The archive.

With most American economists singing happy days are here again after the market's recovery from the early-2000s slump, a minority marched to a different drummer, forecasting falling asset prices, recession, and depression. Sennholz sides partly with these deflationists—granting that they grasp bubbles and overvaluation better than the optimists do—then reverses course. The danger in February 2004, he argues, is not pure deflation but dollar weakness, rising prices, and stagnation, because Federal Reserve inflation, federal deficits, and the dollar's reserve-currency role make inflationary pressure decisive, especially if China and Japan stop absorbing dollars through Treasury purchases. He rereads the Great Depression as the handiwork of Hoover-Roosevelt intervention—Smoot-Hawley, tax hikes, farm controls, the Wagner Act—rather than Fed inaction, and likens Japan's prolonged stagnation to the same obstruction of readjustment. His forecast: controls and dreary stagflation.

They plan the future by the past, by the Great Depression and the Japanese recession.

Not parliament but the government was to blame, so runs Schumpeter's memorandum from Graz in June 1917, after the government's parliamentary opening had collapsed. Its error was to threaten constitutional change by octroi while attempting normal parliamentary rule, the most unfortunate tactic possible, alienating German and Slav parties at once. His remedy is a clear federal settlement: coronation, amnesty, and an open avowal of federation and national autonomy as the basis for a majority resting on Germans, Czechs, and South Slavs. The memorandum's sharpest move redefines conservative statecraft as democratic performance, and it demands a peace formula without indemnities or annexations. Without the animating spirit of leadership, Schumpeter warns, the best rules of procedure remain a dead letter.

Österreich steht an einem Scheidewege, vor einer Krise seiner Geschicke.

English translation: “Austria stands at a crossroads, before a crisis of its destiny.”

Sputnik convinced many Americans that centrally planned Soviet science had overtaken the free market, and this short monograph answers that panic directly. Rothbard treats science and technology as an ordinary problem of allocating scarce resources, insisting that the only rational, voluntary coordinator is the free price system rather than government direction. He denies any genuine shortage of scientists, since a real shortage would show up as rising relative salaries, and marshals Jewkes and Stigler to show that major inventions came from individuals and small firms, not bureaucratic research teams. Soviet science, crippled by the Lysenko affair, becomes his cautionary case; automation, he adds, deserves no more fear than the machines the Luddites smashed. His preferred lever is tax exemption, never subsidy.

The essential feature of innovation is that the path to it is not known beforehand.

Can an economist passionately oppose a policy without smuggling moral commitments into scientific analysis? In this connected three-part essay series, republished here in 2016, Israel M. Kirzner takes Ludwig von Mises’s free-market advocacy as a test of value-free economic advice. His distinctive answer turns on ignorance: people may support measures whose consequences frustrate their own purposes. Entrepreneurial discovery supplies an account of how markets uncover overlooked opportunities and coordinate plans, rather than simply maximize an aggregate called welfare. Yet Kirzner carefully limits that defense: coordination neither validates people’s preferences nor establishes the justice of property rights. The result offers a precise way to distinguish explaining why rent control may defeat its proponents’ aims from deciding which aims society ought to pursue.

Marx never defined the word on which his whole system turns. Taking that omission as his lever, Mises argues that 'class' is not found in nature but constructed by the mind's own sorting into categories, and that proletarian consciousness cannot follow necessarily from proletarian position when workers, unions, and rival socialist factions disagree about their own interests. He presses the contradiction between the 'iron law of wages' and the doctrine of progressive immiseration, answers both with capitalism as mass production under consumer sovereignty, and traces Marx's 'material productive forces' back to the human mind that made the tools. The stakes turn political: once dissent is branded class betrayal rather than honest error, purges and factional bloodletting follow inexorably. Delivered as a 1952 lecture and first printed in 2006, the essay fuses economic critique with epistemology and a warning about freedom.

Purges are the necessary consequences of the philosophical foundation of Marxian socialism.

Does experience preserve sensations, or does it first make sensation possible? In this early manuscript essay, completed in September 1920 and presented in its 2017 English translation, Friedrich August von Hayek argues that sensory qualities emerge from relationships among neural impulses rather than belonging to impulses in isolation. His telephone-switchboard analogy gives the proposal a concrete shape: an incoming signal acquires significance through the connections it activates. Memory, on this account, is not merely a store of conscious impressions but a condition of their formation. Readers can trace how this developmental hypothesis explains both recognition and misperception, and confront its central epistemological tension: experience builds the framework governing later perception, yet that framework cannot be assumed to exhaust the world.

The connections between the physiological elements are thus the primary phenomenon that creates the mental phenomena.

