4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Full shop-windows and idle furnaces at the same moment: the Depression, this 1931 lecture argues, is a crisis of abundance without purchasing power, not a shortage of goods, gold, or effort. Lederer catalogues its causes — cyclical overinvestment financed by credit outrunning real saving, world markets glutted by mechanized grain, rubber, coal, and copper, a swollen German labor supply after conscription's end, and labor-saving rationalization that no longer absorbs workers as the railways once did — then diagnoses why the usual liquidation fails. Cartels and trusts fix prices and quantities, dump losses onto competitive sectors, and block the price falls that would reallocate capital; wage-cutting proves largely a dead end. His verdict is that capitalist automatism has failed, leaving a fixed economy without a plan that only conscious social direction and economic self-government can set right.
Die kapitalistische Wirtschaft ist reich an kostspieligen Paradoxien.
English translation: “The capitalist economy is rich in costly paradoxes.”
Cheap rents can protect an established tenant while making housing harder to obtain for someone arriving later. This tension drives Hayek’s 1931 conference contribution, which uses Vienna to examine how rent restrictions reshape not only construction but the use of existing dwellings. He argues that protected occupancy encourages households to retain unsuitable accommodation, burdens younger entrants, and makes workers reluctant to move for employment. His distinctive concern is the information lost when rents cease to indicate where, and what kinds of, housing are needed. Yet his preference for a free market does not lead him to advocate abrupt abolition: he considers how a progressively enlarged uncontrolled sector might guide adjustment. The result connects a critique of tenant protection with the practical difficulties of withdrawing it.
That mass unemployment is proof of excessive wages, and that cutting wages will clear the labor market, was the reigning Depression orthodoxy Lederer set out to demolish in this 1931 lecture. He grants that a ruthless wage fall might absorb idle workers for a moment, then shows why the concession dissolves: shrinking consumption, technical unemployment that no compensation doctrine repairs, the combine harvester displacing labor faster than cheaper grain can reabsorb it. Against Cassel and Clark he insists the labor market cannot be read in isolation. In the German winter of 1930/31, with cartels holding prices rigid and plants idled by quota, wage cuts could only deepen deflation while strengthening the National Socialists whose rise frightened capital abroad. Unemployment, he concludes, is structural and institutional, not a mere error in the price of labor.
Eine Lohnsenkung vermehrt aber noch nicht den Absatz, sondern verschiebt nur die Kaufkraft vom Arbeiter auf den Unternehmer.
English translation: “A wage reduction, however, does not yet increase sales; it merely shifts purchasing power from the worker to the entrepreneur.”
Abundant productive capacity and mass unemployment form the central paradox of Karl Pribram’s lecture contribution, first published in 1931 and supplied here in its 1932 republication. Pribram locates the Depression’s severity in interacting pressures: lost export markets, collapsing commodity prices, fragile credit, and production costs that resist adjustment. His distinctive concern is who bears that adjustment. Cartels can protect their prices by shifting losses downstream; wages sustain consumption even as employers treat them as costs. Comparing Germany’s financial vulnerability with Britain’s export difficulties and France’s relative insulation, he shows why apparently similar unemployment figures demand different explanations. His assessment of public works and insurance offers a concrete way to examine the tension between restoring profitable production and protecting people whose willingness to work cannot secure employment.
An account of equilibrium prices is not yet an explanation of how prices form. This distinction anchors Wilhelm Vleugels’s 1931 defence of subjective value theory. He grants that economists can describe price interdependence without invoking value, but argues that explaining price movements requires the valuations of people buying, selling, and choosing. His distinctive strategy is to examine whether declared opponents actually abandon those valuations: Cassel’s scarcity principle and Gottl’s alternative vocabulary, he contends, retain what they appear to reject. The essay offers a concrete test for theoretical disagreement—does a new terminology change the explanation, or merely rename its working concepts? Readers can discover both the explanatory role Vleugels assigns to subjective value and his reasons for denying that numerical examples require the measurement of feelings.
Territorial partition could not neatly separate peoples who lived alongside one another. This is the premise of Ludwig von Mises’s brief 1932 review of Rudolph Sieghart’s account of the Habsburg Empire’s final decades. Mises reads the former official’s history as evidence for both the rationale and the defeat of a reform project: transforming the monarchy into a kind of East European League of Nations. His endorsement contains a pointed distinction: Sieghart explains, against his own intentions, why the policy failed. The review offers a compact statement of Mises’s judgement that nationalism had defeated a plausible framework for cooperation without resolving the region’s political and economic conflicts.
