4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Automatic reimbursement of mining costs may reward the very increases it is meant to cover. In this brief intervention recorded in the coal-mining socialization commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer objects that rising production costs can increase profitability when every cost is reimbursed. His demand for a governing formula, left unspecified here, pinpoints a practical tension: covering expenditure is not the same as establishing a defensible rule for payment.
A small ambiguity in coal pricing is the focus of Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920: are sales surcharges necessarily percentage-based when the provision leaves their determination to the Reich Coal Council under “principles to be established”? Lederer acknowledges that wording but regards a different interpretation as scarcely conceivable. This short speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of the gap between what a provision explicitly states and what a participant assumes it must mean in practice.
Industrial ambition might support coal regulation—or turn against it. In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer questions whether firms’ conduct under exceptional circumstances can be expected to persist under ordinary conditions. He asks how a markup over production costs would affect their incentive to reduce costs, without assuming ill intent. Responding to Rathenau’s appeal to industrial ambition, he raises a sharper possibility: under the proposed regulation, firms might redirect that ambition toward demonstrating the scheme’s irrationality. The turn offers a compact example of Lederer testing institutional design against the financial incentives and psychological responses it could provoke.
Who should decide whether a loan opens the way to co-ownership—the enterprise receiving it or the Reich Coal Council granting it? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining socialization proceedings, Emil Lederer asks whether that choice should rest with the Council. His concern is a precise adjustment within the proposal under discussion, not a competing programme: lending discretion should allow the Council to decide whether to take on the associated co-ownership position. The question offers a compact glimpse of how the allocation of a single decision could affect control within a socialization scheme, although the options behind Lederer’s reference to a “second possibility” are not specified in this turn.
Does public investment have an independent scope, or only a role where private capital hesitates? In this single-sentence intervention in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer tests another participant’s formulation: it would leave the state a choice only in investments that entrepreneurs or the capital market are reluctant to undertake. His conditional phrasing identifies a restriction rather than endorsing it. The turn offers a precise glimpse of how the terms of a proposal can narrow public discretion without explicitly ruling it out.
How long must exceptional coal-market conditions last to justify the proposed form of regulation? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 proceedings of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer presses that question without offering a forecast of his own. He contrasts Vogelstein’s expectation of relatively early normalization, based on conversations with members of the Reich Coal Council, with Rathenau’s expectation of prolonged disruption. If Vogelstein’s account holds, Lederer suggests, it could count against the regulatory arrangement under discussion—but first its evidential basis must be established. This short exchange offers a precise instance of policy scrutiny: Lederer tests not merely what others expect, but whether their expectations are sound enough to support an institutional decision.
A buyout paid through annuities over thirty or forty years: this is the proposal Emil Lederer singles out in his brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining socialization proceedings. Welcoming the discussion’s turn toward questions of principle, he treats the financing arrangement as a matter for fundamental debate, not merely administrative detail. The speaking turn stops before he endorses or challenges the proposal. Its interest lies in that precise opening: readers encounter the terms on which socialization was being discussed, while seeing the distinction between a proposal Lederer reports and a position he has yet to state.
An exchange needs someone willing to receive what changes hands. In this single interjection from the official coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer presents that requirement as Dr. Hilferding’s point. The remark offers a compact glimpse of clarification within a live deliberation: calling a transaction an exchange does not settle the question of its recipient. It neither identifies the object exchanged nor establishes Lederer’s own agreement with Hilferding.
Where does the inflationary effect of a coal-mining financing proposal arise? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer locates it in the price increases intended to fund repayment. He contrasts that mechanism with full socialization, which, as he puts it, converts shares into bonds. The distinction offers a precise glimpse of his economic reasoning: the issue is how repayment is financed, not a general objection to socialization.
In den Preiserhöhungen erblicke ich die inflationistische Wirkung.
English translation: “I see the inflationary effect in the price increases.”
Can a proposal be faulted both for falling short of full socialization and for demanding something presently impossible? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer isolates that tension in Wissell’s criticism of the majority report. His opening surprise at Wissell’s and Vogelstein’s shared support for Rathenau’s proposals sharpens the issue: agreement among participants does not settle what their proposals mean. The recorded intervention ends mid-sentence, before Lederer develops his reply. It offers not an alternative programme but a precise glimpse of a dispute in which the definition of socialization and the limits of immediate action become competing grounds of criticism.
Can public supervision of coal mining overcome private owners’ power without changing ownership itself? In this resumed intervention from the Socialization Commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer argues that transparency and profit incentives leave entrepreneurs the stronger negotiating party. His critique of Rathenau’s alternative turns on concrete questions: who receives the gains created by uneven price increases, whether bonuses reward managers or shareholders, and how an uncertain timetable for ownership transfer affects both employers and workers. Lederer acknowledges capitalism’s capacity to encourage cheaper and greater production, but denies that reproducing those incentives amounts to socialization. The exchange offers a focused account of why identical administrative powers—especially authority over coal prices—can serve different purposes under different ownership arrangements.
When does practical caution become a defence of the status quo? In this recorded intervention in the coal-mining socialization commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer challenges Rathenau’s objections to the majority proposals without dismissing the need for workable institutions. His concrete test is whether a reform changes the direction of economic organization. Municipal electricity undertakings and Strasbourg’s administration supply examples for his argument that publicly accountable managers can earn authority through successful performance, rather than depending on private ownership. Differences between miners and workers in export industries, meanwhile, support differentiated implementation rather than uniform socialization. Rathenau’s preserved interjections let readers encounter the dispute directly: whether existing capacities should delimit reform, or whether a new organizing principle can change those capacities.