4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Public control need not mean direct public operation: that distinction takes concrete form in the draft provisions Emil Lederer reads in this brief recorded contribution to the 1920 Socialization Commission’s coal deliberations. Municipalities would assume responsibility for household fuel while retaining cooperatives or retailers as distributing agencies. A parallel balance governs remuneration: fixed pay, participation in returns and performance bonuses must leave the principal part of income secure at competent average performance. Rather than a separate argument by Lederer, this speaking turn records proposed institutional arrangements. It offers a precise glimpse of how coal socialization could combine public responsibility, commercial intermediaries and incentives constrained by income security.
In this brief recorded turn from the coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer reads two proposed provisions on managerial authority and employment. Each district would come under a general director; senior managers would hold fixed-term private employment contracts, with fixed pay and a share of net profit benchmarked against private-industry rates. The passage offers a concrete glimpse of how hierarchical management and commercial remuneration could be incorporated into plans for socialization. It records the provisions Lederer presented, not his justification or endorsement of them.
What can an operation’s recorded profit tell us about how well it is managed? In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer points to accounting prices fixed for individual quality classes. Operations within the same category, he observes, can show higher or lower accounting profits even under equal or poorer management. The turn captures a precise caution: recorded profitability need not provide a straightforward measure of managerial performance.
Does a proposed principle add anything to existing pay arrangements? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer asks whether the allocation of piecework earnings and bonuses already covers the principle under discussion. His practical grounds are precise: bonuses, he observes, are already awarded according to mining output. The speaking turn offers a compact example of Lederer testing a proposed formulation against established remuneration practices. It preserves the question, not its resolution: neither the principle’s full wording nor a reply appears in this unit.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer names bonuses as the general form of a payment mechanism. The remark offers a narrowly focused glimpse of his contribution to the exchange: it identifies the mechanism but leaves its purpose and recipients unstated. Its documentary interest lies in that precise distinction, not in any broader position on coal mining that the sentence alone could establish.
Would the great majority of workers really reject participation in the returns of coal mining? In this single recorded question from the socialization commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer asks Wissell to clarify whether that is indeed his view. The pressure falls on the breadth of the claim: not merely opposition among some workers, but rejection by their overwhelming majority. This brief intervention lets readers examine how an assertion about workers’ collective preferences is challenged in deliberation, without supplying Wissell’s answer or establishing Lederer’s own position on the proposed arrangement.
Does socializing coal production make economic performance merely a technical question? In this brief recorded intervention in the coal-mining commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer challenges Rathenau’s answer through a concrete accounting example: mines assigned the same coal transfer price can still produce different operating results. Savings in materials and changes in organization remain economically significant even when price increases are excluded. For Lederer, those results could provide a basis for bonuses to directors, workers, and salaried employees—though whether such bonuses are desirable is a separate question. The exchange offers a compact view of a precise disagreement within socialization debates: why technical efficiency cannot, by itself, determine economic success when values change between accounting periods.
In this single-sentence contribution to the coal-mining socialization commission’s published proceedings of 1920, Emil Lederer declines to pursue a debate: an adequate response, he says, would require an entire lecture course. The recorded turn offers no substantive position on coal mining and does not identify the disputed issue. Its interest is narrower: it preserves the moment when a participant marks the limits of what he can explain within the discussion.
Die Debatte darüber kann ich jetzt nicht führen, ich müßte sonst ein ganzes Kolleg halten.
English translation: “I cannot conduct the debate on that now; otherwise I would have to give an entire lecture course.”
A wage increase can explain a higher coal price—but what justifies adding another 60 percent? In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal-mining proceedings of Germany’s Socialisation Commission, Emil Lederer accepts the direct calculation and questions the surcharge. His concern is timing: higher coal prices may eventually raise the cost of machinery and pit timber, but those later effects do not obviously warrant an immediate addition. Separate claims for increased capital costs prompt a further suspicion that the same factor may be counted twice. The passage offers a compact example of economic scrutiny conducted through a precise question, distinguishing an accepted cost increase from assumptions still requiring justification.
A late submission is not evidence of what a completed report contains. In this two-sentence intervention in the 1920 coal-mining socialisation commission proceedings, Emil Lederer corrects the chronology: the submission arrived only after the report had been finished, and the matter was absent from the theses themselves. His contribution offers a precise procedural distinction, useful for readers tracing which materials informed the commission’s documents, without judging the submission’s merits.
Workers fighting workers pose a difficulty for any account of revolution as a straightforward confrontation between classes. Written in January 1919 and published unchanged in 1920, Emil Lederer’s essay examines that difficulty within the German revolution. He traces how military discipline, trade-union organization, and hopes of modest advancement had shaped workers’ loyalties before war disrupted their livelihoods and expectations. For Lederer, shared economic position does not automatically produce a common political purpose: rival socialist slogans express different experiences of the same upheaval. His contrast between socialism centred on established organizations and socialism demanding immediate council power lets readers examine why revolutionary conflict can divide a class before that class discovers a coherent basis for action.
Wir haben das Beispiel einer tiefgreifenden Auseinandersetzung innerhalb derselben Klasse, aber keinen Klassenkampf.
English translation: “We have an example of a profound conflict within the same class, but not a class struggle.”
Transferring industry into public ownership does not by itself make economic life democratic. In this two-installment newspaper essay of 1920, Emil Lederer argues that postwar reconstruction requires socialization while confronting two obstacles: dependence on a still-capitalist economy and the danger of bureaucratic paralysis. His case for beginning with mining, forestry, and large landed estates rests on their relative resilience against financial obstruction, not their supposed suitability for rule-bound administration. Equally pointed is his criticism of joint representative bodies in which entrepreneurs retain the expertise and information needed to control decisions. The essay offers a concrete account of why formal representation can fall short of self-government—and why, for Lederer, collective ownership must foster economic initiative rather than merely create new authorities.