The archive.

Who should support factory workers when they can no longer work—the industrial town that employed them or a distant municipality to which they legally belong? In this short 1904 article, Ludwig von Mises approaches Austrian old-age provision through the fiscal consequences of municipal settlement law. Drawing on nineteenth-century proposals for factory taxes and workers’ support funds, he argues that shifting relief obligations to workers’ home municipalities concealed a problem industrialization had already exposed. The 1896 restoration of residence-based settlement claims made dedicated insurance newly pressing. The article offers a concrete account of delayed reform: legal rules did not remove the costs of dependency, but determined which communities had to confront them.

Can an economist’s idealism be dismissed in the name of facts whose full reality remains unknown? In this 1905 comparative review, Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen turns his assessment of Achille Loria’s and Maffeo Pantaleoni’s essay collections into a pointed reflection on scholarly judgement. He acknowledges that Loria’s pursuit of social justice can outrun historical realism, yet questions whether appeals to facts are necessarily less circular than appeals to ideals. Pantaleoni offers a contrasting stance: logical precision coupled with scientific tolerance and a rejection of economic schools. Schullern values both without dissolving their differences. This brief review shows how disagreement with an economist’s premises can become a reason for sustained attention rather than dismissal.

How much theoretical precision should an accessible economics textbook sacrifice to clarity? Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen’s brief 1905 review of Camillo Supino’s Principi di Economia politica makes that tension concrete. He welcomes Supino’s willingness to draw across schools and national traditions while retaining a classical framework, but finds the treatment of value insufficiently deep and potentially troublesome in its terminology. Rather than press these objections, Schullern judges the book by its explanatory purpose, singling out its comparison of collectivism and individualism for praise. The review offers a compact instance of critical restraint: conceptual reservations remain explicit, yet accessibility and the author’s freedom to select among competing explanations carry the final judgement.

Abolishing feudalism need not abolish dependence: this is the tension Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen foregrounds in his short 1905 review of Filippo Lo Vetere’s Il movimento agricolo Siciliano. He welcomes Lo Vetere’s challenge to celebrated reforms, reporting that the removal of customary restraints helped consolidate large estates rather than relieve Sicilian agrarian distress. His sympathetic appraisal connects this criticism with a concrete alternative: agricultural self-help organized through the Consorzio agrario siciliano and local credit cooperatives. The review offers a compact view of Schullern’s receptiveness to an uncomfortable argument about reform, while showing why, for Lo Vetere, access to credit and cooperative organization mattered more to agricultural recovery than legal emancipation alone.

Italy’s agricultural difficulties appear here as a warning to its trading partners: successful reform could make the country a more formidable economic competitor. In this short 1905 review of Italo Giglioli’s Malessere agrario ed alimentare in Italia, Hermann von Schullern zu Schrattenhofen commends the Italian agricultural expert’s report to readers following trade-treaty negotiations. He takes up Giglioli’s diagnosis of cultural backwardness in parts of the population, but stresses the possibility of extending northern Italy’s agricultural advances across the country. Rather than assessing the book’s detailed evidence, Schullern reveals what he finds politically consequential in it: the prospect that national self-criticism, natural resources and agricultural expertise might alter Italy’s economic relations with Austria-Hungary, Germany and France.

A tax can alter prices not only through the payments it imposes, but through the exchanges it prevents. Robert Meyer’s 1905 review of Leo Petritsch’s study of tax shifting singles out this change of perspective: a land transfer may cease to be worthwhile when the tax exceeds the difference between buyer’s and seller’s valuations. Meyer welcomes Petritsch’s account of the wider price effects of such blocked transactions, yet stops short of endorsing his sweeping rejection of taxes on transactions in movable property. This brief review draws a useful distinction between an explanatory advance and the policy conclusions claimed for it. Its critical edge also turns inward: Meyer openly acknowledges his personal stake when protesting Petritsch’s omission of his own research.

