4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Requiring legislation does not settle who has authority to legislate. In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer insists on that distinction: “by law” means legislation by the Land or the Reich, depending on which has jurisdiction. He also draws attention to the qualifier “existing,” without identifying its referent within this speaking turn. The passage offers a compact example of his attention to legal wording, separating the required instrument of action from the allocation of governmental competence.
Where should protections against being outvoted be established—in legislation or in rules of procedure? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 Socialization Commission’s coal-mining deliberations, Emil Lederer places the distinction at the centre of his intervention. He argues that the law under discussion is not the place to settle requirements for simple and qualified majorities, while insisting that certain representative groups must not be outvoted on certain questions. The passage offers a compact view of his procedural position: majority rule needs limits, and qualified-majority requirements must secure minority rights.
Who pays when privately owned coal mines pass into public ownership? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer tests compensation schemes against changing mine values and the burden on coal consumers. A long repayment period invites contested revaluations—and gives owners incentives to increase the sums owed to them. A short one risks loading repayment costs onto coal prices. Against a buyout financed by price surcharges, Lederer proposes using existing interest and entrepreneurial profits to service compensation under full socialization. His exchange with Rathenau sharpens a useful distinction: transferring ownership at once need not mean paying owners everything at once. The contribution exposes concrete financing difficulties behind the apparently simple promise to compensate former owners.
In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of Germany’s Socialisation Commission, Emil Lederer makes production volume the determinant of price. He then challenges his interlocutor’s ability to permit output on the scale attainable under free competition. The intervention captures a specific tension between output constraints and competitive production, without identifying the institutional constraint or developing a policy proposal.
Emil Lederer’s brief interjection in the coal-mining socialization commission proceedings adds a precise temporal qualification: “During the transition period!” Its interest lies in this small act of delimitation—restricting the point under discussion to a transitional interval rather than leaving it as a general claim. The recorded utterance does not identify the transition or explain Lederer’s reasoning; it preserves the qualification itself.
Does an obligation to deliver two million tonnes of coal each month rule out a different way of organizing the industry? In this brief intervention in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer challenges that inference. Assuming the Spa agreement has been concluded as reported, he argues that it binds the proposed German Coal Community just as it binds private enterprises and syndicates. His point is not that these organizations are equally efficient, but that the delivery obligation alone cannot disqualify one of them. The exchange offers a compact example of institutional reasoning: Lederer separates what an external agreement requires from who must carry it out.
A tentative suggestion with a categorical boundary: in this brief recorded intervention in the coal-mining socialization commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer proposes excluding ancillary operations as a general rule. He invokes earlier discussion without restating it, offering a practical way forward rather than an extended justification. The turn lets readers examine the precise form of his proposal—cautious about finding agreement, firm about the proposed exclusion—while leaving unspecified the framework from which these operations would be excluded.
A single remark, followed by recorded laughter, constitutes this complete interjection by Emil Lederer in the coal-mining deliberations of the Socialization Commission published in 1920. He says that an unnamed group unfortunately did not succeed. Neither the group nor its undertaking is identified in the extract. Its interest lies in the contrast between that terse statement of failure and the amusement it elicited—a small trace of an exchange, not a developed position on coal mining.
When does coal revenue become a surplus rather than a claim of the treasury? In this brief recorded intervention in the Socialization Commission’s coal-mining deliberations, Emil Lederer defends a precise distinction: part of the coal price may flow to the Reich as tax, but necessary depreciation and new investment must also be provided for before the remainder counts as surplus. Acknowledging that the declaration may be contestable under current circumstances, he explains the law’s purpose as preventing all surpluses from being treated in advance solely as tax receipts. The passage offers a compact view of how an accounting definition can preserve a distinction between support for public finances, provision for production, and a separate use for the remainder.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining socialization commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer proposes deferring the matter under discussion. Its interest lies in the modest procedural act it preserves: the collective “we” expresses an intention to postpone, but does not establish agreement. The statement documents Lederer’s participation without revealing what was deferred, why, or his substantive position on coal mining.
What must legislation specify about compensation, rather than leave unstated? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer insists that the form of compensation belongs in the text. He then reads § 5, requiring Reich government approval for coal-price decisions. The record offers a precise glimpse of his attention to legislative wording: readers can distinguish his proposed addition from the provision he reads, without mistaking either for a developed account of his preferred compensation scheme or his position on price control.
A ceiling on coal production is not an obligation to produce. In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer makes that distinction concrete: participation shares can specify how much each mine may extract without prescribing how much it must extract. Drawing on the coal syndicate’s practice of leaving output unrestricted when demand absorbed all production at prevailing prices, he rejects compulsory mine-level targets while allowing for a future limit on total extraction. The passage offers a precise glimpse of a regulatory problem: how to divide permitted output among mines without turning permission into a command.