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The Complete “Austrian School of Economics” Collection


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4,366 works (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.

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193–204 of 294 matches · 4,366 works total (including 487 books, 3,476 articles and 400 historical documents)Page 17 of 25; every summary opens into its work.
  1. 1964
    The Theory of Complex Phenomena

    The Theory of Complex Phenomena

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 10 sections

    No inquiry begins from bare fact: without a prior sense of what to look for, even patient observation of raw data yields nothing intelligible. From this premise Hayek builds a defence of pattern prediction. He separates simple phenomena, where a few variables permit exact forecasts, from complex phenomena—life, mind, society—where the relevant elements multiply beyond any hope of ascertaining them, so that theory can predict only classes of patterns rather than particular events. Darwinian natural selection becomes his model case: rigorous and falsifiable, yet unable to specify which species will arise. Statistics cannot rescue us, he warns, since it suppresses the very structural relations that make complex wholes what they are. Scientific maturity lies in recognising the boundaries of prediction rather than imitating the methods of simpler domains.

    But there seems to exist a fairly easy and adequate way to measure the degree of complexity of different kinds of abstract patterns.

  2. 1965
    Die Anschauungen der Mehrheit und die zeitgenössische Demokratie

    Die Anschauungen der Mehrheit und die zeitgenössische Demokratie

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 6 sections

    No identifiable majority, Hayek contends, ever wanted many of the results modern democratic politics produces, which is precisely why blaming the majority misses the disease. The trouble is that representative assemblies now perform two incompatible tasks at once: laying down general rules of justice and directing the concrete business of government. Once every parliamentary resolution counts as law merely because a legislature passed it, the older ideal of law as an impartial, universal norm dissolves, and party coalitions trade privileges among organized interests. Popular sovereignty he calls a rationalist superstition, the assumption that some unlimited power must exist somewhere. His remedy is a bicameral order with one chamber elected on long, staggered, nonrenewable terms and confined solely to general rules, insulated from the bargaining that governs administration.

    Sie ist die Grundlage, die ein friedliches Zusammenleben der Menschen in der Gesellschaft und einen friedlichen Wechsel der Personen, die organisierte Gewalt ausüben, möglich macht.

    English translation: “It is the foundation that makes possible a peaceful coexistence of people in society and a peaceful change of the persons who exercise organized force.”

  3. 1965
    Kinds of Rationalism

    Kinds of Rationalism

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 8 sections

    When general terms like 'planning,' 'social,' and 'positive' are narrowed into political slogans, the same fate threatens 'rationalism' itself, and it is that word Hayek sets out to rescue in this 1965 lecture, delivered in Japan and reprinted here. His quarrel is not with reason but with what he names rationalist constructivism: the Cartesian conceit, running from Bacon and Hobbes through Descartes to Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx, that useful institutions must be deliberately invented and remade from explicit premises. From this hubris, he argues, all modern socialism, planning, and totalitarianism derive. Against it he sets a modest, critical tradition of Hume, Smith, Menger, and Popper, in which reason is itself a product of evolved civilization, transmitted through language and unarticulated rules, and freedom under law becomes an instrument for using knowledge no single mind commands.

    Reason is like a dangerous explosive which, handled cautiously, will be most beneficial, but if handled incautiously may blow up a civilization.

  4. 1965
    The Austrian School of Economics

    The Austrian School of Economics

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 7 sections

    For Hayek, the Austrian school’s achievement was not simply discovering marginal utility, but explaining value through the choices people make among competing uses of scarce resources. This 2013 collection chapter, incorporating revised encyclopedia material, asks why that insight proved transformative—and why its success could make a distinct school disappear. Writing as both historian and participant, Hayek presents Menger’s legacy as a shared approach rather than a fixed doctrine: Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser developed it in markedly different directions. Readers can discover why subjective valuation is not yet an explanation of prices, and how intellectual disagreement helped shape a tradition whose principles, Hayek argues, became part of general economic theory.