A new tax can reduce one lender’s burden while increasing another’s: the difference lies in what was actually collected before. This problem anchors Frank Albert Fetter’s assessment of New York’s 1905 tax changes, adopted as expanding public commitments strained revenues and the state moved away from general property taxation. Fetter tests warnings of financial disruption against early stock-market evidence and examines mortgage taxation through uneven enforcement, local lending conditions, and the possible movement of capital. His discussion of special-franchise litigation adds another distinction: statutory authority does not itself secure collectible revenue. This compact article offers a concrete account of why a tax’s stated rate cannot settle who pays, and why its economic effects must be judged against existing practice rather than an imagined uniform system.

A world price need not be a single quotation, nor a world market a single trading centre. In this published excerpt from his 1905 seminar report, Schumpeter investigates international price formation through the institutions that connect wheat, cotton, coffee, and wool markets: credit, transport, exchanges, auctions, and colonial production. His concrete examples unsettle easy measures of economic independence. Austria-Hungary’s wheat prices can be constrained by the mere possibility of imports; continental traders can bypass London while becoming more closely connected to overseas producers. Comparing these markets reveals why shared price movements coexist with differences in quality, speculative pressure, and bargaining power. Schumpeter’s central distinction is between declining British intermediation and declining international integration: the former, he argues, can be evidence of the latter’s advance.

A price index can change even when prices do not—if the mixture of goods it measures has changed. In this seminar paper published in 1905, Joseph Alois Schumpeter treats such difficulties as questions about what economic measurement can legitimately claim. His guiding distinction is between describing price movements and explaining their causes: an aggregate cannot, by itself, identify monetary influences. No index is best for every purpose. Counting both raw materials and finished products can multiply particular price influences; holding weights fixed can preserve comparability while losing touch with consumption. Readers encounter the economic choices embedded in apparently technical formulas, and the tension between measuring purchasing power consistently and representing an economy whose goods, qualities, and quantities keep changing.

Economic theory must begin not from an abstract calculator but from the acting person, whose bodily, instinctual, and affective constitution shapes conduct in advance. Dedicated to the psychiatrist August Forel, this essay builds a layered anthropology, reflex, instinct, character, habit, suggestion, and traces economic behaviour to instinctual complexes of nutrition, protection, possession, power, and vanity that differ sharply in urgency. Schwiedland's sharpest tool is a distinction economics had blurred: Begier, desire, generates its own activity and seeks heightened pleasure, while Bedürfnis, need, is provoked by deprivation and drives toward its removal. The essence of economy, he insists, lies not in consuming but in procuring goods for future satisfaction. Culture is the refinement of striving; luxury is ambiguous, capable of both waste and invention; and economic reform, he concludes, must include the education of wants.

Die soziale Therapie besteht ja zum besten Teil in einer Beeinflussung des inneren Menschen.

English translation: “Social therapy consists for the most part in influencing the inner man.”

Modern competition, Ettinger contends, throws up the very associations meant to restrain it. Cartels are neither an invention of academic economists nor a creature of legislation, but practical answers to ruinous price wars, overproduction, and unstable relations among firms. With a foreword by Carl Menger, this legal-economic study refuses both a naive faith in laissez-faire and the reflex of treating every combination as criminal conspiracy. If private associations already regulate prices, output, and risk across whole branches, the state cannot pose as a neutral onlooker; it must decide how such power is supervised and where stabilizing coordination shades into private domination. Ettinger works through cartel forms as stages in an industry's self-organization — from loose price agreements, vulnerable to evasion, toward integrated cooperatives that turn rivalry into collective calculation — and supplies model statutes for the promoters and lawyers who would build them.

Dem Kartellprobleme kann und darf der Staat nicht länger als stiller Beobachter gegenüberstehen.

English translation: “The state can and must no longer stand before the cartel problem as a silent observer.”

A tariff reduction need not mean the destruction of a domestic industry. In this 1905 review of Richard Schüller’s Schutzzoll und Freihandel, Carl Menger examines the differences among firms that make reciprocal trade concessions possible. Producers with unequal costs can coexist, while even the strongest enterprises face limits to profitable expansion. On Schüller’s account, carefully measured concessions may therefore contract less competitive production without eliminating an entire branch of industry. Menger’s qualified appreciation centres on the connection between these production conditions and practical treaty negotiation. His review offers a concrete alternative to treating protection and free trade as all-or-nothing choices: assessing which producers bear the losses, where export opportunities arise, and under what conditions both negotiating countries can benefit.