The archive.

Capital can return after a war without restoring the institutions that once coordinated its movement. In this lecture, delivered in 1928 and published in 1929, Felix Somary approaches that discrepancy as both economist and banker, concerned with decisions that cannot wait for historical hindsight. His distinctive focus is the shift from British commercial finance to American securities speculation: optimistic share valuations can give expanding firms exceptionally cheap capital, even as they expose investors to disappointed expectations. Financial recovery, he argues, also leaves foreign property vulnerable to nationalism and weak legal enforcement. The lecture offers a concrete way to distinguish abundant funds from an effective financial order—and to see how the same investment mechanisms can finance industrial experimentation while widening divisions between secure creditor economies and insecure destinations.

Before judging Germany’s foreign borrowing, what debts had actually been incurred, by whom, and on what terms? In this short review, Fritz Machlup praises Kuczynski’s documentation for giving a noisy controversy a factual footing. His distinction is pointed: he values systematic empirical work while distancing it from the “empirical-realist” school of economics. Praise is tempered by unease over public bodies’ substantial share of foreign debt and by the suggestion that official interventions probably worsened borrowing terms. The review offers a compact instance of Machlup’s critical priorities: reliable evidence is necessary for policy argument, but collecting it does not settle whether borrowing abroad is desirable.

Why would investors accept tiny yields on shares while farmers struggled to borrow even at seven or eight percent? In this closing contribution to a scholarly debate, originally published in 1929, Felix Somary insists that the puzzle concerns the allocation of capital, not simply its scarcity. His example is Sofina, whose high share price dwarfed its dividend; the relevant yield, he reminds an interlocutor, must be calculated against market price rather than nominal value. Alongside his defence of a German debt-consolidation loan, Somary advances a tentative social explanation: income has shifted from older rentiers towards younger speculators. The exchanges expose a precise disagreement over what investors seek from securities—and why settling international debts might not resolve the distortions in long-term lending.

When the Methodenstreit pitted Menger's theoretical economics against the German historical school, the deeper logical question, whether a science of human action is even possible, went unanswered. Mises returns to it here, arguing that sociology, with economics as its most developed branch, yields universally valid laws rather than Max Weber's ideal types. Scarcity, choice, and the economic principle are not habits of the capitalist epoch but conditions of all action; Gresham's law and subjective value theory hold wherever their premises obtain. He faults historians who imagine they work without theory while leaning on outdated folk economics, and rejects the historicist and Marxist claim that economic laws are bound to particular epochs, a device, he argues, for evading criticism of socialist calculation. History, he concludes, begins only where theory leaves off.

Ohne Theorie ist Geschichte nicht zu denken.

English translation: “History is unthinkable without theory.”

What makes a change in an economy 'structural' rather than a passing fluctuation? Bayer answers by first building a theory—the national economy as an ordered configuration of households, enterprises, groups, and the proportions among them—and then testing it on Austria after 1918. Only durable alterations in these relations count as Strukturwandlungen; a shift confined to a single firm or household does not. Cut off from the imperial market, small-republic Austria had to knit its branches into a new internal coherence: sugar, coal, and water power expanding toward domestic self-supply, dairy displacing cattle-fattening, cartels and foreign capital reorganizing industry and banking. Economic law, Bayer insists, survives every structural upheaval of power; recovery is a matter of proportion and coordination, not the mere shrinking of overdeveloped branches.

Dieses Bild günstiger wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung hebt sich von düsterem Hintergrunde ab: Die Einkommensverschiebung in und zwischen den Lebenshaltungsgruppen verläuft, von einzelnen relativen Veränderungen abgesehen, in der Richtung allgemeiner Verarmung.

English translation: “This picture of favorable economic development stands out against a somber background: the shift of income within and between the standard-of-living groups proceeds, apart from certain relative changes, in the direction of a general impoverishment.”

A pot’s shape cannot tell us who made it, how it travelled, or why its makers declined a seemingly useful innovation. In this 1929 encyclopedia contribution, Richard Thurnwald brings comparative ethnography to the problems of prehistoric interpretation, treating technology as inherited skill and socially organized practice rather than an inventory of objects. Pottery anchors his inquiry: mobility can favour baskets over ceramics, trade can obscure production sites, and tribute obligations can reshape the division of craft labour. Ritual precautions, too, enter his account of how difficult skills are learned and sustained. Although his classifications and conjectures retain assumptions of contemporary ethnology, his concrete comparisons expose a persistent interpretive danger: mistaking material resemblance for shared history, or technical possibility for inevitable adoption.

