4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Freedom can be endangered not only by its opponents but by defenders who stop rethinking its foundations. In this Stanford lecture of 1946, first published in 2022, Hayek asks how liberal ideas can regain political influence without becoming a fixed creed or a campaign for existing interests. His warning against comprehensive planning accompanies a constructive proposal: an international association of scholars committed to examining the institutions of a free society. Acton and Tocqueville supply a tradition for this undertaking, particularly their distrust of power even when democratically authorized. The lecture reveals Hayek’s view of intellectual renewal as practical work conducted across disciplines and national borders—and makes clear that he regards the loss of freedom as a danger to resist, not an inevitable historical destination.
It is a great tradition which we want to continue by this means, not a fixed programme which we want to put over.
Rising real wages do not by themselves establish that poverty has receded. In this review, published in English translation in 1931, Emil Lederer examines the first volume of The New Survey of London Life and Labour through that distinction. He values Charles Booth’s combination of statistical classification and intimate household observation, but asks what happens when its measures are carried across forty years of changing expectations. Deteriorating housing, commuting costs and lost leisure complicate the apparent gains in purchasing power; London’s locally rooted poor also challenge explanations centred on migration. Lederer’s favourable but questioning assessment shows what historical comparison demands of a social survey: evidence not merely of higher incomes, but of how economic change alters the conditions and possibilities of working-class life.
Can legal protection of human dignity restrain hatred without shielding entrenched injustice? In this private letter of March 30, 1945, Eric Voegelin welcomes Hermann Broch’s proposed statutory safeguards but tests them against uncomfortable cases: would the Great Powers punish incitement within their own governing circles? Drawing on Max Scheler, he treats collective hatred as a product of anxiety and competitive insecurity, not a pathology confined to fascism. His sympathy also stops short of Broch’s condemnation of war itself: where peaceful procedures protect those already in power, Voegelin argues, prohibiting violent resistance may perpetuate injustice. The letter offers a compact encounter between ethical agreement and political pessimism, showing why protecting dignity requires distinctions between legality and justice, incitement and resistance.
Agreement on protecting human dignity conceals a sharp disagreement about democracy in Eric Voegelin’s letter to Hermann Broch of 10 September 1945. Accepting Broch’s revised legislative proposal while doubting its feasibility, Voegelin questions whether democratic participation itself safeguards dignity. He locates American resistance to fascism in inherited oligarchic restraints and provocatively classifies German fascism as a democratic movement freed from such restraints. These are polemical judgments offered in correspondence, not a sustained historical demonstration. Set beside his grateful, explicitly provisional response to the language and mysticism of Broch’s “Vergil,” they reveal the precise point at which intellectual friendship accommodates political disagreement: shared ends do not entail a shared account of the social and spiritual conditions that might secure them.
Broch’s reflections on the end of the novel left a mark on Voegelin’s studies of Plato: this brief letter of 11 November 1947 records that debt without explaining its conceptual workings. Sending an offprint identified by the editors as “Plato’s Egyptian Myth,” Voegelin offers his scholarship as thanks for Broch’s The Death of Virgil. The acknowledgment gives readers a concrete point of contact between literary experiment and philosophical interpretation. Alongside it, Voegelin describes his nearly reclusive work on the “History,” reports two volumes with the publisher, and hopes for a reunion. Preserved here in an edited German transcription, the letter captures an intellectual exchange in the intimate register of gratitude and friendship.
Responding to Broch’s introduction to the Iliad, Voegelin finds a convergence between philosophical inquiry and the novelist’s experience of making literature. This private letter of 31 December 1947 tests that affinity through two concrete problems: how spiritual movements lose their institutional home, and how myth survives in the abstract forms of late artistic work. Voegelin tentatively locates a decisive rupture in the Church’s response to fourteenth-century mysticism, then turns to the mathematical ordering of Plato’s Laws as a counterpart to Broch’s ideas of syntax and abstraction. The interest lies in watching these connections take shape as suggestions exchanged between friends, rather than as a finished theory. An opening report about a mutual acquaintance also preserves the correspondence’s personal texture, including Voegelin’s concern, incomplete information, and moralizing judgments.