A professed belief need not disclose everything its adherents know. In this brief review of R. F. Fortune’s Sorcerers of Dobu, Richard Thurnwald makes that distinction the basis of his own intervention in the debate over Trobriand beliefs about procreation. He argues that restrictions on childbirth outside marriage imply practical knowledge of physical causation, even where an accepted doctrine disavows it. His inference is more than an endorsement of Fortune: it challenges the treatment of such beliefs as remnants of primitive ignorance. Alongside this argument, Thurnwald values Fortune’s concrete accounts of property, stealing, and matrilineal kinship. The review offers a compact encounter with his preference for observed conduct over speculation—and with the interpretive leap by which he turns ethnographic particulars into a claim about socially sanctioned dogma.
Later revisions do not necessarily make an earlier exposition obsolete. In this brief 1932 review, Hayek welcomes the London School of Economics reprint of Böhm-Bawerk’s Grundzüge for restoring detailed discussions omitted from later presentations of his value theory. He credits Böhm-Bawerk not simply with restating Menger and Wieser, but with sharpening their arguments and resolving difficulties while preparing the foundations for his theory of capital and interest. The review offers a compact view of Hayek’s judgement of the Austrian tradition: clarity of exposition can itself advance theory, and an early text may retain analytical value even where its author subsequently changed his position.
What does sociology leave unexplained when it takes meaningful action and the understanding of others as givens? In this 1932 review of Alfred Schütz’s Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Felix Kaufmann identifies that question as the point where Schütz deepens Max Weber’s programme. His interest is methodological: how retrospective attention gives action meaning, and why a participant’s understanding of a social relationship differs from an observer’s. Kaufmann argues that these distinctions matter for constructing sociological ideal types and defining the limits of historical inquiry, rather than merely adding philosophical foundations. The review offers a focused contemporary assessment of Schütz’s challenge to Weber, showing precisely why Kaufmann regarded the analysis of temporal experience as consequential for social-scientific practice.
France and Germany had much to gain from economic cooperation during the Depression—but why should mutual advantage produce political agreement? In this 1932 article, Schumpeter separates the economic case for reconciliation from the national passions and parliamentary constraints obstructing it. Reparations sharpen the contradiction: Germany must export to pay, while its creditors resist German goods. Yet he also questions remedies that look cooperative, from producer agreements benefiting monopolists at consumers’ expense to foreign credit that postpones necessary adjustment. His distinctive contribution is to show how apparently threatening German exports reflect debt obligations rather than simply industrial strength. The reader encounters a case for commercial accommodation that refuses to mistake economic compatibility for political confidence, or capital flows for a means of creating it.
There is in politics a large irrational element even in economic matters.
Can capital accumulation increase because people are compelled, rather than persuaded, to consume less? In this 1932 journal note, Hayek revisits the history of “forced saving,” correcting the account he had offered in Prices and Production. His particular interest is in how newly created purchasing power can redirect existing goods toward production while rising prices reduce others’ consumption. Bentham’s “forced frugality” supplies an early formulation, but Hayek distinguishes evidence of conceptual resemblance from proof that ideas were transmitted. The resulting genealogy clarifies both an economic mechanism and its distributive cost: greater national wealth need not mean greater comfort or justice. Readers can discover why the recipients and uses of new credit matter, and why apparently different monetary vocabularies may describe the same involuntary sacrifice.
Both the narrative of unbroken progress and the fashionable theory of cultural cycles come under fire here as ego-centered, value-laden, and half-mystical—the notion of peoples and states ageing through youth, maturity, and decline among them. What can actually be compared across cultures, Thurnwald argues, is only material culture and knowledge: tools, procedures, medicine, natural science, which diffuse far more readily than law, morals, or religion, as Japan's selective adoption of European technology shows. He reconstructs apparent cycles from the recurring encounter of cattle pastoralists and hoe-farmers—exchange, tribute, warfare, sacred kingship, bureaucracy, dynastic collapse—as situational patterns rather than mystical recurrence, drawing analogies from Central Africa to Egypt, Rome, and tsarist Russia. Development and cycle, he concludes, can be clarified only through value-free socio-psychological analysis of situation-types and chains of effect, never through subjective valuation.
Während rückschauend — je nach unseren Kenntnissen der technischen und Wissensgeschichte —, die verzweigten Linien des Aufspeicherungsvorgangs verfolgt werden können, ist es vorausblickend nicht möglich, die entscheidende Bewegungsrichtung herauszufinden.
English translation: “While in retrospect—depending on our knowledge of technical and intellectual history—the branching lines of the accumulation process can be traced, prospectively it is not possible to discern the decisive direction of movement.”