The archive.

What should a rigorous theory of competitive price explain—and where does clarity leave questions unresolved? In this brief 1943 review of George J. Stigler’s textbook, Ludwig M. Lachmann welcomes an exposition shaped by Frank Knight’s teaching, particularly its consistent treatment of costs as foregone alternatives. His praise makes the reservations revealing: expectations raise a problem of determinateness that Stigler scarcely recognises, while inventories unsettle the rigid distinction between short and long run without prompting a sufficiently developed analysis of time. Lachmann calls these minor defects, not grounds for rejecting the book. The review offers a compact view of his critical priorities: conceptual consistency deserves recognition, but expectations and time demand more than tidy exposition.

Did European labor succumb to inadequate leadership, or to doctrines that left it unable to answer nationalism? In this 1943 review of Adolf Sturmthal’s The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918–1939, Ludwig von Mises shifts the explanation from personalities to economic ideas. He praises Sturmthal’s portraits of labor leaders but argues that Marxism and trade unionism obscured conflicts between workers protected by immigration barriers and those excluded from opportunity. His distinctive concern is the vulnerability of industrial countries dependent on imported food and raw materials: nationalist conquest offered, he argues, a vicious and unworkable answer to problems labor failed to confront. The review makes international mobility and trade central to Mises’s indictment of interwar labor politics—and to his bleak expectations for postwar recovery.

Can a critic of political myths remain captive to one himself? In this 1943 review of Gustav Stolper’s This Age of Fable, Ludwig M. Lachmann applauds an assault on economic and political formulas of both Right and Left, but challenges its picture of security before 1914. For Lachmann, nationalist agitation had already undermined Austria-Hungary and the precarious European balance: national self-determination belongs among the promises requiring scrutiny, not outside them. This brief review brings his conception of historical inquiry into focus—recovering human purposes and plans beneath inherited world-pictures—and shows how that standard turns admiration into a precise objection to Stolper’s historical frame.

Diplomatic authority without troops, and negotiating ambition without realistic leverage: these are the failures Richard Schüller singles out in his review of Francis Deák’s account of Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference. He values Deák’s documentary evidence while doubting his impartiality toward Hungary. His sharpest observations concern the gap between Allied warnings and their ability to restrain occupation or influence who governed in Budapest. Hungarian diplomacy receives equally pointed criticism: Schüller argues that attacking the peace treaty wholesale sacrificed a stronger case for Magyar-majority border areas. This brief review offers a concentrated judgment on how military weakness and mischosen negotiating aims frustrated the settlement, while showing how a reviewer can question an author’s sympathies yet find his evidence revealing.

Apparent access to Admiral Darlan does not, for Eric Voegelin, make Alec de Montmorency’s account reliable testimony. In this brief 1943 review, he separates details that can be checked from claims about dictatorship plans and closed-door negotiations that must await corroboration. He finds the portrait of Darlan’s motives plausible—naval royalism, national pride, and resentment toward Britain—while criticizing the writing’s failure to convey the subject’s tragic fate. The notice’s sharpest distinction is between patriotism and political wisdom: Voegelin considers the defense of Darlan’s patriotism unnecessary, yet refuses to judge his collaborationist policy on the evidence then available. Readers encounter a compact example of wartime criticism that makes motives intelligible without treating intelligibility as vindication.

Economic freedom can be threatened by private concentration as well as state planning: this is the tension Frank Albert Fetter draws out in his 1943 review of Wilhelm Röpke’s Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart. Fetter clarifies Röpke’s elusive diagnosis of social disintegration as a change in structure—the replacement of independent proprietors by employees dependent on large aggregations of capital. His sympathy for this constructive liberalism does not prevent him from questioning Röpke’s idealization of the eighteenth century or his estimate of modern technology. This brief review offers a sharply defined encounter between liberal commitments and the problem of business scale, with Fetter weighing economic independence and human worth against both concentrated power and nostalgia for smaller enterprise.

