4,249 works (including 483 books, 3,406 articles and 357 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
A secure public appointment does not guarantee a secure livelihood—or freedom to defend it. In this 1910 article, Emil Lederer examines how rising prices draw public employees into collective action against a state that is both employer and sovereign. Comparing Germany and Austria, with a shorter treatment of Hungary, he distinguishes officials exercising governmental authority from the expanding ranks of postal, railway, technical, and clerical employees. His distinctive concern is the political force of materially defensive demands: employees seeking to preserve bourgeois living standards can find themselves demanding fuller citizenship and freedom of association. The Austrian service-law proposal makes the tension concrete, setting predictable advancement and procedural safeguards against restrictions on public life. Lederer shows why legal protection can coexist with dependence, and why shared economic grievances need not overcome occupational hierarchy.
Protecting Indigenous workers and securing plantation profits are not opposing aims in Richard Thurnwald’s 1910 article: he makes the former a condition of the latter. Drawing on Pacific fieldwork and colonial statistics, he examines how expanding cultivation strains the communities supplying its labor. His distinction between Indigenous daily activity and imposed plantation schedules challenges the simple accusation of laziness, even as he accepts employers’ demands for disciplined work. Recruitment figures and demographic observations lead him toward medical supervision, better nutrition, and restrictions on recruitment—not Indigenous control over labor. Preserved here as a contemporary offprint, the article offers a concrete encounter with the conjunction of ethnographic attention and colonial management: observations of exhaustion, disease, and population loss become arguments for sustaining an explicitly racialized economic hierarchy.
Across six lectures delivered in Berlin and Vienna in 1909, Philippovich reads nineteenth-century economic politics as a conflict of social ideals rather than a mere succession of party interests: economic demands become intelligible only when traced to rival conceptions of state, society, and personality. He follows the century's dominant idea — the freedom of individuals in pursuit of their economic interests — through the emancipation of land, Gewerbefreiheit, and Freihandel, then shows how it bred capitalism and an 'actual' compulsion for the propertyless. Against it he ranges the counter-movements: conservative organic theory from Adam Müller to Stahl, Marxian socialism, Sozialpolitik as mediation, and agrarianism under world-market pressure. The closing lecture reads modern policy not as surviving laissez-faire but as its fusion with the organic view of society — a regulated freedom charged with fitting capitalism's powers into a durable order.
Die vollkommene Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit!
English translation: “The complete development of the personality!”
A union can survive an economic crisis without gaining the power to improve its members’ lives. This distinction anchors Emil Lederer’s chronicle of German and Austrian trade unionism in 1909, which follows unsettled disputes into early 1910. Reading membership figures and financial accounts alongside industrial negotiations, he shows how unemployment and sickness benefits sustained organizations whose bargaining prospects were narrowing. Employer-controlled employment exchanges made access to work itself a contested instrument of power; in Austria, national divisions further weakened common economic action. Lederer’s perspective brings welfare provision and industrial conflict into the same frame: institutions associated with class struggle could stabilize workers’ lives while remaining unable to secure durable advances. The report offers concrete ways to distinguish numerical growth, organizational endurance, and effective bargaining strength.
A state can declare what settles a debt without determining what that payment will buy. This distinction anchors Franz Xaver Weiss’s 1910 article on monetary value, which rejects both metallic substance and sovereign command as sufficient explanations of purchasing power. Drawing on subjective value theory and Menger’s account of marketability, Weiss argues that money’s usefulness in exchange can sustain its value even without convertibility into metal. His defence of paper money thus accompanies, rather than softens, his criticism of Knapp’s state theory. Equally revealing is his restraint about measurement: price indices can track purchasing power without identifying the causes of its changes. Readers encounter a marginalist account that separates money’s economic usefulness, its legal standing, and the numerical conventions through which its value is compared.
Can a theory of competitive equilibrium explain the profits generated by economic change? In this 1910 article, Joseph A. Schumpeter assesses recent American economics with John B. Clark as his principal interlocutor. He admires the analytical reach of marginal productivity while pressing its unresolved questions: a productive contribution does not by itself explain interest, and changing equilibrium conditions do not explain who introduces new methods or commercial combinations. His survey becomes a critical inquiry into the boundaries of static theory, drawing attention to entrepreneurship, credit, and the monetary character of business capital. Readers can discover both what Schumpeter learned from American theorists and where he resisted them—especially when an explanation of factor incomes threatened to become a moral justification of their owners’ rewards.
