The archive.

Accused by the Prenzlauer Zeitung of denying Germany's capacity to make further tribute payments, Schumpeter answers the newspaper directly, and his grievance is as much logical as political. To prove an impossibility, he explains, one first states the conditions under which the thing would be possible and then shows that they do not obtain; the paper had seized only that first, conditional step and reversed the argument into its opposite. He notes that the editors relied uncritically on a source known to be unfriendly to Germany, that a telephone call would have spared them the error, and that a German teacher was hardly likely to hold the position ascribed to him. Nationalist in tone yet formal in method, the short letter defends argumentative accuracy under the pressure of the reparations crisis.

Reißt ein feindlicher Bericht das erste Glied heraus und lässt er die Bedingungen, deren Unmöglichkeit die Unmöglichkeit des Tributs erweist, weg, so ist das Argument in sein Gegenteil verkehrt.

English translation: “If a hostile report tears out the first link and omits the conditions whose impossibility proves the impossibility of the tribute, then the argument is turned into its opposite.”

Did the banking crises of 1931 expose a failure of classical monetary theory, or institutions and policies that its principles could still explain? In this 1933 review, reprinted in 1990, Ludwig von Mises tests Nassau William Senior’s monetary lectures against exchange depreciation, protectionism, and international lending. His defence of Senior is not simply an appeal to authority: he distinguishes changes in banking arrangements from changes in the mechanisms of monetary adjustment. Especially revealing is his account of banks that promised immediate repayment while financing assets they could not readily sell. Mises locates the monetary danger less in capital flight itself than in newly created central-bank credit used to meet withdrawals. The review offers a compact encounter between classical arguments and interwar banking practice, separating explanations of policy choices from approval of their aims.

Does money’s influence on freedom and personal life require a philosophy beyond economics? In this short review of Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money, Carl Menger challenges the boundary on which Simmel’s project rests. He argues that Simmel mistakes the limitations of historical economics for those of economic science: monetary theory already investigates psychological causes, while economic and socialist writings examine money’s effects on human relations and even imagine worlds without it. Menger credits Simmel with stimulating, sometimes new insights but denies that these amount to a systematic advance in monetary theory. The review offers a compact encounter with Menger’s expansive conception of economics—and his distinction between intellectual ingenuity and theoretical contribution.

A wage increase cannot be assessed through wages alone: its effects on prices, employment, and production depend on the accompanying policy choices. In this 1977 article, Guillermo L. Gómez M. and Gerhard Tintner build an aggregate model of Colombia that combines Keynesian consumption relationships with neoclassical production and labor demand. Their estimates make the case for coordinating investment, public expenditure, and trade policy rather than treating economic targets separately. Yet the practical ambition encounters unreliable data, restrictive assumptions, and the unresolved choice of a welfare objective. Readers can examine both the numerical trade-offs the authors identify and their refusal to turn modeled wage effects into a mechanical recommendation for wage freezes—a concrete encounter between econometric calculation and political feasibility.

Hard problems melt like chocolate creams, and hungry seminar participants replenish themselves through “Import tariffs”: Felix Kaufmann’s song affectionately brings intellectual ambition down to the dinner table. In Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation, this portrait of the Mises Circle makes debate and conviviality parts of the same pleasure. Yet its confidence briefly falters: why keep questioning when life flows on regardless? The answer—a resolve to take a stand—gives the returning refrain a seriousness its exuberant praise of truth might initially conceal. This small work offers a distinctive glimpse of scholarly fellowship expressed through jokes, shared appetites, and the feeling of being at home in argument.

German trade unions recovered members, won wage increases and gained official recognition during 1916–18—but how much power did these gains confer? In this instalment of his Sozialpolitische Chronik, Emil Lederer distinguishes organizational strength from workers’ capacity to secure adequate consumption, freedom of movement and political influence. Labour scarcity strengthened bargaining while military controls restricted mobility; higher money wages could not compensate for missing civilian goods. His statistical scrutiny accompanies a critical examination of union leaders’ cooperation with government and their increasingly contested authority among workers. Completed in autumn 1918 and published unchanged in 1920, the chronicle preserves an analysis made before demobilization transformed its conditions. It offers a concrete account of how institutional recognition and economic concessions could coexist with political subordination.