    A school has its greatest success when it ceases as such to exist because its leading ideals have become a part of the general dominant teaching.

  5. 1966
    Personal Recollections of Keynes and the 'Keynesian Revolution'

    Personal Recollections of Keynes and the 'Keynesian Revolution'

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 5 sections

    Keynes made an unforgettable impression even on those who could never accept his monetary theories, and Hayek, friend since their 1928 meeting and sparring partner after his 1931 move to London, begins here in that key of admiration. But recollection turns to reckoning. Recalling his laborious review of the Treatise on Money, only for Keynes to change his mind, Hayek explains why he never mounted a comparable assault on the General Theory, and locates his true objection not in any detail but in the whole macroeconomic approach. The Keynesian Revolution's lasting effect, he contends, was to elevate measurable aggregates over the relative prices and capital structures through which an economy actually coordinates, encouraging a sophisticated inflationism by assuming resources everywhere lie unused. He predicts the episode will one day appear a temporary aberration.

    But the assumption that all goods and factors are available in excess makes the whole price system redundant, undetermined and unintelligible.

  6. 1966
    The Principles of a Liberal Social Order

    The Principles of a Liberal Social Order

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 7 sections

    Freedom, on this account, depends far less on who holds power than on how far power may reach. Reconstructing classical liberalism as a theory of law-governed order, Hayek separates the English Old Whig tradition of Hume, Smith and Acton from the Continental constructivism he traces to Rousseau and the French Revolution, and insists that liberalism and democracy answer entirely different questions. He renames the market a catallaxy to dispel the fiction that society is one great household with shared ends, grounds liberty in private property and general rules of just conduct, and dismisses 'social' or distributive justice as nonsense in an order where no one distributes. First delivered to the Mont Pelerin Society in 1966, the paper closes on the three great negatives that must govern all coercion: peace, justice and liberty.

    Liberalism and democracy, although compatible, are not the same. The first is concerned with the extent of governmental power, the second with who holds this power.

  7. 1967
    Dr. Bernard Mandeville

    Dr. Bernard Mandeville

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 5 sections

    Notorious in his own century as a satirist who declared private vices public benefits, Bernard Mandeville is recovered here, in the German translation of Hayek's 1966 British Academy lecture, not as an economist but as a profound psychologist of human nature. The scandalous paradox of The Fable of the Bees, Hayek argues, is the lesser insight; the greater is that complex social order arises from actions that pursue private aims while intending none of the larger outcomes they produce. Mandeville thus becomes an early theorist of spontaneously grown institutions, law, morality, language, money, markets, against the seventeenth-century rationalism of Descartes and Hobbes. The essay traces a line of descent from Mandeville through Hume and Adam Smith to Ferguson's formula about results of human action but not human design, and onward to Darwin.

    Ich befürchte, die meisten Zeitgenossen von Bernard Mandeville würden sich im Grabe umdrehen, wüßten sie, daß er der Britischen Akademie inzwischen als »master mind« gilt.

    English translation: “I fear that most of Bernard Mandeville's contemporaries would turn in their graves if they knew that he is now regarded by the British Academy as a "master mind".”

  8. 1967
    Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and the Social Sciences in Vienna

    Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and the Social Sciences in Vienna

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections · Translation of the 1967 original

    Mach’s influence on Hayek took an unexpected form: his attack on metaphysics helped Hayek question the foundations of Mach’s own psychology. In this brief symposium contribution, presented in English translation, Hayek recalls his student years in Vienna before the formation of the Vienna Circle. Mach offered a resource for clarifying what counted as scientific explanation, without requiring allegiance to positivism or to its socialist advocates. The sharpest example is Hayek’s rejection of “simple and pure sensations” as the elements of perception—a criticism that helped set him on the path toward The Sensory Order. This personal testimony lets readers distinguish intellectual influence from doctrinal agreement, while tracing a concrete connection between Hayek’s early psychological interests and his later methodological concerns.

