thus by no means an ethically reprehensible principle.”
Equality before the law is one thing; equality of natural endowment quite another—and Mises devotes this seven-part essay to keeping the two from being confused. Human capacities are demonstrably unequal; the question is what a social order does with that fact. Status societies of lords, serfs, and slaves let the abler dominate, whereas capitalism compels them to serve, channeling superior talent into satisfying mass consumers who remain, in the market, always right. Representative government he reads as the political counterpart of consumer sovereignty, and socialism as its reversal—a subjection of the many to the few dressed in democratic language. Along the way he punctures the paternalism of the advertising critics, the faith that mass schooling can erase inborn difference, and the progressive businessman who imagines a secure post under the planners, closing not in fatalism but in warning.
It proclaimed that all men are born equal in rights and that this equality cannot be abrogated by any man-made law, that it is inalienable or, more precisely, imprescriptible.
A low-interest development loan may be expensive; a rigorously supervised one may be impossible to repay. In this 1961 article, Richard Kerschagl compares Eastern and Western financing by looking beyond stated credit terms to equipment prices, commodity deliveries, export markets, and political leverage. He argues that Soviet-bloc credits can conceal costs in tied transactions, while Western lenders too often demand hard-currency repayment without securing borrowers’ opportunities to earn it. His distinctive concern is the connection between financial obligations and actual flows of goods. That perspective also unsettles the equation of development with industrialization: agricultural improvements or transport may serve a country better than prestigious factories. Readers gain concrete criteria for judging aid by its effective costs, local suitability, and repayment prospects rather than its advertised generosity.
For nearly three millennia silver was the money metal of antiquity and the Middle Ages, beside which gold played a modest part; this volume in the series Die metallischen Rohstoffe follows its descent from coinage into the smelter. Kerschagl moves from the chalcophile geology of galena and the Comstock Lode through amalgamation, cupellation, and cyanide leaching to the monetary drama: shifting gold-silver ratios, the Latin Monetary Union's retreat from true bimetallism, and the doomed remonetization schemes of the interwar years. He argues that no one can fix an objective silver price, that most output now comes as a by-product of lead, zinc, and copper mining, and that only twentieth-century industrial demand, not monetary nostalgia, at last stabilized the metal.
Das Silber ist vorläufig in geordnete industrielle Bahnen hinübergelenkt worden und seine monetäre Wiederverwendung weder ein echtes noch auch nur ein sinnvolles Problem mehr.
English translation: “Silver has for the time being been diverted into orderly industrial channels, and its monetary reuse is no longer a genuine or even a meaningful problem.”