Voegelin helps find readers for Broch while refusing to make readership the measure of literary worth. This private letter of 5 June 1944, presented in an edited German transcription, moves from subscription orders to a sharp disagreement over poetry’s isolation in mass society. Loneliness, he argues, does not make intellectual creation meaningless: its foundations lie in mysticism, not social recognition. His caustic preference for an “ivory tower” over collective fantasy gains particular force from the practical assistance surrounding it. The letter offers a compact encounter with intellectual independence as both conviction and daily practice—sustained through friendship, prospective readers, and the uncertain search for a publisher.
Can a state profit from spirits while encouraging people to drink less? In this article, Siegmund Feilbogen argues for an Austrian monopoly of domestic spirits distribution—not state ownership of distilleries—as a means of funding social provision and curbing alcoholism. His distinctive concern is institutional design: private producers could retain remunerative prices while fewer sales outlets weakened incentives to promote drinking. The export question tests the proposal’s limits. Acknowledging the state’s shortcomings as a merchant, he asks how foreign trade might remain outside domestic monopoly controls. Readers encounter a concrete attempt to reconcile fiscal need, temperance, and commercial competition, including the awkward question of compensating those whose livelihoods reform would displace.
A population that strengthens a state need not be one that improves its inhabitants’ living standards. This tension runs through Viktor Mataja’s chapter in the Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaftspolitik. He refuses to treat growth or density as inherently beneficial, asking instead how household costs, economic organization, and demographic composition alter their effects. His scrutiny of pronatalist measures is concrete: inheritance penalties may damage family businesses, while financial incentives cannot remove the burdens of pregnancy and parenthood. Yet this caution coexists with his endorsement of eugenics and racial-nationalist priorities. The chapter offers a revealing encounter with an economist who recognizes the limits of demographic intervention but allows national and military ambitions—and discriminatory assumptions about hereditary worth—to displace economic welfare as policy’s governing standard.
Böhm-Bawerk’s fiscal career becomes a defence of abstract economics in this dictionary entry by his lifelong friend and fellow Austrian economist Friedrich von Wieser. Wieser credits his colleague’s scientific training with the clarity needed to reform taxation, strengthen state credit and manage public finances—directly answering critics who regarded Austrian theory as remote from practical life. The appreciative portrait also makes room for disagreement: Wieser explains Böhm-Bawerk’s account of interest through the lower valuation of distant needs, while acknowledging its divided reception. This compact assessment shows how an intellectual ally connects theoretical precision with administrative judgment, yet distinguishes the value of Böhm-Bawerk’s research from acceptance of his central explanation of interest.
A brief private note, written two days before Christmas 1937, catches Alfred Schütz in an ordinary moment between his phenomenological labors. Just back from Paris, he has carried home an issue of the Revue de Paris for its essay by Paul Valéry, which he presses on his correspondent with the request that it be returned once read. He adds a book as a Christmas gift, should the friend not already own it, and sends warm wishes to him and his wife. Slight in itself, the letter survives as a small biographical trace of the émigré scholar's Parisian ties and reading life on the eve of war—a fragment of correspondence rather than a work of theory.
An economist’s lasting contribution need not lie in solutions that survive criticism. In this brief review of Edgeworth’s Papers relating to Political Economy, Ludwig von Mises locates much of Edgeworth’s value in his ability to expose weaknesses in others’ arguments and formulate difficult problems. His appreciation is discriminating: he questions the gains from mathematical reformulation and judges substantial portions of the collection superseded, while insisting that later obsolescence does not cancel original achievement. The review offers a compact view of Mises as a reader of another economist—skeptical of analytical effort without explanatory returns, attentive to the historical claims of outdated work, and appreciative of Edgeworth’s plea against mutual disparagement between theoretical and historical inquiry.