4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Exchanging representatives is not the same as sharing financial interests. In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s coal-mining proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks how coal and iron could be linked through reciprocal capital participation without sacrificing the unity of a proposed coal trust. His concrete example is a coke manager’s profit-related remuneration: shared ownership could make it depend indirectly on the iron industry’s performance. The contribution offers a compact distinction between administrative coordination and financial interdependence, showing how Lederer envisaged giving practical force to common industrial interests without merging the industries into one organization.
Must the iron industry own coal mines to secure its interests, or could financial ties to a coal trust achieve the same result? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of Germany’s Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer challenges the practical distinction between direct ownership and an association of interests. His focus is concrete: central management can direct operating managers, while bonuses tied to the iron industry’s profitability could reinforce those instructions. The passage offers a compact way to distinguish ownership from control and managerial incentives. Lederer’s claim remains conditional, especially on a return to more normal market conditions: he asks why such coordination should fail, rather than presenting proof that it has succeeded.
Changing who sits on a governing body need not change where power lies. In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer tests Wissell’s proposed reforms against a concrete question: would they reduce the overlapping authority of the Reich Coal Council, Reich Coal Association and syndicates? He distinguishes politically convenient institutional arrangements from a clearer transfer of functions to the council, arguing that administrative simplification should strengthen control in the common economic interest. His cautious response—reserving judgement on legal details and leaving implementation open—lets readers see a specific choice within the reform debate: whether to alter representation and supervision or redistribute authority itself.
Was the coal association actually carrying out any activity? In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer proposes that the Reich Economics Ministry’s representative answer Rathenau’s question first. The interest lies in this procedural choice: rather than assess the association himself, Lederer seeks an official response. The brief record lets readers distinguish a request for clarification from a substantive position on coal policy.
An economically rational proposal need not be politically achievable—and preserving private ownership need not make it easier to enact. In this brief intervention in the Socialization Commission’s 1920 coal-mining deliberations, Emil Lederer accepts the benefits of combining production into a trust but challenges confidence in both its controllability and its political prospects. Answering Weber and Vogelstein, he argues that private consolidation may face industrial resistance while lacking the radical parties’ support for socialization. His practical proposal is to simplify the existing coal organization without closing off later consolidation. The exchange offers a compact view of Lederer weighing institutional design against political support, and distinguishing an immediately workable reform from a larger objective the commission cannot yet secure.
Accurate accounts need not mean efficient management. In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer asks whether setting prices from production costs plus surcharges could reward mine operators for spending more. His concern is not fraudulent bookkeeping, but unnecessarily costly operation: would premiums for lower costs offset a rule under which higher costs also increased profits? By separating scrutiny of accounts from scrutiny of managerial decisions, Lederer gives concrete form to a difficulty of public regulation where private operators retain control. The contribution leaves the issue open, sharpening the question of what cost oversight must establish beyond the correctness of recorded expenditure.
Can cost control restrain prices if the pricing rule rewards higher costs? In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer tests a proposed cost-plus arrangement against reports of escalating costs in American wartime industry. He explicitly marks his uncertainty about whether incentives for cost reduction had been tried there. His objection nevertheless reaches beyond that precedent: tying prices to production costs may give producers a general interest in increasing expenditure. The speaking turn offers a compact distinction between monitoring costs and changing the incentives that generate them, without proposing a replacement scheme.
In this single interjection recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer specifies “the American one.” The record preserves an emphatic intervention, but not the object it identifies. Its interest lies in that precise limit: a trace of Lederer’s participation in the discussion, not a developed judgement on American industry or a statement of his position on socialization.
In this single interjection recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer points to taxation as the cause of a problem under discussion. Its interest lies in that precise attribution: he singles out taxation as an explanation, though the extract preserves neither the problem he means nor his reasoning. This is a small documentary trace of his participation, not a statement of his wider mining policy.
Can a premium for economical coal production overcome a pricing system that rewards higher costs? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks for a practical calculation rather than accepting the proposed incentive on principle. He also questions whether apparent gains in an enterprise combining mining and further processing amount merely to an accounting shift between its branches. His test is concrete: the premium must outweigh the incentive to raise costs without disregarding consumers’ interests. The contribution lets readers see Lederer scrutinizing regulation through the interaction of accounting, incentives and prices—and questioning whether safeguards shaped by wartime conditions remain necessary under normal circumstances.
Der Anreiz der Prämie muß größer sein, als der Anreiz, die Selbstkosten zu steigern.
English translation: “The incentive provided by the premium must be greater than the incentive to increase production costs.”
If profits are calculated in proportion to production costs, rising costs need not squeeze profits: they may increase them. In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer points to that consequence of the pricing method under discussion. His objection is explicitly conditional: the relationship would hold over the long run only while that method remained feasible. This single recorded speaking turn offers a compact insight into how a pricing rule can make higher costs a basis for higher profits rather than a burden on them.
What is the scale of the amount under discussion? In this single interjection recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks whether it is ten times the share capital. The question offers a precise glimpse of his effort to clarify a financial comparison—not evidence of endorsement or opposition. Its interest lies in that distinction, while the amount’s referent remains outside this extract.
(Lederer: Das Zehnfache des Aktienkapitals?)
English translation: “(Lederer: Ten times the share capital?)”