The archive.

When the state reserves an industry to itself, are its earnings simply another tax? This distinction anchors Carl Menger’s review of Otto Gerlach’s revision of the fifth edition of Wilhelm Roscher’s System der Finanzwissenschaft. Menger welcomes the edition’s greater practical usefulness but challenges Gerlach’s classification of state monopoly receipts as indirect taxes. Excluding private enterprise, he argues, secures returns for the state through a mechanism distinct from taxation—even when a monopoly also facilitates tax surcharges. His qualified defence of Roscher makes this more than an assessment of editorial improvements: the review shows why the source of public income matters, and how apparently tidy fiscal categories can obscure the economic arrangements that generate it.

Must wartime price increases be reversed before foreign trade can recover? In this review of Robert Liefmann’s study of monetary expansion, Alfred Amonn challenges that prescription by distinguishing exchange-rate stability from restoration of a lower price level. He accepts that new money raises prices through incomes and demand, but disputes Liefmann’s claim to have discovered this mechanism. His sharper objection concerns causation: he treats rising domestic prices and currency depreciation as parallel effects of monetary expansion, rather than the former as the cause of the latter. The review offers a compact encounter with economic criticism in practice, showing why higher import prices measured in marks do not, in Amonn’s argument, necessarily mean paying more in goods or labor.

A common customs frontier does not imply a common economic interest. In this 1902 article, Eugen von Philippovich examines tariff negotiations in a monarchy whose economic unity depends on a renewable agreement between Austria and Hungary. His revealing example is grain protection: Hungary’s agricultural exporters can benefit from import duties because the shared customs territory has become a net grain importer, leaving Austrian consumers to bear higher food costs. By tracing such conflicts through constitutional procedures and organised pressure on bureaucracies, Philippovich shows why tariff policy cannot be read simply from parliamentary decisions. Germany’s proposed tariff adds an external constraint, encouraging even export interests to support retaliatory bargaining measures. The article offers a concrete account of how internal distributional struggles can turn hopes of commercial cooperation into competitive protectionism.

A brief private note, written two days before Christmas 1937, catches Alfred Schütz in an ordinary moment between his phenomenological labors. Just back from Paris, he has carried home an issue of the Revue de Paris for its essay by Paul Valéry, which he presses on his correspondent with the request that it be returned once read. He adds a book as a Christmas gift, should the friend not already own it, and sends warm wishes to him and his wife. Slight in itself, the letter survives as a small biographical trace of the émigré scholar's Parisian ties and reading life on the eve of war—a fragment of correspondence rather than a work of theory.

A stronger krone need not mean a richer Austria. In this article, Alfred Amonn challenges the demand for currency appreciation by separating money’s numerical value from the goods and services it can command. Against Emanuel Hugo Vogel, he argues that raising the exchange rate cannot create purchasing resources for the country; it can, however, redistribute income toward creditors while disrupting production. His alternative—stable domestic purchasing power—also presents a practical difficulty: Austria’s controlled prices, fiscal deficit, and delayed inflationary effects make existing monetary relationships unsuitable for immediate stabilization. The article connects a precise dispute over the aim of monetary policy with the difficult sequencing of reconstruction, showing why fiscal repair and price adjustment must, in Amonn’s account, precede durable stability.

What evidence should ground an account of the earliest economic institutions? In this brief English-language review of W. Koppers’s Die Anfänge des menschlichen Gemeinschaftslebens, Eugen Peter Schwiedland approaches ethnology from a question pursued in his own Political Economy: how economic life began. He welcomes Koppers’s treatment of property alongside family, religion and other forms of communal life, but his strongest endorsement concerns method. Historically descriptive research, he argues, offers an alternative to philosophical sociology’s excessive reliance on imagination. Without testing that claim through detailed examples, the review records Schwiedland’s clear preference for ethnological evidence as a foundation for studying economic origins.

Greater need does not necessarily give a worker greater power to demand higher pay: family responsibilities may instead make leaving a poorly paid job harder. This tension anchors Richard Schüller’s account of workers’ demands as conditions for accepting employment, rather than wishes or a fixed subsistence minimum. He examines how savings, information, mobility and union support turn preferences into effective bargaining power. His distinctive claim is that the poorest workers do not automatically set wage levels: employers must also meet the demands of workers whose services they cannot replace. Readers can discover why partial unionization may matter, why dangerous work need not command a premium, and why labour supply depends on the terms offered. Schüller’s racial and national stereotypes also expose limits in his comparative analysis.

Salaried employees could strike, bargain collectively, and acknowledge a conflict with employers without abandoning their claims to middle-class distinction. This tension anchors Emil Lederer’s study of German private-sector employees after November 1918. Drawing on technical and commercial associations, salary agreements, and disputes over workplace representation, he distinguishes the adoption of union methods from conversion to socialism. Inflation eroded welfare funds, while comparisons with skilled workers’ earnings challenged assumptions of salaried superiority; yet occupational pride and nationalist allegiances persisted. Lederer treats revolution as an opening for collective action, not merely a consequence of economic decline. His account shows why increasingly similar employment interests could sustain sharply different political loyalties—and why organizational change cannot be read directly as a change in social identity.

A workshop can pass between generations; a salary lasts only as long as employment. Emil Lederer makes this difference in temporal horizon central to his account of modern economic dependence. In this essay, first published in 1918/19 and reprinted here in 1979, insecurity concerns not only how much people earn, but how far into the future they can organize their lives and sustain attachments. His comparison of proprietors, civil servants, salaried employees, and workers gives the psychology of modern life a specific economic foundation. Insurance sharpens the distinction: a pension can extend an income without restoring control over productive resources. The essay poses a demanding question for social reform: can greater security or collective ownership also give individuals a durable connection to the material foundations of their lives?

German trade unions emerged from the revolution of 1918 with more members, legal recognition, and greater influence—but no settled answer to what their new power should achieve. In this critical survey, Emil Lederer examines the tension between bargaining within capitalism and preparing to transform production. He tests institutional gains against their economic substance: inflation eroded wage increases and strike funds, while employer–union cooperation could secure recognition without altering private ownership. Works councils sharpened a further conflict, representing entire workforces rather than the members of voluntary unions. Lederer’s distinctive concern is how these organizational arrangements shaped competing ideas of socialism and class struggle. His analysis shows why stronger labor institutions could simultaneously stabilize existing economic relations and generate demands to overturn them.

War can impoverish an economy while enriching its owners. In this 1918/19 article, Emil Lederer examines that tension principally through Germany’s wartime experience, distinguishing depleted productive resources from growing monetary claims on future output. Agricultural receipts can rise as harvests shrink; industrial reserves can conceal equipment consumed without replacement; higher wages need not secure workers a lasting share in recovery. Reading prices, company accounts, and wage statistics against material shortages, Lederer asks who will command reconstruction—not merely how production will resume. His analysis also challenges the equation of extensive state regulation with an end to capitalism: rationing still leaves access dependent on money. The result is a concrete account of how wartime gains can become durable economic power even when the productive basis of wealth has deteriorated.

Advertising joins business technique to psychological influence: this is Schwiedland’s starting point in his brief English-language review of the third enlarged edition of Victor Mataja’s Die Reklame. Noting advertising’s expanding political uses, he commends Mataja’s scientific approach and impartial assessment of its forms and effects. The interest lies in what Schwiedland singles out for approval: an inquiry that considers advertising’s educational and enlightening potential alongside its economic results. This compact endorsement shows the criteria by which he welcomes advertising as a subject of systematic study, without offering specific findings or a developed critique.