  9. 1967
    Indonesia: The Generals

    Indonesia: The Generals

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 1 sections

    An overstaffed civil service cannot be adequately paid, yet dismissing its educated employees may threaten political stability. This dilemma anchors Hayek’s brief 1967 letter to the Sunday Times, republished here in 2022. Returning from Djakarta, he supplements Henry Brandon’s reporting with a sympathetic account of Indonesia’s governing generals: he stresses their varied professional origins and presents corruption as a problem constrained by the bureaucracy inherited from Sukarno. The letter offers a sharply bounded encounter with Hayek’s political judgement—how he frames the relationship between administrative reform and preserving order. The later editorial note supplies context about Suharto’s regime that is distinct from Hayek’s own defence of the rulers’ position.

  10. 1967
    Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct: The Interplay between Rules of Individual Conduct and the Social Order of Actions

    Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct: The Interplay between Rules of Individual Conduct and the Social Order of Actions

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 3 sections

    Hayek draws a distinction that, once stated, seems obvious yet is constantly confused: the rules an individual follows are not the same thing as the order of actions that emerges when many follow them. A rule may be innate or learned, genetic or cultural, and need never be consciously known; what natural selection tests is not the isolated rule but the viability of the whole group order it helps sustain. Moving from the flight patterns of geese and insect division of labour to kinship, property, and succession, he shows coordination arising without any actor grasping the design. He calls the theoretical reconstruction of such processes conjectural history, aligns social science with biology and geology rather than mechanics, and, invoking Mandeville, Hume, and Smith, defends explanation by function without any designing purpose.

    Norms are thus an adaptation to a factual regularity on which we depend but which we know only partially and on which we can count only if we observe those norms.

  11. 1967
    Rechtsordnung und Handelnsordnung

    Rechtsordnung und Handelnsordnung

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 12 sections

    Behind the single German word Rechtsordnung, Hayek finds two things habitually run together: the order of legal rules and the Handelnsordnung, the order of actions that arises when people follow them. Written in German across twelve sections, the essay defines order as a factual relation among recurring elements that lets us form reliable expectations from partial knowledge, with no ordering will required. The market is his central case: it solves the problem of using more knowledge than any single mind possesses, adjusting through prices by what he calls, borrowing from cybernetics, negative feedback. From this he mounts a sustained assault on 'social' justice, on Carl Schmitt's concrete-order thinking, and on the welfare state's drift from private-law rules toward public-law command, arguing that only human conduct, never an unintended outcome, can be called just or unjust.

    Gerecht oder ungerecht kann nur menschliches Verhalten oder dessen beabsichtigte Ergebnisse sein, aber nicht eine bloße Tatsache, die niemand absichtlich herbeigeführt hat oder herbeiführen könnte.

    English translation: “Only human conduct, or its intended results, can be just or unjust, but not a mere fact that no one has intentionally brought about or could have brought about.”

  12. 1967
    The Constitution of a Liberal State

    The Constitution of a Liberal State

    Friedrich August von Hayek · 2 sections

    The separation of powers, the founders' chosen guard for liberty, has failed, hollowed out, Hayek argues, once law came to mean whatever a legislature enacts rather than a particular kind of rule. First published in Il Politico, this essay locates the deeper error in the doctrine of sovereignty: the assumption that ultimate power must be unlimited because power can be checked only by another power. Against Rousseau, legal positivism, and unlimited majority rule, he revives the distinction between law as an abstract rule of just conduct and command aimed at chosen outcomes. His remedy splits the assembly in two, a partisan governmental chamber for services and budgets, a nonparty lawmaking chamber for universal rules, and, illustrating the design through taxation, names the result demarchy.

    In the last resort it rests on the misconception that the ultimate ‘sovereign’ power must be unlimited, because, it is thought, power can be checked only by another power.

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