Educated people like to think themselves immune to advertising; the opening move here is to deny it, since publicity works beneath conscious scrutiny through repetition, imagery, and mere familiarity. Beginning from the premise that distribution completes what production only starts, this wide-ranging study treats advertising as a social power and anatomizes its media and economics—costs and prices, agencies and copywriters, the branded-goods system and retail substitution, mail-order houses, and the department store as a psychology of the female shopper. Mataja asks whether advertising is genuinely productive, refusing both blanket condemnation and the boosters' optimism, and closes on the state: unfair-competition law, the disfigurement of townscapes by posters, and the vexed question of an advertisement tax.
Die Reklame schafft einen Zustand, der einem Markte vergleichbar ist, auf dem die Waren zur Schau und Auswahl bereitgestellt werden, nur wirkt sie viel ausgedehnter, weil unabhängig von bestimmten Zeitpunkten und vom Erscheinen der Interessenten.
English translation: “Advertising creates a condition comparable to a market on which goods are set out for viewing and selection, only it operates far more extensively, since it is independent of particular points in time and of the appearance of interested parties.”
A dividend is not the whole of a shareholder’s gain, and a liquidation date does not tell us when losses occurred. These distinctions drive Felix Somary’s 1910 article on measuring the profitability of joint-stock companies. Bringing commercial reasoning to statistical method, he argues that reserves, retained earnings, and the timing of losses must enter calculations that dividend figures alone cannot support. He also separates company profitability from the yield available to someone buying shares at market prices: a high dividend yield may signal a depressed price rather than a flourishing business. The article offers a concrete way to examine how apparently straightforward financial ratios answer different questions—and how poorly chosen accounting categories can distort the record of a business crisis.
Competing firms can become close allies when they purchase the same commodity: labor. In this 1910 social-policy chronicle, Emil Lederer examines how employers’ associations in Germany and Austria turn that shared interest into organized power. His sharpest test is collective bargaining: does an agreement recognize workers’ organizations as negotiating partners, or merely give contractual form to employers’ commands? Contrasting compromise in woodworking with confrontation in construction, he shows why disputes over hours, piecework, and labor exchanges concern workplace authority as much as wages. Strike-compensation funds make solidarity materially sustainable; political alliances extend it beyond the workplace. Written while the construction conflict remained unresolved, the report lets readers examine Lederer’s distinction between coordination for bargaining and organization aimed at curtailing the other party’s independence.
How can legal obligations be understood where protection, kinship, ritual, and retaliation are inseparable? In this 1910 article, Richard Thurnwald approaches the question through field research in Buin, southern Bougainville, tracing claims and duties through concrete relationships rather than abstract rules. Chiefs depend on followers who can withdraw allegiance; marriage payments redistribute obligations of protection; ownership of planted trees may differ from rights over the soil. These distinctions make familiar legal categories less secure and reveal how authority operates without centralized enforcement. Thurnwald’s attention to local specificity also sits uneasily beside his evolutionary hierarchies and colonial assumptions. The article offers both a detailed account of negotiated obligations and an opportunity to examine the interpretive limits of its ethnographic method.
Twenty years of criticism, yet no change of theoretical position: this is the tension Schumpeter identifies in his 1910 review of the first half-volume of the third edition of Böhm-Bawerk’s Positive Theory of Capital. His brief, admiring notice focuses on how objections—especially those of Lexis and American economists—elicited new arguments about the disproportionately greater productivity of roundabout production. Schumpeter reads the prevalence of opposition as evidence of Böhm-Bawerk’s influence, not his displacement. Rather than independently testing the theory, he shows how its defence has expanded the book’s scope. The review offers a compact instance of Schumpeter’s judgement of theoretical achievement: criticism can deepen an exposition even when it leaves its author’s central convictions intact.
Personal authority can outlast the arguments that earned it. In this brief 1910 review of Eugenie Fabian-Sagal’s study of Albert Schäffle, Joseph A. Schumpeter asks how a critic can separate lasting contributions to knowledge from the force of an economist’s personality. He welcomes the monograph’s judgement and endorses its distinction between Schäffle’s greatness and the more enduring genius of Smith or Ricardo. The review offers a compact glimpse of Schumpeter’s standards of intellectual appraisal: admiration must neither substitute for argument nor prevent discrimination among a thinker’s achievements.