4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Should representation in coal mining be organized solely by territory, or should occupational representatives also have a place? In this brief intervention from the Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer challenges their exclusion without offering a rival institutional blueprint. His emphasis is practical: having stated their competing positions, commission members should examine Werner’s proposals, contribute arguments, and work through specific questions. The recorded speaking turn offers a compact view of Lederer’s approach to deliberation—keeping a substantive disagreement open while urging colleagues to move from declarations of principle to collaborative scrutiny.
Does worker representation require a separate organization at every level of coal-industry governance? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer argues that the answer depends on who already sits within the governing bodies. Against Werner’s concern about a cumbersome hierarchy, he distinguishes an authority confronting workers from a council in which they themselves exercise influence. Supporting Wissell’s simpler arrangement, Lederer treats an additional workers’ apex body as a practical choice rather than an indispensable safeguard. The exchange offers a concrete glimpse of socialization as institutional design: seats, votes and electoral arrangements matter, but so does avoiding layers that obstruct decisions. His confidence in integrated representation leaves the allocation of powers as the question still to be settled.
Should works councils’ existing control over hiring and dismissal become a permanent legal right? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer argues that current practice rests on circumstances that may change: additional miners benefit both the industry and the wider economy, but expanded oil firing could eventually require fewer workers. His objection concerns not worker participation itself, but the conversion of an economically contingent arrangement into binding law. He places production and staffing policy within the Reich Coal Council, where workers can shape overall decisions, while questioning how far individual works councils should be able to challenge their implementation. The contribution offers a concrete distinction between participation in industry-wide planning and local authority over employment.
How far should a proposed provision reach? In this single-sentence intervention from the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer supports deleting paragraph 2 because it goes particularly far. The record offers a precise point of agreement within the deliberations, not a developed policy argument: readers can identify his objection to the provision’s reach, but neither the paragraph’s wording nor his broader position on coal-mining policy is supplied.
Emil Lederer’s brief speaking turn in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings concerns a procedural loose end: § 11 also needs amendment and should be discussed immediately. The interest lies in this insistence on leaving nothing unresolved. The record preserves a precise request to extend deliberation, but neither the provision’s content nor the proposed change—a useful distinction between evidence of procedural attention and evidence of a policy position.
An eight-day right to object to a manager’s appointment is the concrete issue in this brief intervention by Emil Lederer in the 1920 coal socialization commission proceedings. Quoting Werner’s proposed provision, Lederer identifies a limited form of worker influence: a works committee could challenge an appointment on grounds of harm to legitimate enterprise or workforce interests, with a Reich Coal Council committee deciding the objection. His focus is procedural consistency rather than a general defence or rejection of worker participation. Following Wissell’s interjection, he concludes that the provision must be deleted in light of an earlier resolution. The turn offers a precise glimpse of how proposed institutional rights could be undone by decisions already taken—without supplying the earlier resolution or establishing Lederer’s broader position.
Government approval of coal prices does not settle who shapes them. In this brief recorded intervention in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer answers Rathenau by insisting that the proposed Reich Coal Council’s powers must be read across the draft, not confined to its explicit competence clause. The price proposals themselves matter, he argues, especially if producers constitute two-thirds of the body submitting them, as Rathenau’s remarks indicate. The passage offers a precise distinction between formal authority to approve a price and institutional influence over the proposal placed before government.
“Do we know this law?” Emil Lederer’s complete speaking turn in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920 is a single question about the participants’ familiarity with the law under discussion. Its documentary interest lies in this request to establish shared knowledge before debate proceeds. Read on its own, it leaves both the law’s identity and Lederer’s intention unresolved: clarification and doubt are possible readings, not established positions.
How should compensation be fixed in a proposal to socialize coal mining? In this brief intervention recorded in the German Socialization Commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer suggests mentioning an alternative draft’s provision for determining compensation in advance. He also recalls his side’s proposed valuation: a benchmark tied to share-price movements, with a premium of 60–80%. The turn offers a concrete glimpse of how compensation could be built into a socialization proposal, while preserving the distinction between a proposed formula and an agreed settlement.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer identifies a dependency between present operations and future expropriation: while enterprises remain unexpropriated, their operational performance would determine the principles governing that change in ownership. The remark offers a precise point of entry into the problem of transition—how enterprises operate before expropriation may shape its terms. It leaves open both how performance would be assessed and which principles would follow.
Who should approve compensation when its recipients hold votes in the deciding body? In this brief intervention from the coal socialization commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer objects to draft wording that would leave approval of the opening balance sheet with the Reich Coal Council. Those to be compensated, he points out, hold 25 per cent of its votes. Declaring that he will not countersign the draft, Lederer exposes the distributive authority embedded in an apparently accounting procedure. This single recorded speaking turn offers a precise example of how a procedural clause can give beneficiaries a voice in determining their own compensation.
Does a draft reflect the discussion that preceded it, or merely repeat the first proposal? In this single recorded question from the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer asks whether the text incorporates views expressed in an earlier meeting with von Siemens. The brief intervention shows Lederer checking the relationship between consultation and drafting, without taking a substantive position on coal-mining policy. Its interest lies in that precise procedural distinction: a document placed before a commission need not embody the deliberations already held.