4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
In this brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of Germany’s Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer doubts that a unified vote can be reached on the point under discussion. The transcript immediately registers objections and interjections: even his assessment of the prospects for agreement meets resistance. The disputed issue and Lederer’s reasons remain unspecified. This small documentary source offers a precise glimpse of procedural friction, rather than a statement of his substantive position on coal mining.
A reserved share of council seats need not measure workers’ actual influence: this is Emil Lederer’s reason for opposing an increase in their designated 25% representation on the proposed Reich Coal Council. In this brief intervention in the 1920 Socialization Commission deliberations, he expects workers also to enter through consumer representation and parliamentary appointments. His treatment of executive powers is similarly attentive to institutional detail: budgetary and procedural oversight, he argues, already leaves the Reich Coal Directorate the independence needed to manage effectively. The contribution offers a compact example of Lederer reasoning through the difference between formal categories and practical authority, rather than treating either worker representation or administrative autonomy as a simple numerical or legal formula.
In this single-sentence intervention in the coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer adds municipalities, the association of cities, and consumer cooperatives to a category under discussion. The category itself is not preserved in this extracted speaking turn. Its interest lies in the concrete institutions Lederer names: a brief clarification that brings municipal and cooperative bodies within the discussion’s scope, without supplying a wider argument about their role.
Protecting coal consumers need not mean giving them control: that is the tension in Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Socialization Commission’s deliberations, published in 1920. Answering fears of producer dominance, he argues that producers’ pricing freedom depends on abnormal market conditions and could diminish as world-market prices take effect. Yet he also recognizes that management and workers might combine into a monopoly harmful to the wider economy. His proposed safeguard is counterweight, not consumer supremacy: balanced representation should force compromise. This recorded speaking turn offers a compact view of institutional design under economic uncertainty, including Lederer’s explicit admission that no arrangement can guarantee decisions will never injure consumers.
Who should speak for the public in a socialized coal industry? In this brief intervention in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer distinguishes ownership by the community from ownership by mine workers alone. His practical concern is how to represent competing interests without pretending they can disappear. Government influence over coal prices, he argues, requires parliamentary accountability; a supposedly neutral panel requires impartiality that technical expertise cannot guarantee. He therefore prefers an arrangement that gives opposing parties enough power to compel cooperation. The intervention offers a concise encounter with socialization as a problem of institutional design: how public ownership can be served by negotiated compromise rather than entrusted to an assumed disinterested authority.
Who would sit on the Reich Coal Council? In this brief recorded question from the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer asks whether the draft under discussion specifies the council’s composition. His intervention offers no preferred membership or wider policy argument; it isolates an apparent gap in the proposal. The documentary interest lies in this precise demand for clarification: readers encounter Lederer testing what an institutional draft actually says about who would constitute its governing body.
In this single recorded question from the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks whether the matter under discussion is left to procedural rules or to decisions of the Reich Coal Council. His intervention draws attention to a precise institutional distinction: what rules determine and what the council may decide. The matter itself and the reply are absent from this extracted speaking turn; its interest lies in Lederer’s brief demand for clarification, not in a developed coal-policy argument.
Who has authority to transfer the coal industry: the Reich Coal Council or the legislature? In this brief recorded intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s deliberations, Emil Lederer identifies an ambiguity between two guiding principles. One permits the Council to decide on earlier expropriation; the other assigns determination of the complete transfer to the legislature. Rather than assume a contradiction, he asks whether the two provisions refer to different transfers. The passage offers a precise instance of scrutiny directed at a reform proposal’s wording: the allocation of decision-making power depends on clarifying what, exactly, is being transferred.
An opening balance sheet can serve different purposes: establishing operating costs is not the same as deciding compensation. In this brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer presses that distinction against ambiguous drafting. He sees the proposed thirty-year repayment arrangement as obscuring a compensation problem shared by competing drafts, and questions giving decisive authority to the Reich Economic Council before its functioning can be assessed. The interest of this small documentary source lies in Lederer’s precise objection: accounting terminology must not blur the boundary between objectively ascertainable costs and decisions about compensation.
Who would sit on the Reich Coal Council? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer makes membership the decisive point of disagreement. He refuses to join Professor Lindemann’s position because Rathenau’s proposed council would still include entrepreneurs, unlike the proposal Lederer supports. The single speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of an institutional fault line: competing schemes differed not merely in what the council would do, but in who would participate in it. It records Lederer’s objection without supplying the full alternative scheme.
Who represents coal-industry capital when socialization is under discussion? In this brief recorded commission intervention, Emil Lederer points to the presence of leading capitalists, either personally or through close associates. Rathenau’s interruption challenges the distinction between their side and Lederer’s; Lederer invokes expropriation in reply. The exchange offers a compact glimpse of how ownership complicates claims about representation.
A voting threshold can carry an economic policy choice. In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer explains the two-thirds majority requirement by recalling an intention not to allow new private enterprises to emerge. His account links the rule to discussion of the Kraemer draft; Rathenau’s printed interjection signals agreement. The passage offers a compact example of how a participant justified procedure through a substantive economic aim, without specifying the rule’s precise application or setting out a broader programme for coal mining.