When two price indexes diverge, what establishes which one is wrong? In this 1929 review of Warren Milton Persons’s The Construction of Index Numbers, Gottfried Haberler challenges the assumption that mathematical consistency tests can settle questions of economic measurement. He questions why price and quantity indexes must use identical averaging formulas, and rejects Persons’s inference that cumulative divergence from a fixed-base series discredits chain indexes. For Haberler, comparisons between adjacent periods have an advantage: they reduce the heterogeneity of the goods being compared. This compact technical review shows how a dispute over formulas turns on a substantive question—whether the observations remain economically comparable—and distinguishes proof of divergence from proof of error.

Reviewing Hans Neisser's Der Tauschwert des Geldes, Hayek praises a disciplined synthesis of German monetary theory while doubting the very object at its centre—the 'general' value of money and the price level. He approves Neisser's refusal to mistake Fisher's equation of exchange for a causal theory, treating it instead as a way of displaying the variables still to be explained, and singles out the analysis of credit money—bank deposits, cheque money, note-issuing banks, discount policy—as the book's finest achievement. Crucial to both men is that money represents 'pure demand,' not tied to a simultaneous supply of goods, and so 'acquires a life of its own.' Skeptical of velocity and aggregate magnitudes, Hayek uses the occasion to sharpen his own preference for a theory built on credit, cash demand and the coordinating role of interest.

Neisser very correctly emphasizes that the equation itself is very far from offering even a theory of the value of money.

If the United States has a comparative advantage in steel, should it abandon wheat production and depend on Luxembourg’s harvest? Haberler uses this deliberately disproportionate pairing to distinguish gains from trade from the demand for complete specialization. In this 1929 article, his defence of comparative cost proceeds by limiting what the principle claims: money prices do not overturn comparative advantage, but production costs alone cannot determine which goods a country exports and imports. Answering James W. Angell and A. F. Burns, Haberler separates genuine qualifications from supposed refutations. Readers can discover how a classical proposition survives these objections through sharper distinctions—while Haberler leaves unresolved the deeper problem of its reliance on a labour theory of value.

Economic policy, Braun insists, is not a catalogue of desirable social ends nor an administrative handbook, but an analytical science of what state intervention actually does. Grounded in the value and price theory of the Vienna school after Menger, the work makes a sharp methodological cut: economics cannot pronounce on the legitimacy of political aims — those spring from shifting cultural ideals and collective needs — but it can trace how any measure alters the exchange constellations through which production and distribution run. A state cannot simply decree a market result; its measure either changes some datum of price formation or remains economically inert. From this principle Braun builds a taxonomy of interventions — price fixing, price burdens, price relief, influences on demand and supply — judging each by the market relations it disturbs and the reactions it sets loose, without endorsing or condemning intervention as such.

Volkswirtschaftspolitik ist die Lehre von den Wirkungen, die durch Maßnahmen von Staat und Gemeinden auf die Tauschkonstellationen ausgeübt werden.

English translation: “Economic policy is the doctrine of the effects produced by measures of the state and of municipalities upon exchange constellations.”

Where earlier theory chose between technique and valuation, the first part of Engländer's system attempts to weld the two together. The objective-technical structure derives relative prices from labor and production conditions; the subjective-social derives them from valuation and income. Grounding value in the psychic phenomena of desiring goods and avoiding evils, he builds from primary values through economic value, cost, and yield to market price, insisting there is no necessary link between a good's higher marginal utility and a higher price. Rent emerges as scarcity plus the differential advantage of fertility and location; wages and capital interest are handled as factor prices. Yet interest, he concedes, resists convincing derivation here, and its fuller treatment is postponed to the theory of money in Part II.

Nach dem Sprachgebrauch der klassischen Schule erklärt der objektiv-technische Preisaufbau wohl den natürlichen Preis, aber nicht den um den natürlichen Preis oszillierenden Marktpreis.

English translation: “According to the usage of the Classical School, the objective-technical price structure indeed explains the natural price, but not the market price oscillating around the natural price.”

How does the cost of higher-order productive goods relate to the value of the finished products they make? This youthful essay of 1876, printed only decades later in Wieser's collected papers, answers by dismantling the cost theory of value from within. Starting with a single economizing agent, one scarce input, and several consumption goods, Wieser shows that the apparent proportionality between product value and cost is an illusion of good management, not a transfer of value from input to output. Value flows the other way: needs and scarcity impute worth to the productive good through its expected marginal product. His decisive move makes any cost rule normative rather than descriptive—it ought to be, not it is—valid only while its presuppositions hold. This is an early Austrian account of imputation and opportunity cost.

Der Wert der Güter ist nicht bestimmt durch ihren wirklichen, sondern durch ihren, soweit unsere Erkenntnis reicht, wirtschaftlich gebotenen Gebrauch.

English translation: “The value of goods is determined not by their actual use, but by the use which, so far as our knowledge extends, is economically enjoined.”