When does a simplifying assumption become an obstacle to explaining interest? In this brief 1943 reply to Lutz’s criticism of The Pure Theory of Capital, Friedrich August von Hayek distinguishes his provisional assumption of a constant income stream from the analysis he believes is needed: preferences for additional income at different future dates. He points to chapters Lutz excludes, but also concedes that their argument is inadequately developed. The revealing tension is between theoretical ambition and analytical tractability: Hayek admits abandoning a fuller treatment when comparisons across many dates became overwhelmingly complicated. This compact comment lets readers see precisely what he defends—and why he regards his treatment of time preference as needing revision.

Can an international currency retain the discipline of gold without tying monetary reserves to a material of limited practical use? In this 1943 article, Hayek develops proposals by Benjamin Graham and Frank D. Graham for currency issued and redeemed against a fixed basket of storable raw commodities. His distinctive concern is to make private demand for liquidity serve a useful economic purpose: holding more money would mean accumulating materials available when spending revived. The basket’s total price would be fixed, while its components’ relative prices remained free to change. The article offers a concrete encounter with Hayek as a designer of monetary institutions, exploring how a binding public rule might stabilize international exchange without discretionary management or guarantees to individual producers.

Can capitalism prosper economically while losing the loyalties that sustain it politically? In this 1943 review essay, Fritz Machlup compares Graham’s proposals to reform free enterprise with Joseph A. Schumpeter’s prediction that capitalism’s success will prepare its replacement by socialism. Their shared commitment to individual freedom sharpens rather than resolves their disagreements over monopoly, inheritance, and the owner-managed firm. Machlup distinguishes the economic case for large corporations from their effects on attachment to private property, and tests institutional proposals against the values they promise to preserve. His scrutiny is especially pointed where Schumpeter moves from explaining capitalism’s decline sociologically to establishing democratic socialism’s logical possibility. The comparison lets readers examine how liberal commitments can support divergent prescriptions—and why efficiency, freedom, and political survival cannot be treated as interchangeable measures.

Victory, not defeat, is the premise of this 1943 prognosis, which asks not whether capitalism deserves approval but what order can survive the war — defining capitalism by private ownership, private profit and loss, and privately created means of payment, then denying that any social system is ever pure. Total war, Schumpeter argues, builds bureaucracies and vested interests that outlast the emergency, while capitalism's own success corrodes its foundations: large-scale enterprise displaces the owner-manager, routinizes the entrepreneur, and breeds the taxation, labor power, and intellectual hostility that turn against it. He rejects the vanishing-investment-opportunity thesis in favor of this self-undermining account, and forecasts not doctrinaire socialism but an amphibial order — a formally private economy sustained by public expenditure, then Guided Capitalism and State Capitalism — cumbersome, mixed, and less vigorous than capitalism at its height.

But it is capitalism in the oxygen tent—kept alive by artificial devices and paralyzed in all those functions that produced the successes of the past.

A stable currency did not restore Austria’s access to markets lost with the dissolution of the Habsburg economic territory. That gap between financial recovery and commercial viability anchors Richard Schüller’s account of interwar trade policy. Writing as a participant in Austria’s negotiations, he examines bilateral clearing with unusual candour: he helped devise a mechanism that enabled imports without foreign exchange, then witnessed its imbalances, evasions, and administrative burdens. His wider question is why rules intended to secure equal trading opportunities could fail to prevent discrimination yet obstruct practical reductions in trade barriers. This 1943 article lets readers examine commercial institutions through the choices and disappointments of a negotiator, while distinguishing the political leverage of controlled trade from its economic effectiveness.

Can monetary expansion cause inflation without doing so every time? In this 1943 article, Alfred Amonn defends quantity theory by separating a conditional causal claim from the evidence needed to explain an actual rise in prices. His distinctive emphasis falls on how money enters expenditure: commercial credit, government spending, and saving do not have identical effects, nor must additional purchasing power raise consumer prices rather than asset prices. Amonn treats the exchange equation as a constraint, not a self-sufficient causal explanation. His closing thought experiment—whether a fully employed economy could replace taxation with newly printed money without raising prices—makes the dispute concrete. The article offers a way to distinguish monetary mechanisms from automatic predictions, while showing why institutions and the destination of spending matter.