Royal authority in Hammurabi’s Babylon depended on institutions it did not simply replace: lineages, temples, households, and privileged associations. In this completed section on the state, Richard Thurnwald reads laws alongside royal letters and contracts to ask how kingship cut across inherited dependencies while continuing to govern through them. His distinctive emphasis falls on overlapping functions: temples stored and lent as well as taught, while figures translated as merchants also collected dues and directed exchange. Legal distinctions between free people, royal dependents, and enslaved people make these relationships tangible through unequal compensation and punishment. Readers encounter a reconstruction of government through personal obligations rather than an impersonal apparatus—one whose tentative institutional identifications and evolutionary assumptions remain open to scrutiny.

A stamp on a banknote could declare monetary independence, but could it determine who should bear an empire’s debts? In this March 1920 article, Karl Schlesinger examines the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian currency as a struggle over inherited liabilities, fiscal needs, and the location of circulating money. His attention falls on the gap between legal separation and practical enforcement: counterfeit stamps defeated border controls, while Czechoslovakia’s attempted monetary contraction produced shortages without promptly lowering prices. The same scrutiny informs his criticism of the peace treaty’s liquidation provisions, which assigned rights according to histories of individual notes that officials could not establish. Readers encounter monetary sovereignty not as a clean administrative act, but as a contested redistribution of wealth whose consequences depended on confidence, credit, and enforceable rules.

An economist’s books have no buyers: in Felix Kaufmann’s comic song, even the defence of marginal utility suffers from insufficient demand. A Vienna-trained scholar greets his school’s supposed demise with theatrical despair, turning Menger’s work into a devotional object and his pen into a dagger—until economic polemics summon him back to battle. Set to Schumann’s music with an acknowledged debt to Heine, the song makes scholarly allegiance look at once ridiculous and resilient. Its humour lies in the uneasy overlap between devotion to a theory and concern for one’s own professional survival. Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation and arrangement preserve this small drama of intellectual loyalty, in which economic terminology itself joins the heroic posturing.

A loan may fall due in three months while the capital it finances remains committed to production for years. In this 1932 paper, Fritz Machlup examines that mismatch from the standpoint of the productive system rather than the individual creditor. Selling a claim can restore one investor’s cash without freeing any underlying capital; even an advance against inventories can release a borrower’s own funds for machinery. These examples sharpen his challenge to the doctrine of self-liquidating credit. Machlup argues that routine repayment depends on replacement savers sustaining commitments that withdrawing creditors leave behind. The paper offers a concrete way to distinguish contractual maturity from economic duration—and to understand why individually liquid claims need not permit collective withdrawal without a contraction of production.

An invitation to refute a doctrine becomes comic when the speaker declares in advance that no critic can succeed. Felix Kaufmann’s two-stanza song turns economic conviction into a performance of certainty: marginal utility supplies the recurring answer, while Vienna claims privileged access to liberalism’s reasons. The sharper joke concerns values, which the speaker holds at a distance before insisting that thought cannot proceed without them. In Arlene Oost-Zinner’s 2010 English translation, with music by Gustav Pick, readers encounter a compact satire of theoretical allegiance and methodological self-contradiction. Although the title names Mises and Mayer, the lyrics leave their respective positions unassigned; the interest lies in the confident voice and the tensions it cannot quite conceal.

Does closer knowledge of an economy’s complexity discourage intervention—or equip governments to intervene? In this comment on George Stigler, Murray N. Rothbard argues that statistical inquiry and administrative power can grow together, even when researchers have no political program. His laissez-faire perspective centres on a distinction between entrepreneurs’ knowledge of prices, costs, and profits and the aggregate information required by economic planners. Examples ranging from social surveys to input-output analysis give concrete form to his contention that methods of observation can become instruments of control. The comment also exposes a methodological dispute: whether empirical attention to particular problems sufficiently disciplines policy, or whether deductive theory is needed to reveal resource constraints and opportunity costs.