What Marx called the great catastrophe of the Industrial Revolution was, on Mises's telling, a rescue. Pre-capitalist England—hedged by guild restriction, monopoly, and poor laws—could not absorb its growing landless poor; entrepreneurs with little capital organized the destitute to make cheap goods for the masses, and survival, population growth, and rising living standards followed. Around this historical revision Mises builds a defense of liberal individualism against theories that dissolve persons into nation, class, or 'material productive forces.' He presses Marx on his own contradictions—why condemn capitalists for performing a historically necessary role?—and traces socialist planning back to Plato's fantasy of rule by philosophical administrators. Because planning converts individual initiative into command rather than merely swapping capitalists for officials, it changes the whole character of economic life. Delivered as a 1952 lecture, the transcript first reached print in 2006.

The socialist state is necessarily a police state.

Long after Böhm-Bawerk had dismantled Marx's economics, Marxism kept its prestige — and this lecture-essay asks why a doctrine attacking the whole social order went so long unrefuted as philosophy. The answer, Mises argues, lies in its unexamined core: historical inevitability, the malleability of man, and the mysterious 'material productive forces' that supposedly explain all culture yet are themselves never explained. He separates anti-Marxism from liberalism, defends Freud against the charge of materialism, and traces the vocabulary of 'organization' and 'social engineering' back to Comte and Saint-Simon, where human beings become raw material to be arranged. Against the planners he reframes the whole quarrel: not plan versus no plan, but whose plan shall rule — one dictator's, or the many plans of individuals who each, in acting, already plan.

It is impossible to defeat a philosophy if you do not fight in the philosophical field.

Every person acts on a philosophy, whether he can name it or not—and the reigning philosophy of the age, Mises contends in this 1952 lecture, is essentially Marxist, even among those who loudly reject Marx. The argument dismantles materialism in its several guises: the mechanistic view that treats man as a machine (La Mettrie, the newborn likened to a Ford car), the physiological reduction of thought to secretion, and the historical materialism that makes tools the engine of history. Against all of these Mises insists that tools are products of ideas, not their cause, and that Marx's theory of ideology—doctrines as mere expressions of class interest—destroys the notion of truth it depends on. Tracing Marx back to Hegel's teleology, he warns that once socialism is cast as history's destination, dissent is condemned in advance.

A machine doesn't achieve anything, doesn't do anything alone—it is always men or a number of men who achieve something by means of the machine.

Interest is not a fee charged for the use of money, but the market expression of a universal fact: present goods are valued above future goods. From this rooting of interest in time preference, Mises builds a theory of the trade cycle in which depressions trace not to capitalism's inner laws but to bank credit expansion. New credit lowers the market rate below what real saving would set, luring entrepreneurs into projects that falsified calculation makes look profitable; the boom is malinvestment, and the crisis merely discloses the scarcity that was there all along. His house-building analogy — foundations laid for a structure the available materials cannot complete — fixes the point. Credit expansion, he adds, lets governments spend without openly taxing, which is why sound money is finally a matter of limiting political power.

Credit expansion is fundamentally really a problem of civil rights.

Georges Sorel, alone among the thinkers who absorbed Marx, added something genuinely new: a cult of action, sabotage, the general strike, and political myth that would echo through Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler alike. From that observation these lectures range across the fault lines Marx left unexamined - above all the principle of nationality, which Marx dismissed because he expected capitalism to dissolve national peculiarities before socialism arrived. Mises shows why free-trade optimism about the obsolescence of war, shared by Wilson and Norman Angell, collapses in an interventionist world of tariffs, embargoes, and raw-material controls. He follows the shifting vocabulary of socialism and communism from the 1830s through Lenin and Stalin, and reads the First and Second Internationals as bureaucracies that preached peace while ignoring the trade and migration barriers that actually make nations fight.

Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler were all influenced by Sorel, by the idea of action, by the idea not to talk but to kill.

Profit and loss are signals before they are rewards: in a market economy they reveal what consumers most urgently want and pull capital toward the uses that serve them best. Working from that premise, Mises separates the physical capital goods inherited from the past - often specific, obsolete, or badly located - from the accounting abstraction of capital, and shows why technocratic schemes to scrap old methods for newer ones squander real wealth. Private property, on his account, is a social function, retained only by serving customers cheaply and well, and wholly unlike feudal ownership rooted in conquest and privilege. Taxation and interference, he warns, sap consumer sovereignty by starving new firms of the capital they need to grow. The essay closes by contrasting profit-and-loss management with the bureaucratic kind proper only to policing and other nonmarket services.

But capitalism is not dying; people are murdering it.