4,249 works (including 483 books, 3,406 articles and 357 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Who should approve compensation when its recipients hold votes in the deciding body? In this brief intervention from the coal socialization commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer objects to draft wording that would leave approval of the opening balance sheet with the Reich Coal Council. Those to be compensated, he points out, hold 25 per cent of its votes. Declaring that he will not countersign the draft, Lederer exposes the distributive authority embedded in an apparently accounting procedure. This single recorded speaking turn offers a precise example of how a procedural clause can give beneficiaries a voice in determining their own compensation.
Does a draft reflect the discussion that preceded it, or merely repeat the first proposal? In this single recorded question from the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer asks whether the text incorporates views expressed in an earlier meeting with von Siemens. The brief intervention shows Lederer checking the relationship between consultation and drafting, without taking a substantive position on coal-mining policy. Its interest lies in that precise procedural distinction: a document placed before a commission need not embody the deliberations already held.
Can a plan for coal socialization coherently create new private enterprises while also marking them for disappearance? In this brief speaking turn from the commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks for clarification rather than offering a rival programme. He separates expansion by an existing corporate group from the founding of a new enterprise, then questions whether powers to intervene in an existing business justify making the Reich Coal Council an operator in its own right. His pointed questions expose a concrete difficulty in institutional design: investment, intervention and public ownership are distinct acts, even when a proposal treats them as interchangeable routes to developing coal production.
Sie schaffen den Privatbetrieb und setzen ihn wieder auf den Aussterbeetat.
English translation: “You create the private enterprise and put it back on the list for extinction.”
How much detail does a legislative draft need once its governing principles are clear? In this brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer argues that § 8, paragraph 2 makes separate treatment of every special case unnecessary. Yet drafting economy does not mean considering a proposal in isolation: invoking Rathenau’s explanations, he insists that its construction also matters for another draft. The speaking turn offers a compact glimpse of the tension between adequate general rules and coordination across proposals, without identifying the drafts or spelling out the distribution principles at issue.
Who would the twenty-five representatives actually represent? In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of Germany’s Socialization Commission, published in 1920, Emil Lederer corrects a specific misunderstanding: selecting twenty-five people from the managers of 200—or, in another estimate, 500—enterprises does not mean electing twenty-five general directors. The value of this compact source lies in that procedural distinction. It lets the reader see Lederer separating enterprise-level management representation from representation by general directors, without turning the correction into a broader programme for organizing coal mining.
Would a general directorate for coal mining become dependent on the directors it was meant to oversee? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer answers Lindemann’s concern by clarifying the proposed electoral arrangement: 25 members would be chosen from a constituency of 200–500 directors, general directors and managers, rather than necessarily being general directors themselves. The interest lies in this precise distinction between managerial office and elected membership. Lederer clarifies who could represent the industry without settling how power would operate within the resulting body.
Agreement turns on a condition in this brief intervention by Emil Lederer, recorded in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialisation Commission published in 1920: industry must be able to act collectively as a counterweight. His single sentence lets the reader observe a precise qualification of assent—support for a proposal depends on the capacity of industry itself to balance another power. Neither that power nor the proposal is identified within this speaking turn; its interest lies in the institutional condition Lederer insists on, rather than in a fully stated programme.
Should voting proceed by separate constituent groups rather than leave the outcome to chance? In this single-sentence intervention, recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer turns an open procedural question into a claim of necessity. He does not identify the groups or explain the voting rules. The interest of this small documentary source lies in that precise shift: readers can observe Lederer treating the arrangement of voting itself as a safeguard against contingent outcomes, rather than as a merely administrative detail.
Should managerial authority confer eligibility for elected office—or count against it? In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining socialization commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer suggests declaring general directors ineligible for election. His conditional wording offers a possible rule rather than announcing a decision. The remark gives readers a precise proposal to consider: executive position could be grounds for exclusion, not qualification. It supplies neither a rationale nor, within the sentence itself, the identity of the electoral body.
Man könnte die Generaldirektoren als nicht wählbar bezeichnen.
English translation: “One could designate the general directors as ineligible for election.”
Emil Lederer’s complete recorded interjection in the 1920 coal-mining socialization proceedings consists of a single judgement: section 10 is self-evident. This small documentary source preserves his emphatic response, not an explanation of the provision. Its interest lies in that distinction: readers encounter what Lederer treated as obvious in the discussion, while the utterance alone leaves both the provision’s substance and his reasons unstated.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer insists that a matter be examined again by the editorial commission. The statement offers a narrow documentary glimpse of his procedural stance: further scrutiny is necessary. It gives neither his reasons nor the object of review, making it evidence of a request for reconsideration rather than a substantive position on coal mining.
A report must speak to readers who have not followed its drafting. In this single-sentence intervention in the coal-mining socialization commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer explains that a formulation was intended to convey the report’s basic ideas to readers unfamiliar with an earlier draft. The remark offers a precise glimpse of his concern for intelligibility beyond the drafting circle—not a position on mining policy, but a clarification of whom the report’s wording was meant to serve.